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The objective of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) is to provide useful in-
formation to the users of fi nancial statements to assist in making economic decisions. To be use-
ful, information has to be relevant and reliable, but the reliability of information suffers when 
the guidelines for the reporting of specifi c issues are not clear and managerial discretion arises. 
Write-offs are one of those accounting issues that are regularly related to earnings management. 
By now it is seen as common knowledge that write-offs, especially those on goodwill, do not 
refl ect declines in asset value; rather, they are used as a device to manipulate fi nancial reports. 
However, there is a striking lack of grounded theoretical research that can confi rm this assess-
ment. The aim of this dissertation is to provide valuable analytical and empirical insights on 
fi xed asset write-offs under IFRS. In a fi rst step, the practical implementation of IAS 36 in Europe 
has to be analyzed, which is best done empirically. Based on the fi ndings from these empirical 
surveys, the most substantial questions remaining are subject to an in-depth analytical discus-
sion. Since IAS 36 entails different measurement issues that have their origins in fi nance theo-
ry, this dissertation also aims to introduce some basic techniques from theoretical fi nance to 
accounting research. Lastly, as the analyses presented in this dissertation do not cover all open 
questions on fi xed asset write-offs, the author hopes to encourage further research on this im-
portant topic.
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1.1 Introduction
The objective of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) is to provide
useful information to the users of financial statements to assist in making economic
decisions.1 To be useful, information has to be relevant and reliable, but the reliability
of information suffers when the guidelines for the reporting of specific issues are not
clear and managerial discretion arises.
Write-offs are one of those accounting issues that are regularly related to earnings
management. By now it is seen as common knowledge that write-offs, especially those
on goodwill, do not reflect declines in asset value; rather, they are used as a device to
manipulate financial reports.2 However, there is a striking lack of grounded theoretical
research that can confirm this assessment.
Indeed, several of the requirements incorporated in IAS 36 Impairment of Assets
entail managerial discretion. Implementing an impairment test necessitates the calcu-
lation of the recoverable amount of the asset under consideration, which is defined as
the higher value of the fair value less costs to sell and the value in use. The fair value
less costs to sell is to be derived from an active market – which is in practice absent for
most assets. The value in use is to be calculated from corporate planning, discounting
the cash flows from further internal use and the disposal of the asset with a discount
rate that reflects market perceptions. Both estimating the fair value less costs to sell
if there is no market price and calculating the value in use introduce material room for
managerial discretion.
Some of this managerial discretion could be eliminated by a rigorous analytical dis-
1See paragraph 12 of the IFRS Framework.
2A recent survey by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) found that write-offs on
goodwill and other intangible assets do not seem to reflect the effects of the financial and economic
crises appropriately, see ESMA (2013).
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cussion of the rules presented by IAS 36. In particular, the definition of the value in use
urgently needs further elaboration. IAS 36 requires a pre-tax calculation, but a theo-
retically suitable model to fulfill this requirement has not yet been designed. Moreover,
analytical discussion related to asset write-offs is scarce. While there is an extensive
debate regarding the depreciation-problem3, write-offs remain virtually disregarded.4
A number of empirical studies regarding the determinants of fixed asset write-offs
have been conducted for the US market.5 Under different regulations regarding the
accounting for fixed asset write-offs, these studies find very different determinants of
the write-off decision. Some research has been done regarding the Australian market,6
but only very limited work has been done on Europe.7 As different regulations apply
in Europe and because the influence of national patterns on the write-off tendency is
hard to measure,8 the findings of existing research are not necessarily applicable to
European companies.
Furthermore, while empirical studies find that earnings management as well as de-
clines in asset values are important determinants of asset write-offs, they cannot answer
the question as to the circumstances under which earnings management is applied.
The aim of this dissertation is to provide valuable analytical and empirical insights on
3The depreciation problem describes the question of how much of an asset should be depreciated on
a regular basis; see, for example, Jackson (1911), Wright (1964) or Kim and Moore (1988).
4Goex and Wagenhofer (2009) analyze the optimal impairment rules in a game theoretical setting,
and there is an ongoing debate on the appropriate discount rate for the calculation of the value in
use (see Husmann and Schmidt (2008), Kvaal (2010) and Husmann and Schmidt (2011)), but none
of these studies answer the question of how the rules should be implemented.
5See, for example, Zucca and Campbell (1992) for an analysis of write-offs in the absence of respec-
tive regulations, Riedl (2004) for an analysis of asset write-offs under SFAS 121 Accounting for the
Impairment of Long-Lived Assets, and Beatty and Weber (2006) for an analysis of asset write-offs in
the SFAS 142 Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets adoption period.
6See, for example, Minnick (2011).
7AbuGhazaleh, Al-Hares and Roberts (2011) analyze goodwill write-offs in the United Kingdom.
8See Kvaal and Nobes (2012).
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fixed asset write-offs under IFRS. In a first step, the practical implementation of IAS 36
in Europe has to be analyzed, which is best done empirically. Based on the findings
from these empirical surveys, the most substantial questions remaining are subject to
an in-depth analytical discussion. Since IAS 36 entails different measurement issues
that have their origins in finance theory, this dissertation also aims to introduce some
basic techniques from theoretical finance to accounting research. Lastly, as the analyses
presented in this dissertation do not cover all open questions on fixed asset write-offs,
the author hopes to encourage further research on this important topic.
As depicted in Figure 1.1, the dissertation answers three main research questions.
The first research question is “What drives fixed asset write-offs, impairment or earn-
ings management?”. This question is addressed empirically by the two papers “Deter-
minants of the Write-Off Decision under IFRS: Evidence from Germany” and “What
Drives Companies? An Analysis of Fixed Asset Write-Offs in Europe in the Context of
Different Institutional Settings”. The second research question – “How are the rules of
IAS 36 to be implemented?” – is addressed by the analytical paper “A Critical Analy-
sis of the Requirements of IAS 36 – A Pre-Tax CAPM?”. The last research question –
“When does earnings management drive the write-off decision?” – is answered in the
analytical paper “A New Perspective on Fixed Asset Write-Offs – When is Earnings
Management Optimal”.
1.2 Overview of the Manuscripts
This dissertation contains four manuscripts that discuss very specific issues related to
fixed asset write-offs according to IAS 36. The basics of IAS 36 and the main problems
regarding its practical implementation are discussed in the paper “Der Impairment-Test
gemäß IAS 36: Problembereiche und Implikationen der Wirtschaftskrise”, published
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Figure 1.1: Structure of the dissertation manuscripts
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The first paper in this dissertation – “Determinants of the Write-Off Decision under
IFRS: Evidence from Germany” – empirically analyzes the factors that drive the write-
off decisions of German listed companies. As outlined above, as yet no empirical study
regarding write-offs in Germany has been conducted. The findings of existing studies
in different markets may not hold for German companies since they have to apply
differing accounting rules and operate in a very different institutional setting. The
aim of this paper is to close this research gap and identify the drivers of write-offs in
Germany.
To reach this goal, a sample of 165 German firms that were listed in the DAX,
MDAX, TecDax and SDAX indices between 2004 and 2010, comprising 805 firm-years,
is analyzed. As the write-off decision is a bivariate variable, a probit model is applied.
Three groups of independent variables are included in the analysis. The first group
contains variables measuring the firm performance and is supposed to proxy for the
probability that the firm has impaired assets. The second group of variables identifies
firm-years in which incentives for earnings management are expected to arise. Finally,
the third group comprises other variables that have previously been shown to have an
influence on write-offs.
This structure enables analysis of the general hypothesis that write-offs are driven by
both asset impairment and earnings management. The findings of the study support
this hypothesis as both factors are shown to be important determinants of the write-
off decision. The most significant result is that write-offs seem to be used to smooth
income.
The findings imply that the write-off behavior of German companies materially differs
from that of US companies, as big bath accounting and management changes have
7
regularly been found to be significant drivers for the write-offs of the latter.11 None of
these factors seems to have a significant influence in Germany. This difference could
derive either from the different accounting standards applied or from the different
institutional setting that companies operate in.
Additionally, these findings imply that the reporting of fixed asset write-offs is dis-
torted. The fact that income smoothing is applied means that the information content
of financial reports is reduced. Write-offs have been one of the main focus areas of
the Financial Reporting Enforcement Panel (FREP) since 2006.12 The findings of this
study indicate that write-offs are still used for earnings management, and that further
actions are necessary to ensure the provision of useful information regarding the value
of fixed assets.
This paper has been accepted for publication in the journal International Business
& Economics Research. The study is co-authored by Henning Zülch. The input of
the submitting doctoral candidate includes the development of the research question,
the preparation of the theoretical and empirical basis, the gathering of data and the
execution of empirical analyses as well as the respective interpretation and the issuance
of the draft paper. An earlier version of the paper was presented at the annual European
Accounting Association Conference 2011 in Rome. Furthermore, it was accepted for
presentation at the annual meeting of the American Accounting Association 2011 in
Denver, and at the Workshop on Empirical Research in Financial Accounting 2011 at
the University of Seville. Additionally, the most important implications for the users of
financial statements have been discussed in the article “Bilanzpolitik im Rahmen der
Entscheidung zur Erfassung einer Wertminderung gemäß IAS 36 - Empirische Analyse
11See for example Riedl (2004) or Beatty and Weber (2006).
12The main focus areas of the FREP can be inspected at http://www.frep.info/pruefverfahren/
pruefungsschwerpunkte_en.php.
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des Bilanzierungsverhaltens deutscher Unternehmen im Zeitraum 2004 - 2010” which
was published in the journal Corporate Finance biz in 2012.13
In the second manuscript – “What Drives Companies? An Analysis of Fixed Asset
Write-Offs in Europe in the Context of Different Institutional Settings” – the drivers
of the write-off decision and the respective magnitude of companies from the EU15
member states are analyzed. The contribution of this analysis to the write-off research
is threefold. First, as outlined above, empirical analyses regarding write-offs in Europe
are very scarce, and no study analyzing all European countries has been conducted to
date. Second, a methodological contribution is made by introducing a double hurdle
model to the analysis of write-offs, which is suited to simultaneous analysis of the
drivers of the write-off decision and the write-off magnitude. In previous research the
Tobit model has mostly been applied. The Cragg model, applied in this paper, has
the advantage of allowing for different influences at both stages of the determination
of write-offs, whereas for each determinant the Tobit model implies the same influence
on the write-off decision as on the write-off magnitude. Finally, to the best of the
author’s knowledge, no study covering a comparable number of countries has yet been
conducted. Therefore, this study is the first to provide empirical insight on the influence
of institutional settings on the write-off decision. The aim of this paper is to gain
an understanding of the mechanisms involved in the determination of write-offs and
to analyze the impact of asset impairment, earnings management and institutional
factors.
The sample used for this analysis comprises 1,300 companies and a total of 7,268
firm-year observations of companies that are domiciled in the EU15 member states.
It covers the period from 2005 to 2011. As stated above, the Cragg model is applied.
13See Siggelkow and Zülch (2012).
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This model analyzes the write-off decision as a bivariate variable at the first stage, and
the write-off magnitude as a logarithmized ratio of the write-off to the previous year
total assets at the second stage. As independent variables, basically the same groups
as for the analysis of the German setting are applied: a group of variables measuring
firm performance to proxy for the probability that the firm holds impaired assets, a
group of variables identifying periods that suggest earnings management, and a group
of control variables that measure those effects that have previously been shown to
influence write-offs. Building on the findings of the first analysis comprising firms from
all countries, three country clusters developed by Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003) are
used to classify the companies involved and analyze differences in the mechanisms that
drive write-offs.
The general hypothesis of this paper, as for the German setting, is that write-offs
are driven by asset impairment as well as by earnings management. Additionally, it
is assumed that the drivers of write-offs vary based on the institutional setting within
which the company operates. The findings of the study support the hypotheses. It
is found that while the decision to recognize a write-off is mainly driven by asset im-
pairment, the decision regarding the amount that is written off is materially influenced
by earnings management as well. In particular, support for big bath accounting and
income smoothing is found. Regarding the country clusters, the results of the study in-
dicate that there are different drivers of fixed asset write-offs; the most significant result
indicates that the write-off magnitude is used for earnings management in countries
with high investor protection.
There are two important implications of these findings. First, they support the
assessment that in European countries applying IAS 36, write-offs do not exclusively
reflect economic declines in asset values; rather, they are used to manage earnings. Sec-
ond, they show that the harmonization which was the intended result of the mandatory
10
adoption of the IFRS in Europe has not yet been reached. On the contrary, the find-
ings support the statement by Ball (2006), that the mere implementation of uniform
accounting standards is not sufficient to ensure uniform accounting practices. An ad-
ditional analysis regarding the changes of those mechanisms that drive write-offs over
time further supports Schipper (2005) in stating that a uniform enforcement body is
needed to reach uniform accounting practices.
This paper has been submitted for publication to the European Accounting Review.
Additionally, the paper has been published as an HHL Working Paper.14 Furthermore,
the paper has been accepted for presentation at the annual European Accounting As-
sociation (EAA) Conference 2013 in Paris. The co-author is Henning Zülch. The
contribution of the author of this dissertation is in the development of the research
question, the required database and the theoretical and empirical foundations, the
execution of the empirical analyses and the preparation of the draft manuscript. The
most important practical implications of the research findings were merged into the pa-
per “Bilanzpolitik bei Wertminderungen europäischer Unternehmen - eine empirische
Analyse”, which has been submitted to the journal Betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung
und Praxis.
The third paper – “A Critical Analysis of the Requirements of IAS 36 – A Pre-Tax
CAPM?” analyzes the requirements of IAS 36 regarding the derivation of the discount
rate for the calculation of the value in use. While there has been a discussion regarding
the reasonableness of those requirements,15 the contribution of this paper is a detailed
discussion of their practicality.
IAS 36 requires the use of a pre-tax discount rate that is independent of the capital
14See Siggelkow and Zülch (2013). This paper is also available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2198809.
15See Husmann and Schmidt (2008), Kvaal (2010) and Husmann and Schmidt (2011).
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structure. However, in practice the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) are usually
used,16 a measure which fulfills none of these requirements. This ignorance of the
statutory provisions can be ascribed to a lag in terms of guidance on how they could
be fulfilled. There is no theoretical model that allows calculation of the pre-tax cost
of capital, and neither is there a consistent recommendation for how the influences of
the capital structure should be eliminated from the cost of capital.
Therefore, the objectives of this paper are to explicitly elaborate the requirements
of IAS 36 regarding the discount rate to be deployed to calculate the value in use,
contrasting these requirements with the existing recommendations and techniques used
in the practical application, and finally deriving a model that is theoretically fulfilling
all of the identified requirements.
The result of this paper is a variation of the classical capital asset pricing model
(CAPM), which incorporates taxes on the firm level. It is noted that independence of
the capital structure can be achieved by deploying the cost of equity of the fictitiously
unlevered firm. If these costs of equity were calculated based on the model derived
in this paper, all of IAS 36’s requirements could be fulfilled. However, the model has
some important problems in terms of its application, leading to the conclusion that the
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) should revise the rules regarding the
calculation of the value in use.
The results of this paper imply that it is currently not possible to calculate a value in
use that truly fulfills all the requirements of IAS 36. While there exists some practical
guidance that tries to consider all these requirements, a theoretically convincing solu-
tion does not exist; the specifications of IAS 36 are inconsistent to a very high degree,
requiring further analytical discussion to find an appropriate solution. This paper is a
16See KPMG (2010).
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first step in reaching this goal.
This paper is under review for publication by the journal Zeitschrift für Betriebs-
wirtschaft. It is co-authored by Marcus Salewski and Henning Zülch. The contribution
of the submitting doctoral candidate lies in the development of the research question
and the theoretical basics regarding IAS 36, and in cooperation in deriving the model
and the interpretation. Additionally, the author of this dissertation independently
translated the paper into English and revised it to incorporate commentaries received
from referees. An earlier version of this paper in German has been published as an HHL
Research Paper,17 and presented at the 6th Research Forum at HHL Leipzig Graduate
School of Management.
The fourth paper – “A New Perspective on Fixed Asset Write-Offs – When is Earn-
ings Management Optimal” – contains an analysis of the question of when it is opti-
mal to opportunistically delay a write-off and under which circumstances immediate
recognition is the optimal strategy. While this question results from the findings of
empirical studies on the determinants of fixed asset write-offs, it has never been directly
addressed, yet. In addition, the paper materially contributes to the existing research
regarding write-offs in particular and earnings management in general by introducing
the real options approach to the analysis of accounting decisions.
The empirical studies that were conducted as a part of this dissertation, as well as a
number of empirical studies conducted for US and Australian companies, reveal that
write-offs are driven by earnings management as well as by asset impairment. However,
these empirical studies barely analyze the circumstances under which one or the other
17See Salewski, Siggelkow and Zülch (2012), which is available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2191499.
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influence prevails.18 Hence, the aim of this paper is to analyze this issue in a very
general setting and to motivate further research in this direction.
The model established in this paper introduces managerial discretion regarding the
reporting of fixed asset write-offs without introducing information asymmetries. It is
shown that in the chosen setting, in which discretion only arises when the asset is
impaired and the discretion only enables the firm to delay the write-off, the payoff if
the write-off is delayed can be interpreted as the payoff of a barrier option, or, more
specifically, a down-and-in call. The firm decides to delay the write-off whenever the
value of this barrier option exceeds the payoff it receives for transparent reporting (i.e.
for immediately recognizing the write-off). The value of the barrier option increases in
the benefits of transparent reporting as well as in the benefits of earnings management,
and decreases in the costs of earnings management.
The findings of this paper present a rationale for the notion that in practice write-offs
are often realized too late.19 They indicate that if the benefits of earnings management
are reduced and the costs of earnings management are increased, the probability that
a firm delays write-offs can be materially decreased. In comparison, the payoff the
firm receives for transparent reporting is less suitable to influence the use of earnings
management in the write-off decision because it influences both the value of the barrier
option and the payoff the firm receives if it does not delay the write-off.
This paper is currently under review for publication in the European Accounting
Review. The co-authors of this paper are Alexander Lahmann and Henning Zülch. The
input of the author of this present dissertation is in the provision of the theoretical
background on IAS 36 and in cooperation in the development of the research question,
18Minnick (2011) showed that write-offs recognized by well-governed companies seem to reflect asset
impairment, while those recognized by poorly governed companies reflect earnings management.
19See Hoogervorst (2012).
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the derivation of the model and its implications, and the preparation of the draft
manuscript.
1.3 Principal Research Contributions
This dissertation answers some of the most substantial questions concerning fixed asset
write-offs according to IAS 36, which have remained unanswered – and in some cases
even unasked – until now.
The empirical studies present much-needed insight into the mechanisms that drive
fixed asset write-offs in Europe. Moreover, the study of the German setting shows that
the enforcement mechanisms installed up to now do not suffice to completely prevent
earnings management in the write-off decision. It is shown that different determinants
drive the write-off decision and the write-off amount, and that the write-off amount
in particular is materially driven by earnings management. Furthermore, it is found
that there are different determinants depending on the institutional setting a company
operates in, and that strong investor protection does not suffice to prevent earnings
management. Overall, these findings show that neither the objective of the IFRS
to provide useful information nor the goal to reach harmonization by the mandatory
adoption of the IFRS in Europe have yet been reached.
The analytical paper on the derivation of an appropriate discount rate for the calcu-
lation of the value in use provides important understanding regarding the requirements
of IAS 36 and their practicality. To date this discussion has been led from a finance
perspective, but this article examines the accounting dimension and shows that a the-
oretically and practically suitable solution is still missing. This paper elucidates that
further analytical discussion, and above all further guidance from the IASB is needed.
The analytical paper on the decision to apply earnings management introduces a
new perspective to the accounting research in two ways. First, it explores the question
15
regarding the situations in which earnings management is optimal, providing a marked
contrast to previous work which simply questioned whether earnings management is
generally applied. Second, the real options approach is established for the analysis of
accounting decisions. This approach enables the analysis of various decisions in various
settings, and is thus suitable for the analysis of a number of different accounting issues.
The findings presented in this paper could ultimately help to find a mechanism that
effectively prevents earnings management.
Overall, this dissertation has a material impact on the understanding of write-offs
under IFRS. Especially considering the fact that prior research is scarce, this work
discusses the most important questions regarding IAS 36. The nature of this standard
as an intersection of accounting and finance is accounted for by introducing some
finance techniques that bring further insights.
Furthermore, there are some practical implications related to the results of the stud-
ies contained in this dissertation. After all, (potential) shareholders should be aware
of the fact that write-offs are used to manage earnings and which mechanisms drive
the related decisions. Moreover, it should be regarded that comparison of the financial
statements of companies domiciled in different countries should be undertaken cau-
tiously, as comparability is not guaranteed. Similarly, enforcement institutions need
to be aware that their present actions do not suffice to prevent earnings management.
Contractors should be aware of the power they have in influencing a firm’s tendency
to manage earnings, as each contract that refers to accounting numbers without in-
troducing costs of earnings management increases the probability that earnings are
managed. Finally, the IASB should be aware of the remaining issues related to the
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Abstract This study examines the factors that influence write-off decisions in
German listed companies. Write-offs have been widely discussed, especially for the US-
American market, and a relation to earnings management has been found in existing
studies. German companies differentiate from the companies that have already been
analyzed as they operate under different accounting standards (IFRS) and in a different
institutional setting. Additionally managers are confronted with the task to derive
the IFRS annual statements from the existing annual statements according to local
GAAP which follow a differing objective. Based on a sample of 805 observations of
German companies listed in the DAX, MDAX, TecDax and SDAX indices between 2004
and 2010, we analyze the impact of firm performance as well as reporting incentives
on the write-off decision. We find that the write-off probability rises significantly
with decreasing overall firm performance which is in line with the legal requirements.
Additionally we find a strong relation of the write-off probability with unexpectedly
high earnings, which is an indicator for income smoothing. Besides influencing the
shareholders perception income smoothing can serve to minimize overall tax payments
or to influence the banks risk assessment. In contrast with prior studies focusing on
the US-American market, we found no evidence for other capital market motives like
big bath accounting and management changes, neither could we confirm the hypothesis
that earnings-based management compensation or leverage have a significant influence
on the write-off decision. These results indicate that German managers aim to influence
tax payments and potential lenders and not the perception of potential shareholders.
2.1 Introduction
According to IAS 36 Impairment of Assets, companies applying International Finan-
cial Reporting Standards (IFRS) are required to perform annual tests to detect the
existence of indications that the value of long-lived assets covered by the scope of the
standard may be impaired. If such an indication exists, the company is required to cal-
culate the recoverable amount and compare it to the carrying amount of the asset under
consideration. Although IAS 36 provides a detailed description of how to calculate the
recoverable amount, the calculation entails large areas of discretion. As the recoverable
amount is usually deduced from future expected cash flows, a situation arises in which
information is distributed asymmetrically because management has more information
than investors regarding future strategy and development, which gives rise to earnings
management (Schipper (1989)). In our study we examine the factors that influence the
write-off decision for German listed companies.
Earnings management concerning the recognition of write-offs has been discussed
in several studies. However, the existing literature has been mainly focused on the
US-American market (e.g. Beatty and Weber (2006); Francis, Hanna and Vincent
(1996); Riedl (2004)). Little research has been conducted regarding the European
IFRS setting, and to the best of our knowledge there does not exist a study on write-
offs under IFRS in Germany. We concentrate on Germany for two reasons. First,
Germany’s publicly listed companies have been required to prepare their consolidated
financial statements based on IFRS since 2005. Second, the institutional setting in
Germany varies materially from that in the USA, which may give interesting insights
for other countries with similar institutional settings.
The regulations concerning the impairment of assets vary between the US-GAAP
and IFRS regimes, especially regarding the techniques used to decide whether an im-
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pairment loss is realized. ASC 360-10 Impairment and Disposal of Long-Lived Assets
(formerly SFAS 144) requires a company to test the asset for recoverability as an ini-
tial step, by comparing the carrying amount with the sum of the estimated future
undiscounted cash flows from further use of the asset. As a second step, the write-off
amount is calculated as the difference between the carrying amount and the fair value
of the asset. IAS 36 requires the company to compare the recoverable amount (the
higher of value in use and fair value less costs to sell) with the carrying amount. If the
carrying amount exceeds the recoverable amount the asset is impaired and is required
to be written off by the difference between the two amounts. Thus, according to IFRS
the write-off decision and the write-off amount are technically decided within the same
step, while two steps are required according to US-GAAP. This may lead to differing
factors influencing the write-off decision according to the two systems.
The USA can be classified as a common-law country with high shareholder protec-
tion, relatively low creditor protection, low ownership concentration and a developed
equity market; therefore the regime is market-centered (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and
Shleifer (1998)). In contrast, Germany is a code-law country with low shareholder pro-
tection, high creditor protection, high ownership concentration and an underdeveloped
equity market; therefore it is a bank-centered regime. Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003)
show that companies in countries with high investor protection, low ownership concen-
tration and developed equity markets engage less in earnings management, suggesting
different patterns of earnings management in the USA and Germany.
Additionally the German GAAP, which are still used to prepare individual finan-
cial statements, are materially influenced by stakeholder orientation. This stakeholder
orientation results in prudence being the overriding principle, which means that losses
have to be realized sooner rather than later, in contrast with gains which may only be
realized when they occur. Furthermore, there exists a close link between tax account-
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ing and local GAAP, motivating companies to manipulate their individual financial
statements to minimize tax payments. Even though companies are required to recon-
cile their individual financial statements to IFRS for the preparation of consolidated
financial statements, we assume that both the local GAAP and the IFRS accounts will
ultimately be based on the same basic assumptions to avoid incongruity.
The results of our analysis show that the write-off decisions of German listed compa-
nies are materially influenced by firm performance. In contrast with different studies
on the US-American market, we do not find big bath accounting to be significant, but
we do find that the write-off decision is materially influenced by income smoothing.
This finding is of interest to local as well as international regulatory and supervisory
bodies, as well as to shareholders, lenders and financial analysts. IFRS are designed
to provide useful information for (potential) shareholders of a company. All attempts
at earnings management work against the fair presentation. Hence, to receive useful
information, investors need to anticipate methods to manage earnings. As Leuz, Nanda
and Wysocki (2003) show, earnings management decreases in enforcement. To reduce
earnings management it is necessary to empower enforcement at specific points, which
requires the government to be conscious of what methods of earnings management are
used.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2.2 we give a brief
overview of the existing literature and present the hypothesis development. In section
2.3 we describe our research design and the sample selection. Section 2.4 reports our
results and sensitivity analysis. Our conclusions are presented in section 2.5.
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2.2 Prior Research and Hypothesis Development
2.2.1 Prior Research
In this section we will give a short overview of the existing literature regarding the
factors influencing the impairment of assets. We are aware that there has been an
extensive amount of research conducted in this area, and therefore we will concentrate
our literature review on the most influential studies which use similar regression models
to ours.
Most of the existing literature examines the US-American market, but little research
has been done which focuses on the write-off decision itself. Minnick (2011) examines
the relation of the write-off decision with corporate governance. She finds a positive
relation of percentage of outside directors, shareholder protection, pay-performance
sensitivity, and CEO turnover with the write-off decision and a negative relation of
board size and the write-off decision. By analyzing good and bad governed companies
separately she finds that write-offs of good governed companies are related to economic
factors while those of bad governed companies are opportunistic. Additionally she finds
that good governed companies realize smaller impairment losses than bad governed
companies do because the latter recognizes the loss only when it is so big that it cannot
be ignored, anymore. Loh and Tan (2002) analyze macroeconomic and firm-specific
factors that influence the write-off decision of companies in Singapore. They find that
the unemployment rate, the GDP growth rate, the occupancy rate of properties and
management changes are important determinants, whereas variables like the debt to
asset ratio seem to be less significant. Francis, Hanna and Vincent (1996) analyze the
causes of impairment losses of US-American companies before the adoption of SFAS 121
Accounting for the Impairment of Long-Lived Assets and for Long-Lived Assets to be
Disposed Of, and find significant evidence for the influence of management changes
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and write-off history on the frequency and magnitude of write-offs. Interestingly the
authors additionally find evidence against the income smoothing and big bath theory,
since write-offs decrease in firm-years with unexpectedly high and unexpectedly poor
performance.
Riedl (2004) compares the write-off characteristics of US-American companies before
and after the adoption of SFAS 121. He finds that impairment losses were more closely
related to management incentives and less closely related to economic effects after the
change in accounting regulations. During the post-SFAS 121 period he shows that
there is a significant correlation between management changes, as well as big bath
accounting, and the magnitude of write-offs, but both factors were insignificant during
the pre-SFAS 121 period. Beatty and Weber (2006) conduct a two-stage analysis
estimating a joint probit and censored regression to analyze factors influencing the
goodwill write-off decision and write-off magnitude in the SFAS 142 Goodwill and Other
Intangible Assets adoption period. What makes these write-offs special is that in the
transition period managers have to choose between a certain current write-off below the
line and an uncertain future write-off included in income from continuing operations.
Among other things the authors find that where net worth covenants exclude the effect
of accounting changes, the frequency and magnitude of SFAS 142 write-offs rises for
firms with a relatively high risk of future write-offs if a potential future above the line
write-off will be highly capitalized, and if the bonus-based compensation plan explicitly
excludes special items. Furthermore, the probability and magnitude of SFAS 142 write-
offs decreases if the firm is traded on an exchange with explicit delisting requirements
and in the tenure of the CEO, which the authors explain by the fact that a shorter
CEO tenure increases the probability that the actual CEO did not make the original
acquisition.
Cotter, Stokes and Wyatt (1998) investigate the determinants of the magnitude of
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impairment losses of Australian companies, focusing on management incentives. They
find a significant relation between management changes and the magnitude of write-offs.
They also find a relationship with the amount of cash reserves, which they interpret
as the capacity to absorb impairment losses. Interestingly the authors do not find a
significant impact on the magnitude of write-offs in respect of governance mechanisms
such as the existence of an audit committee and auditing by the Big Six auditors.
AbuGhazaleh, Al-Hares and Roberts (2011) analyze the impact of earnings man-
agement on the goodwill write-off decision and its magnitude in the UK after the
mandatory adoption of IFRS 3. The authors elaborate on the influence of corporate
governance mechanisms in detail, and find that goodwill impairments are materially in-
fluenced by management incentives like management changes, big bath accounting and
income smoothing. However, due to the strong relationship between goodwill impair-
ments and good governance, they argue that managers use their discretion to convey
private information rather than to manage earnings opportunistically. Finally, Garrod,
Kosi and Valentincic (2008) analyze the write-off decision and its magnitude in small
privately-held companies in Slovenia. They report that in the absence of agency prob-
lems and in an environment with high alignment between financial and tax reporting,
companies tend to manage earnings using current asset write-offs, whereas fixed asset
write-offs seem to be influenced mostly by regulatory factors.
Taken together, these studies suggest that there are strong incentives for large listed
companies to use the write-off decision and its respective magnitude to manage earn-
ings.
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2.2.2 Development of Hypotheses
2.2.2.1 The Write-Off Decision
According to IAS 36, a company is required to assess whether there is an indication
that the asset under consideration may be impaired at the end of each reporting period.
In making this assessment, as a minimum the company is required to consider internal
and external factors described in IAS 36.12 as follows:
• a significant decline in the asset’s market value
• significant changes in technological, market, economic or legal environment
• increased market interest rates or other market rates of return on investment
• carrying amount of total net assets exceeds market capitalization
• obsolescence or physical damage of an asset
• significant changes in the extent to which an asset is used
• economic performance of the asset is worse than expected
If there is an indication that the asset may be impaired, the recoverable amount
of the asset must be calculated and compared to the carrying amount. A positive
difference between carrying amount and recoverable amount must be written off. The
recoverable amount is defined as the higher of value in use and fair value less costs
to sell, where the value in use is the present value of future cash flows from further
use of the asset and its final disposal. Ideally, the fair value less costs to sell shall be
derived from a binding sale agreement. If a sale agreement does not exist it is to be
derived from an active market or, failing that, from the best information available to
reflect the amount that an entity could obtain, at the end of the reporting period, from
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the disposal of the asset in an arm’s length transaction between knowledgeable willing
parties, after deducting the cost of disposal. As a binding sale agreement will rarely be
available and for most assets an active market does not exist, the fair value less costs
to sell is typically calculated as the present value of future cash flows that a market
participant could gain with the asset. In contrast to the calculation of the value in use,
firm-specific factors like synergies may not be included.
The assessment of whether an indication exists that the asset may be impaired, as
well as the calculation of the recoverable amount, requires insider knowledge with re-
spect to the status, usage and profitability of the asset under consideration, giving the
management room for individual judgment. According to Healy and Wahlen (1999),
“earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and
in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders
about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual
outcomes that depend on accounting numbers”. The occurrence of earnings manage-
ment thus depends on the existence of certain reporting incentives that motivate the
management to manipulate earnings. We assume that the write-off decision is affected
by both a decrease in the recoverable amount of the asset under the carrying amount,
which we will call impairment, as well as reporting incentives.
2.2.2.2 Impairment
IAS 36 requires an impairment write-off to be made whenever an asset’s recoverable
amount falls below the asset’s carrying amount. The calculation of the recoverable
amount is only required if there is an indication that the asset may be impaired.
Following Cotter, Stokes and Wyatt (1998), we argue that if there is an indication that
the asset may be impaired and the carrying amount exceeds the recoverable amount,
the management has an incentive to write off for at least two reasons: legal liability to
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recognize the impairment loss, and the comparative advantage of providing information
about their firm’s expected future cash flows. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer
(1998) classify Germany as a country with relatively high enforcement, and therefore
non-compliance with the accounting standards is relatively risky. The identification
of companies that have assets which are impaired is based on the assumption that
impairment is associated with poor firm performance. Hence we suggest our first
hypothesis:
H1: The write-off probability is higher for companies with worse performance.
We include three proxies for firm performance in our analysis, the choice of which is
in part influenced by the specification of IAS 36. The first proxy is income before write-
offs. IAS 36.14 (b) states that operating profits which are worse than expected are an
indicator that the asset might be impaired. Thus we expect a negative correlation
between the write-off probability and income before write-offs. As the calculation of
the recoverable amount is mostly based on expected future cash flows, our second proxy
for firm performance is the operating cash flow of the company. IAS 36.14 (b) also
states that net cash flows that are worse than expected indicate that the asset might be
impaired. Therefore we expect a negative correlation between the write-off probability
and the operating cash flow. The necessity to write off follows from the relation of
market value to carrying amount. Thus our third proxy for firm performance is the
market to book ratio. IAS 36.12 (d) identifies a market to book ratio below one as
an indicator that the asset under consideration is impaired. As with earnings before
write-offs and the operating cash flow, we expect a negative correlation between the
market to book ratio and the write-off probability.
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2.2.2.3 Reporting Incentives
Following Healy and Wahlen (1999), we divide reporting incentives into two broad
groups: capital market motivations and contracting motivations. We do not explicitly
analyze regulatory requirements since we do not partition our sample by industries.
We incorporate overall regulations in our analysis through control variables such as
firm size.
Capital Market Motivations The perception of the company by stock market partic-
ipants is probably one of the most important targets for management, since actual and
potential shareholders control the share price. Therefore, positively influencing their
perception is probably one of management’s main incentives. One way to achieve this
goal might be to manage current year’s earnings performance. Following the extensive
income smoothing literature, we assume that good earnings performance is related to
a high write-off probability. The idea behind this is that the management tries to
meet the shareholders’ expectations. According to Moses (1987), we can define income
smoothing as an “effort to reduce fluctuations in reported earnings”, meaning that the
management uses the write-off decision as a “smoothing device” to reduce the diver-
gence of reported earnings from the expected number. The notion of income smoothing
is based on the assumption that shareholders perceive actual earnings as a signal for
future earnings, and that smoothed earnings allow for more precise forecasts, which
the capital market rewards with higher share prices. In support of this assumption,
Kasznik and McNichols (1999) report that even though financial analysts do not adjust
their forecasts for companies that consecutively meet their expectations, the market
grants a market premium.
In the German setting there are two further arguments for income smoothing. Re-
garding the individual annual statements, high tax-book conformity exists. According
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to Graham and Smith (1999), high tax-book conformity is an incentive to smooth
earnings because it reduces overall tax expenses under a progressive tax rate. Since we
assume that not all earnings management will be undone in the reconciliation process,
the income smoothing in individual annual statements will impact the consolidated
financial statements according to IFRS. The second argument is that debt financing
is relatively important in Germany because the equity market is underdeveloped. Ac-
cording to Trueman and Titman (1988), material debt financing is an incentive to
smooth earnings because if the lender observes a low volatility in the company’s earn-
ings the assessment of the probability of bankruptcy is lowered, which in turn results
in decreased borrowing costs.
Some empirical studies (e.g. Francis, Hanna and Vincent (1996)) find significant
evidence for the existence of income smoothing in the write-off decision, but other
studies find that there is no such relationship (e.g. Riedl (2004)). We assume that
managers apply income smoothing, meaning that impairment losses will be recognized
in years with unexpectedly high income before impairment losses:
H2: Companies with unexpectedly high earnings before impairment losses have a
higher write-off probability.
Closely related to the assumption of income smoothing is that of big bath account-
ing. Big bath accounting means that the management accumulates problems until it
finally recognizes a huge impairment loss in a year in which the company has realized
an unexpectedly low income anyway. Following this approach offers several advan-
tages (see Strong and Meyer (1987)). First, the management in this way establishes a
safety cushion for subsequent years in which it will be easier to meet the shareholders’
expectations. Second, it is argued that recognizing a large one-time loss signals that
past problems have been solved. The third advantage is a merely arithmetic: lower-
ing earnings in the current year ensures high earnings growth for the future. Another
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more psychological argument on which the big bath technique may be based is that if
the situation is already bad, making it a little worse will in most cases do no harm,
either to management reputation or to earnings expectations (see Walsh, Craig and
Clarke (1991)). Thus we assume that managers apply big bath accounting, meaning
that impairment losses will be realized in years with unexpectedly low income before
impairment losses:
H3: Companies with unexpectedly low earnings before impairment losses have a higher
write-off probability.
While H2 and H3 seem to be contradictory at first sight, Kirschenheiter and
Melumad (2002) prove that if the reporting environment permits discretion, the opti-
mal strategy of management is to smooth income if good news occurs and use big bath
accounting if bad news occurs.
Another incentive that influences the write-off decision is a change in management.
There are different reasons for incoming managers to recognize write-offs in their first
year (see Wells (2002)). One of these is that they are not held responsible for past
performance, and thus they may explicitly attribute the impairment losses to the pre-
ceding management. This is often referred to as “cleaning the decks”, illustrating the
fact that new managers tend to realize impairment losses that have been delayed in
prior years. In this way it is possible to anticipate future losses without any loss of
reputation, resulting in increasing earnings in subsequent years. The result of high
write-offs in the first year is that income in future years is relieved of these expenses, so
that an improving earnings trend can be reported from the first year of tenure onwards.
In support of this theory, Moore (1973) finds that companies with recent management
changes show a significantly greater proportion of income-reducing discretionary ac-
counting decisions. A number of studies report the same result for the relationship
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between management changes and write-offs (e.g. Beatty and Weber (2006); Francis,
Hanna and Vincent (1996); Riedl (2004)), whereas others find no significant relation-
ship (e.g. Cotter, Stokes and Wyatt (1998)).
H4: Firm-years in which a management change has occurred have a higher write-off
probability.
Contrating Motivations There are different kinds of contracts that rely on account-
ing data. Two kinds that are frequently used are credit agreements and management
compensation contracts, where credit agreements are usually tied to leverage and man-
agement compensation contracts often refer to earnings. The leverage of the company
under consideration may influence credit agreements in two ways. First, the level of
borrowing costs is based on the assessment of financial risk for which leverage is an
important determinant, meaning that higher leverage can result in higher borrowing
costs. Second, most credit agreements contain strict regulations concerning leverage,
called debt covenants. The breach of a given covenant can lead to an immediate re-
payment claim from the creditor, which would result in extensive liquidity problems
for most companies. Following the results of Duke and Hunt (1990), leverage can be
used as a proxy for the closeness to debt covenant restrictions. Sweeney (1994) also
provides evidence in support of the hypothesis that managers of firms approaching
technical default respond with income-increasing accounting changes. Regarding the
write-off decision, this means that the write-off probability decreases, delivering our
fifth hypothesis:
H5: Companies with higher leverage have a lower write-off probability.
Management compensation is commonly divided into a fixed and a variable part,
where the latter has a short-term and a long-term component. The short-term com-
ponent is usually based on a measure of the company’s success, whereas the long-term
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component contains a stock-option plan. If impairment losses influence the figure stand-
ing for success (e.g. EBIT, profit) we assume that the management has an incentive
to delay write-offs to later years in order to increase the current period’s income (see
Watts and Zimmerman (1978)). Similarly, Beatty and Weber (2006) find that bonus
plans that do not explicitly exclude impairment losses reduce the write-off probability.
Therefore, our sixth hypothesis is as follows:
H6: Companies which grant managers earnings-based bonuses that are affected by
impairment losses have a lower write-off probability.
2.3 Research Design
2.3.1 Sample Selection
Our full sample is comprised of all the non-financial German companies that were
listed in the German DAX, MDAX, TecDax and SDAX indices between 2004 and
2010, with a complete IFRS dataset available in the Worldscope database. To be
able to calculate variables that refer to previous year data, such as expected earnings,
we had to exclude the first observation, and the first observation after a gap, for all
companies. Our full sample contains 165 firms, providing 805 firm-years. To test for
the influence of management changes and earnings-based bonus payments we hand-
collected information on these two variables as described below for all companies that
were listed in HDAX (a combination of DAX, MDAX and TecDax) between 2004
and 2010. Therefore we excluded from the sample all companies that were not listed
in HDAX during the period under consideration, and additionally had to exclude a
further 170 and 182 observations for the management change sample and the earnings-
based bonus sample respectively due to a lack of information. Table A.1 describes the
process of sample selection for all three samples.
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(Table A.1 About Here)
2.3.2 Model and Variable Measurement
Since the decision to write off is a dichotomous variable, we used a probit regression
to examine the influence of the impairment and reporting incentives described above
on the write-off decision. We include multiple firm-years of the companies examined
in our analysis, and thus apply a panel research design. To implement our analysis we
use the following random effects probit regression:
Pr(WOit = 1) = β0 + β1INCOMEit + β2OCFit + β3MTBit
+ β4BIGBATHit + β5INCSMOOTHit + β6DTAit
+ β7FIRMSIZEit + β8BIG4it + β9LISTINGit
+ β10−15YEARt + εit.
(2.3.1)
To test the influence of management changes we run the following probit regression
on our management change sample:
Pr(WOit = 1) = β0 + β1INCOMEit + β2OCFit + β3MTBit
+ β4BIGBATHit + β5INCSMOOTHit
+ β6DTAit + β7MCit
+ β8FIRMSIZEit + β9BIG4it + β10LISTINGit
+ β11−16YEARt + εit.
(2.3.2)
Similarly, to analyze the influence of earnings-based bonus payments we run the
following probit regression on our earnings-based bonus sample:
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Pr(WOit = 1) = β0 + β1INCOMEit + β2OCFit + β3MTBit
+ β4BIGBATHit + β5INCSMOOTHit
+ β6DTAit + β7EBBit
+ β8FIRMSIZEit + β9BIG4it + β10LISTINGit
+ β11−16YEARt + εit.
(2.3.3)
The endogenous variable WOit is a dichotomous variable that takes the value 1 if
company i recognizes a write-off in t, and takes the value 0 otherwise. We calculate
total write-offs as the sum of write-offs on goodwill, other intangibles and property,
plant and equipment. In contrast to Garrod, Kosi and Valentincic (2008), current
asset write-offs are not included in the analysis as they are excluded from the scope of
IAS 36. Hence, the dichotomous variable WOit is equal to 1 whenever total write-offs
exceed 0. We decided to represent the independent non-indicator variables as ratios
rather than as levels to control for scale. Thus INCOMEit represents the net income
of company i in t corrected for any write-offs divided by total assets of company i in
t−1. OCFit is company i’s operating cash flow in t divided by total assets of company
i in t− 1. MTBit represents company i’s market to book ratio in t. Similar to Francis,
Hanna and Vincent (1996), to proxy for income smoothing and big bath accounting
we first calculate an earnings management indicator EMIit, which is the difference of
company i’s net income in t corrected for taxes and write-offs and company i’s earnings
before taxes in t − 1 divided by company i’s total assets in t − 1. The definition of
the earnings management indicator is based on the choice of a random walk model
for the development of earnings before taxes predicting actual earnings being equal
to last year’s earnings (see Moses (1987)). If the earnings before taxes and write-
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offs in t are unexpectedly high the earnings management indicator takes a positive
value; if they are unexpectedly low it is negative. INCSMOOTHit proxies for income
smoothing of company i in t. It takes the value of the earnings management indicator
EMIit if this exceeds 0, and is 0 otherwise. We do not proxy for income smoothing
using a dichotomous variable because if the management tries to smooth earnings the
necessity to write off rises with the degree to which actual and expected earnings
deviate. Similarly, BIGBATHit proxies for big bath accounting of company i in t and
equals the earnings management indicator EMIit if this falls below 0, and is 0 otherwise.
As the choice of the ratio used to proxy for leverage does not play an important role
(see Duke and Hunt (1990)) we use DTAit, which represents the ratio of total debt of
company i in t divided by total assets of company i in t.
The variables MCit and EBBit were hand-collected. Healy (1985) argues that com-
pensation plans will generally contain upper and lower bounds, and proves that man-
agement has an incentive to choose income-increasing accruals (i.e. no write-off) only
if neither the lower nor the upper bound defined in the bonus plan is binding. If one of
these bounds is binding the management has an incentive to choose income-decreasing
accruals (i.e. to write off) in order to maximize their future payments. We collected the
information on compensation plans from annual reports. Due to a lack of information
on bounds or exact measurement for the earnings-based compensation, we decided to
proxy for earnings-based bonus payments using the dichotomous variable EBBit, which
equals 1 if the management receives earnings-based bonus payments that are affected
by impairment losses, and is 0 otherwise. We exclude those firm-years for which we
only found general statements in the annual reports. The information on management
changes was collected from the homepage of the DGAP Deutsche Gesellschaft für Ad-
hoc-Publizität mbH, which is a portal that companies can use to fulfill the duty to
publish ad hoc disclosures. MCit is a dichotomous variable that equals 1 if changes
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in the management board of company i occurred in t, and is 0 otherwise. Companies
that do not use the services of DGAP were excluded from the sample.
In addition to the variables measuring the hypothesized effects, we included some
control variables measuring other factors that could influence the tendency to write off.
Following the existing literature, we include measures for company-size, the size of the
auditor and listing on foreign stock exchanges. FIRMSIZEit is the natural logarithm
of the total assets of company i in t. BIG4it is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if
company i was audited by a Big 4 Four audit company in t and 0 otherwise. Finally,
LISTINGit is an indicator variable equal to 1 if company i was listed on a foreign stock
exchange in t and 0 otherwise. YEARt are dummy variables for the observation year,
which we included to control for macroeconomic effects.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Descriptives and Correlation Analysis
Table A.2 provides descriptive statistics for our sample firms.
(Table A.2 About Here)
We find that an impairment loss was realized in about 60% of our sample firms-years.
Average income before write-offs amounts to 4% of lagged total assets, and average
operating cash flow is about 9% of lagged total assets. The mean market to book ratio
amounts to 2.56. We further find that the average leverage amounts to 20.82%. In
about 83% of our earnings-based bonus payments sample-firm-years managers received
earnings-based bonus payments that were affected by write-offs. In about 26% of the
management change sample-firm-years a management change had occurred.
Table A.3 partitions the observations according to those firm-years in which an im-
pairment loss was recognized and those in which there was no impairment loss.
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(Table A.3 About Here)
Regarding the impairment variables, we find the net income before write-offs to be
significantly higher for non-write-off firm-years than for write-off firm-years; this is
consistent with prior research. Interestingly we do not find significant differences in
mean values between the two groups in respect of operating cash flow and market to
book ratio, indicating that managers base their write-off decision on earnings measures
rather than on cash flow measures. Regarding the reporting incentives, we find sig-
nificant differences in the means of leverage, management change and earnings-based
bonus payments. Contrary to our expectations the mean leverage is higher for write-
off firm-years than for non write-off firm-years which argues against Hypothesis 5 that
the managers of companies with high leverage will try to delay impairments. Instead,
it supports the impairment hypothesis that companies in a worse financial situation,
i.e. which are higher leveraged, will have a higher write-off probability. As expected,
the mean management change indicator is significantly higher for write-off firm-years
indicating that incoming managers tend to realize impairment losses either to clean
the decks or to anticipate future losses, or both. Consistent with our expectations,
the mean earnings-based bonus payment indicator is significantly lower for write-off
firm-years, suggesting that managers who receive compensations that do not exclude
write-off effects write off less frequently than managers whose compensation is not af-
fected by write-offs. We do not find significant differences in terms of our big bath
proxy or our income smooth proxy. Additionally, we find that write-off firm-years are
associated with significantly higher company size, higher frequency of auditing by a
Big Four audit company, and listing on a foreign exchange.
Table A.4 reports the pair wise Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients for
all variables analyzed. The correlations are relatively low, showing that our results are
not influenced by multicolliniarity.
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(Table A.4 About Here)
2.4.2 Regression Results
2.4.2.1 Impairment Variables
Table A.5 presents the results from our three probit regressions.
(Table A.5 About Here)
Regarding the impairment variables, we find net income before write-offs to be signif-
icant at the 1% level for all three models. The sign is negative as predicted, indicating
that lower income is associated with higher write-off probability. This confirms Hypoth-
esis 1 that the write-off probability rises with decreasing firm performance. Operating
cash flow is insignificant for all three models. This result shows that contrary to what
the standard-setter requires, the impairment decision does not seem to be based on
the expected cash flows but on the accruals-based measure of income before write-offs.
Alternatively, this insignificance could result from using the overall operating cash flow
as proxy for the free cash flow generated by the assets tested for impairment.
Contrary to our expectations the market to book ratio has a positive sign for all three
models, indicating that the write-off probability increases with increasing market to
book ratio. However, this result is significant at the 10% level for model 1 and model
3 only, and completely insignificant in model 2, including the management change
indicator. Thus it is not very robust. The positive sign could indicate that the market
to book ratio cannot be interpreted as an indicator for the market value of the asset
being higher than its book value, resulting in no necessity to write-off, but instead
it should be interpreted as a measure for growth options. Cotter, Stokes and Wyatt
(1998) argue that a high market to book ratio results from high growth options, and
43
that companies with high growth options are riskier and thus more susceptible to
impairments.
2.4.2.2 Reporting Incentives
Regarding the reporting incentives, we find a significant positive influence of income
smoothing at the 1% level for models 1 and 3 and at the 5% level for model 2, while
big bath and leverage are insignificant for all three models. Thus, our findings support
Hypothesis 2 while we have to reject Hypotheses 3 and 5. Analyzing the US-American
market, Riedl (2004) found the opposite results, with a significant negative influence
of unexpectedly low earnings being a sign of big bath accounting, a significant nega-
tive influence of leverage supporting his debt-covenant hypothesis and no significant
influence of income smoothing.
The insignificance of big bath in this study could result from the German setting.
As stated earlier, German companies’ individual financial statements are driven by
prudence and creditor protection as well as the attempt to minimize tax payments.
These factors result in a tendency to recognize expenses sooner rather than later and in
good years rather than in bad. Due to credibility considerations the early realization of
losses in the individual and tax statements also results in an early realization of losses in
the consolidated financial statements according to IFRS. The insignificance of leverage
could result from the assumption that leverage can be used to proxy for the closeness
to debt covenants. Additionally German companies historically rely heavily on debt,
and a high leverage in most cases leads to the banks being more attentive to possible
earnings-increasing procedures, thereby reducing the room for earnings management.
Regarding the management change variable in model 2, we could not find a significant
influence, indicating that German managers do not tend to realize impairment losses in
their first year. The insignificance could also result from the fact that we considered all
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changes in the management board to be of interest and did not differentiate between
different positions or situations. The earnings-based bonus payment indicator in model
3 is just below the 10% level of significance (i.e. 11.4%). This insignificance could result
from the fact that we did not account for caps and floors of the compensation plans
due to a lack of information.
2.4.2.3 Control Variables
We find a significant positive relationship between the impairment probability and
the company size in all three models. Auditing by a Big Four audit company has a
significant influence in model 2 at the 5% level, but is insignificant in models 1 and 3.
The indicator for listing on a foreign stock exchange is only marginally significant in
model 1 and insignificant in models 2 and 3. Untabulated year-dummies have positive
signs (except for 2007 which is negative), but all are insignificant except for 2006 in
model 1. As the financial crises had not begun in 2006 but GDP was rising significantly
instead, the significant positive influence could result either from income smoothing or
from a learning effect after mandatory IFRS-adoption in 2005. In model 2, 2006 is also
insignificant and 2007 becomes positive, while 2008 and 2009 are negative. In model
3, all year dummies are positive. The year 2006 is significant at the 1% level, and 2008
becomes significant at the 10% level. This could be interpreted as the influence of the
financial crises, but it is a weak result due to a lack of robustness.
2.4.3 Sensitivity
To validate our findings, we conducted a series of sensitivity analyses. Results are
presented in table A.6.
(Table A.6 About Here)
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We replaced net income before write-offs with the return on assets, operating cash
flow with sales and the market to book ratio with the change in market to book ratio
compared with the preceding year. Additionally we estimated our model using a panel
logit regression. Finally, we excluded all observations from 2005, because 2005 was
the year of mandatory IFRS adoption. Net income (or return on assets), the income
smooth variable and company size remained significant at the 1% level through all
variations. The operating cash flow becomes marginally significant with a positive sign
if we include market to book ratio change instead of market to book ratio, but it remains
insignificant in all other model specifications. A positive influence of operating cash
flow on the write-off probability implies that the operating cash flow does not proxy
for impairment but for the capacity to absorb impairment losses, as Cotter, Stokes and
Wyatt (1998) argue. The significance of market to book ratio fluctuates from 4.4% to
16% between the different variations, always with a positive sign. Market to book ratio
change is insignificant. Big bath and leverage remain insignificant through all model
variations as well as auditing by a Big Four audit company. The indicator variable for
the listing on a foreign stock exchange falls just below the 10% significance level if we
include the return on assets instead of the income before write-offs. Overall we find
that the write-off decision is materially influenced by income before write-offs, income
smoothing and the firm size, and that this main result is not altered by different model
variations.
2.5 Conclusions
This study investigates the factors that influence write-off decisions in German com-
panies applying IFRS. We find that the write-off probability materially increases in
situations of decreasing net income before write-offs, and in a context of increasing firm
size. Furthermore, the write-off decision is materially influenced by income smooth-
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ing. Overall our findings support the hypothesis that earnings management behavior in
Germany materially deviates from that in Anglo-American countries like the USA. The
write-off decision is materially influenced by income smoothing, while other reporting
incentives do not have a significant impact. In contrast to prior studies – most of which
analyze the US-American market – we could find no evidence for big bath accounting,
and neither were there relationships between impairments and earnings-based bonus
payments, management changes or leverage.
Our study contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, only a minimal
amount of research has been conducted regarding the write-off decision under IFRS,
with the existing research mainly focusing on the US-American market. As there are
material differences between US-GAAP and IFRS, especially regarding the write-off
decision, our study gives insights into the importance of earnings management in the
application of IAS 36. Second, we analyze the write-off behavior in a different insti-
tutional setting. Germany is a bank-centered code-law country with low shareholder
protection, high creditor protection, high ownership concentration and an underdevel-
oped equity market. Therefore the incentives for earnings management are likely to
be very different for German firms than for US-American firms since the USA is a
market-centered common-law country with high shareholder protection, relatively low
creditor protection, low ownership concentration and a developed equity market.
Our results are of interest to German regulatory and supervisory bodies as they prove
that German companies apply significant discretion in their write-off decisions, which
could possibly be decreased by focusing enforcement on this special issue. Additionally
our findings should be of interest to all shareholders and lenders, as well as financial
analysts, in interpreting financial reports according to IFRS. Further, the results are of
interest to the IASB as we provide evidence that the regulation gives room for earnings
management and its use in Germany.
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However, our study is subject to some limitations. First, our definition of the man-
agement change variable is based on the assumption that all changes in the management
board matter. A further analysis of changes in different positions on the management
board could provide further insight into the influence of management changes. Sec-
ond, the definition of the earnings-based compensation variable does not include the
fact that most compensation plans have caps and floors. If this information was avail-
able and included in a similar study, additional insight could be gained regarding the
impact of management compensation. Finally, because we only analyzed German pub-
licly listed companies, we could not analyze the effect of different institutional settings.
Therefore we cannot definitely identify what leads German companies to apply income
smoothing extensively – whether it results from being bank-centered, from tax-book
conformity, or from other factors. Hence, in future research it could be interesting to




Table A.1: Sample selection
Full sample Management change Earnings-based bonus
sample payments sample
companiesb Firm-years companiesb Firm-years companiesb firm-years
Companies listed in DAX, MDAX, TecDax or
SDAX between 2004 and 2010
229 1603 229 1603 229 1603
Financial companies (35) (245) (35) (245) (35) (245)
Not German (17) (119) (17) (119) (17) (119)
No complete dataset (166) (166) (166)
No IFRS (88) (88) (88)
First firm-yearsa (180) (180) (180)
Non-HDAX company (47) (223) (47) (223)
No sufficient data on management changes (170)
No sufficient data on earnings-based bonus pay-
ments
(182)
Final sample of firm-years 165 805 85 412 98 400
a For the calculation of ratios that revert to previous year data the first observation of each company and the first observation after
a gap in the data had to be excluded.
b The number of companies excluded from the sample is given for financial, foreign and non-HDAX companies only, as the other
criteria usually change from year to year and thus do not result in the exclusion of a whole company on a stand-alone basis. However,
the combination of different exclusion criteria might well result in the complete exclusion of a company. Therefore, the final sample
of firms cannot be calculated from the numbers given above because the sample reduced due to companies that were eliminated
cumulatively because of an incomplete dataset, no IFRS, the first reporting periods and a lack of sufficient data on management
changes/earnings-based bonus payments.








WOit 0.60 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 805
INCOMEit 0.04 0.14 -0.88 0.01 0.04 0.09 1.28 805
OCFit 0.09 0.11 -0.59 0.05 0.08 0.13 0.54 805
MTBit 2.56 2.48 -1.84 1.28 1.93 2.92 28.57 805
BIGBATHit -0.03 0.07 -0.79 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 805
INCSMOOTHit 0.05 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.05 1.58 805
DTAit 20.82 16.50 0.00 6.74 18.74 31.69 98.02 805
MCit 0.26 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 412
EBBit 0.83 0.38 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 400
FIRMSIZEit 14.10 1.89 9.45 12.77 13.86 15.05 19.38 805
BIG4it 0.83 0.37 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 805
LISTINGit 0.10 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 805
Table A.2 provides descriptive statistics for the sample observations.
Variable definitions:
WOit an indicator variable equal to 1 if company i recognized a write-off
in t and 0 otherwise
INCOMEit net income of company i in t corrected for impairment losses rec-
ognized by company i in t divided by total assets of company i in
t− 1 of company i in t
OCFit the operating cash flow from company i in t divided by total assets
of company i in t− 1
MTBit the market to book ratio of company i in t
BIGBATHit proxy for unexpectedly low earnings equal to EMI if EMI < 0 and
0 otherwise
INCSMOOTHit proxy for unexpectedly high earnings equal to EMI if EMI > 0
and 0 otherwise
DTAit the total debt of company i in t divided by total assets of company
i in t
MCit an indicator variable equal to 1 if a management change occurred
at company i in t and 0 otherwise
EBBit an indicator variable equal to 1 if company i’s management re-
ceived earnings-based bonus payments in t and 0 otherwise
FIRMSIZEit the natural logarithm of the total assets of company i in t
BIG4it an indicator variable equal to 1 if company i was audited by a Big
Four audit company (PricewaterhouseCoopers, KPMG, Ernst &
Young, Deloitte) in t and 0 otherwise
LISTINGit an indicator variable equal to 1 if company i was listed on a foreign
stock exchange in t and 0 otherwise
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Table A.3: Descriptive statistics separated by write-off and non-write-off firm-years
Non-write-off firm-years (N=319) Write-off firm-years (N=486)
Mean Median Standard Mean Median Standard
(p-value) Deviation (p-value) Deviation
INCOMEit 0.07 0.06 0.14 0.02 0.03 0.14
(0.000)
OCFit 0.10 0.09 0.13 0.08 0.08 0.09
(0.144)
MTBit 2.69 1.98 2.22 2.47 1.88 2.63
(0.217)
BIGBATHit -0.02 0.00 0.08 -0.03 0.00 0.07
(0.719)
INCSMOOTHit 0.05 0.01 0.14 0.05 0.01 0.10
(0.370)
DTAit 16.38 13.69 14.74 23.74 21.88 16.95
(0.000)
MCit 0.19 0.00 0.39 0.29 0.00 0.45
(0.031)
EBBit 0.90 1.00 0.31 0.80 1.00 0.40
(0.012)
FIRMSIZEit 13.18 13.04 1.46 14.70 14.45 1.91
(0.000)
BIG4it 0.75 1.00 0.43 0.88 1.00 0.32
(0.000)
LISTINGit 0.05 0.00 0.22 0.14 0.00 0.35
(0.000)
Table A.3 shows the descriptive statistics differentiated by write-off and non-write-off
firm-years. Significance levels of differences in means are reported in parentheses.
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Table A.4: Correlation analysis
WOit INCOMEit OCFit MTBit BIGBATHit INCSMOOTHit DTAit MCit EBBit FIRMSIZEit BIG4it LISTINGit
WOit 1.000 -0.229 -0.062 -0.065 -0.049 -0.062 0.223 0.107 -0.126 0.418 0.177 0.141
(0.000) (0.079) (0.064) (0.165) (0.079) (0.000) (0.031) (0.012) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
INCOMEit -0.193 1.000 0.492 0.450 0.415 0.404 -0.344 -0.137 0.085 -0.105 -0.029 -0.036
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.091) (0.003) (0.415) (0.307)
OCFit -0.052 0.417 1.000 0.387 0.189 0.175 -0.190 -0.093 0.000 -0.048 0.008 0.026
(0.144) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.060) (0.994) (0.174) (0.824) (0.463)
MTBit -0.044 0.295 0.301 1.000 0.271 0.294 -0.200 -0.039 0.049 -0.114 -0.019 -0.057
(0.217) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.433) (0.326) (0.001) (0.586) (0.108)
BIGBATHit -0.013 0.371 0.178 -0.004 1.000 0.709 -0.075 -0.071 -0.001 0.030 0.030 -0.018
(0.719) (0.000) (0.000) (0.900) (0.000) (0.033) (0.151) (0.982) (0.392) (0.393) (0.605)
INCSMOOTHit -0.032 0.407 0.030 0.173 0.151 1.000 -0.197 -0.027 -0.041 -0.188 -0.008 -0.067
(0.370) (0.000) (0.399) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.588) (0.415) (0.000) (0.829) (0.058)
DTAit 0.218 -0.318 -0.146 -0.089 -0.033 -0.110 1.000 0.081 -0.098 0.344 -0.043 0.105
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.012) (0.351) (0.002) (0.102) (0.051) (0.000) (0.221) (0.003)
MCit 0.107 -0.078 -0.090 0.071 0.011 -0.030 0.103 1.000 -0.094 -0.033 -0.030 0.038
(0.031) (0.113) (0.069) (0.153) (0.823) (0.541) (0.036) (0.117) (0.499) (0.541) (0.448)
EBBit -0.126 0.090 -0.009 0.042 -0.040 0.003 -0.089 -0.094 1.000 0.005 -0.145 0.074
(0.012) (0.073) (0.856) (0.403) (0.428) (0.952) (0.074) (0.117) (0.927) (0.004) (0.143)
FIRMSIZEit 0.394 0.022 -0.011 -0.148 0.108 -0.159 0.263 -0.008 0.026 1.000 0.290 0.404
(0.000) (0.536) (0.764) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.879) (0.609) (0.000) (0.000)
BIG4it 0.177 -0.004 0.057 0.011 0.027 -0.031 -0.089 -0.030 -0.145 0.280 1.000 0.153
(0.000) (0.911) (0.105) (0.763) (0.449) (0.388) (0.011) (0.541) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000)
LISTINGit 0.141 -0.001 0.011 -0.085 0.033 -0.055 0.092 0.038 0.074 0.508 0.153 1.000
(0.000) (0.969) (0.763) (0.016) (0.351) (0.120) (0.009) (0.448) (0.143) (0.000) (0.000)
Table A.4 exhibits the pair wise Pearson correlation coefficients in the lower left triangle. Pair wise Spearman correlation coefficients are provided in the
upper right triangle. Significance levels are reported below in parenthesis.
Table A.5: Panel probit regression results
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(including MC) (including EBB)
Predicted Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Sign (Z-Statistic) (Z-Statistic) (Z-Statistic)
N=805 N=412 N=400

















DTAit - 0.004 0.005 -0.014
(0.66) (0.53) (-1.10)
MCit + – 0.245 –
– (1.07) –












Log Likelihood -382.710 -188.209 -171.619
Wald-statistic 0.000 0.000 0.001
Percent correctly predicted 0.709 0.684 0.699
McFadden‘s Pseudo R2 0.292 0.272 0.329
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Table A.5 shows the panel probit regression results using random effects with
clustered robust standard errors. The total sample used in Model 1 consists
of 805 firm-year observations. The reduced sample used in Model 2 contains
all German companies listed in HDAX between 2004 and 2010 for which a
complete Worldscope dataset and sufficient information concerning manage-
ment changes was available. The sample consists of 412 firm-year observations.
The reduced sample used in Model 3 contains all German companies listed in
HDAX between 2004 and 2010 for which a complete Worldscope dataset and
sufficient information concerning earnings-based bonus payments was avail-
able. The sample consists of 400 firm-year observations. Parameter estimates
are based on the following models:
Model 1: Pr(WOit = 1) = β0 + β1INCOMEit + β2OCFit +
β3MTBit +β4BIGBATHit +β5INCSMOOTHit +β6DTAit +
β7FIRMSIZEit+β8BIG4it+β9LISTINGit+β10−15YEARt+
εit
Model 2: Pr(WOit = 1) = β0 +β1INCOMEit +β2OCFit +β3MTBit +
β4BIGBATHit + β5INCSMOOTHit + β6DTAit + β7MCit +
β8FIRMSIZEit+β9BIG4it+β10LISTINGit+β11−16YEARt+
εit
Model 3: Pr(WOit = 1) = β0 +β1INCOMEit +β2OCFit +β3MTBit +
β4BIGBATHit + β5INCSMOOTHit + β6DTAit + β7EBBit +
β8FIRMSIZEit+β9BIG4it+β10LISTINGit+β11−16YEARt+
εit
*** ** * denotes significance at <0.01, <0.05, <0.1 levels respectively.
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Table A.6: Sensitivity analysis
Model 1 Model 1 Model 1 Model 1 Model 1
with ROAit with SALESit with Logit excluding
MTBCHANGEit 2005
Predicted Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Sign (Z-Statistic) (Z-Statistic) (Z-Statistic) (Z-Statistic) (Z-Statistic)
N=805 N=805 N=805 N=805 N=721
CONSTANT +/- -7.807∗∗∗ -7.974∗∗∗ -7.815∗∗∗ -14.543∗∗∗ -8.591∗∗∗
(-6.64) (-6.49) (-6.76) (-6.77) (-6.68)
IMPAIRMENT
INCOMEit - – -4.908
∗∗∗ -5.06∗∗∗ -9.918∗∗∗ -5.227∗∗∗
– (-6.10) (-6.09) (-6.07) (-6.05)
ROAit - -0.048
∗∗∗ – – – –
(-5.24) – – – –
OCFit - 0.824 – 1.34
∗ 1.899 0.934
(1.05) – (1.69) (1.34) (1.11)
SALESit - – (-0.880) – – –
– (-0.58) – – –
REPORTING INCENTIVES
MTBit - 0.055 0.082
∗∗ – 0.135∗ 0.063
(1.39) (2.02) – (1.86) (1.54)
MTBCHANGEit + – – -0.027 – –
– – (-0.33) – –
BIGBATHit - (0.581) (0.599) 0.318 0.977 0.309
(0.53) (0.56) (0.30) (0.50) (0.28)
INCSMOOTHit + 2.255
∗∗∗ 2.640∗∗∗ 2.912∗∗∗ 5.635∗∗∗ 2.871∗∗∗
(3.40) (3.93) (4.33) (4.03) (4.14)
DTAit - 0.100 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.004
(1.53) (0.60) (0.79) (0.54) (0.54)
CONTROL VARIABLES
FIRMSIZEit + 0.542
∗∗∗ 0.570∗∗∗ 0.551∗∗∗ 1.015∗∗∗ 0.602∗∗∗
(6.26) (6.43) (6.41) (6.42) (6.31)
BIG4it + 0.371 0.322 0.371 0.587 0.369
(1.21) (1.06) (1.23) (1.11) (1.17)
LISTINGit + -0.693 -0.765
∗ -0.741∗ -1.345∗ -0.912∗
(-1.53) (-1.70) (-1.66) (-1.70) (-1.93)
Log Likelihood -390.960 -383.465 -384.417 -381.662 -343.635
Wald-statistic 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
McFadden’s Pseudo R2 0.277 0.291 0.289 0.294 0.290
Table A.6 shows our sensitivity analysis. We based our sensitivity tests on our model 1 with a sample size of
805 firm-year observations. The exclusion of 2005 reduces the sample to 721 firm-years. Parameter estimates
are based on model 1 described in Table A.5 with the variations indicated in the header of the table.
*** ** * denotes significance at <0.01, <0.05, <0.1 levels respectively.
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Abstract Based on a sample of 1,300 companies from the EU15 member states,
this study examines the factors that influence fixed asset write-offs in Europe. Using the
Cragg model for the corner solution outcome of asset write-offs we are able to separately
analyze the determinants of the write-off decision and of the write-off magnitude. We
show that in general the write-off decision seems to be driven by asset impairment while
the write-off magnitude seems to be driven by earnings management. Further analyses
are conducted of the write-offs separated into country clusters. We cannot confirm our
assumption that earnings management decreases with greater investor protection, but
we show that companies from ‘outsider economies’ use income smoothing and big bath
accounting to determine the write-off magnitude. We do not find such clear patterns
for ‘insider economies’, but nevertheless we are still able to show that it does not seem
to be asset impairment alone that drives asset write-offs. By partitioning our sample
period into two sub-periods we can additionally show that the processes that determine
write-offs become more similar for ‘outsider economies’ and ‘insider economies with
strong enforcement’, while those of ‘insider economies with weak enforcement’ change
individually. We see that the influence of asset impairment seems to decrease over
time.
3.1 Introduction
Since the adoption of the IAS Regulation (EC Regulation No. 1606/2002) all Eu-
ropean publicly listed companies are required to prepare their consolidated financial
statements in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).
The aim of the mandatory adoption of IFRS has been to harmonize financial report-
ing in order to ensure a high degree of transparency and comparability. However, the
introduction of uniform accounting standards does not necessarily result in uniform
financial reporting (Ball (2006)). Financial reporting (quality) is rather influenced by
a set of local factors like politics and enforcement that do not converge simultaneously
with the introduction of IFRS. It is therefore likely that national patterns persist over
time (Kvaal and Nobes (2012)). Different accounting practices can easily evolve when
accounting choices exist and when accounting regulations are based on fair value ac-
counting. Fair value accounting requires managerial judgment and therefore always
entails managerial discretion. How this discretion is used by managers is influenced
by the national setting in which these managers operate. The result is that despite
the mandatory introduction of IFRS financial reporting practice is not the same in all
countries applying international standards, but differs depending on their institutional
background (Kvaal and Nobes (2012)).
IFRS are a globally accepted set of accounting standards involving a huge extent
of fair value accounting, which for most European countries implied a change in their
overall accounting regime. One important international regulation that incorporates
fair value accounting is IAS 36 Impairment of Assets, which governs when and by
which amount fixed assets have to be written off. Kvaal and Nobes (2012) classify the
tendency to write off as an IFRS practice for which national differences are difficult to
measure. This study examines the factors that determine the write-offs of European
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publicly listed companies. By segmenting the companies into three country clusters in
accordance with Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003) we are able to analyze the influence
of the institutional setting in which the companies operate. Prior studies that examine
the impairment of assets have mainly focused on the US-American (e.g. Riedl (2004);
Beatty and Weber (2006)) or Australian markets (e.g. Cotter, Stokes and Wyatt (1998);
Minnick (2011)). Only sporadic work has been done concerning some countries in the
European market (e.g. AbuGhazaleh, Al-Hares and Roberts (2011); Garrod, Kosi and
Valentincic (2008)), and to the best of our knowledge there has been no study on write-
offs across Europe. Thus, in contrast to the existing literature our study incorporates
companies from different countries with different institutional settings, giving us the
opportunity to analyze the influence of institutional factors on write-offs.
Our sample comprises 1,300 companies from the EU15 countries, and our period of
analysis covers the years 2005 to 2011 inclusive. To analyze the factors that influence
the write-off decision and the write-off magnitude a corner solution model has to be
applied. Previous studies largely used the Tobit model (e.g. Riedl (2004); AbuGhaza-
leh, Al-Hares and Roberts (2011)). We compare two well-known models – namely the
Tobit model (Tobin (1958)) and the Cragg model (Cragg (1971)) – and find that the
more general Cragg model fits better. One advantage of the Cragg model is that it
analyzes the factors influencing the write-off decision separately from the factors influ-
encing the write-off magnitude, while the Tobit model assumes that all factors have the
same influence on both aspects. Applying the Cragg model we find, for example, that
big bath accounting and income smoothing help to explain the write-off magnitude but
have no influence on the write-off decision.
To analyze the influence of different institutional settings we estimate the regres-
sion separately within three country clusters: ‘outsider economies’, ‘insider economies
with strong enforcement’, and ‘insider economies with weak enforcement’ (Leuz, Nanda
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and Wysocki (2003)). We find that the write-off decision of companies in ‘outsider
economies’ is mainly driven by asset impairment while the write-off magnitude is sig-
nificantly influenced by earnings management. For the ‘insider economies’ we find
no clear pattern of earnings management but can still show that write-offs are not
solely driven by firm performance. To examine whether the processes that drive asset
write-offs become more similar across these country clusters over time, we partition
our sample into two periods and run the regression for all clusters for both periods.
We find that the write-off practices of countries in ‘outsider economies’ and ‘insider
economies with strong enforcement’ become more similar while the determinants that
drive write-offs in ‘insider economies with weak enforcement’ change somewhat indi-
vidually. Additionally, we find that the influence of asset impairment decreases over
time.
This paper contributes to the existing literature in three ways. First, we introduce
an alternative to the Tobit model which currently seems to be the standard solution
for the analysis of write-offs. In this study we contrast the Cragg model and the Tobit
model and find that the Cragg model outperforms the Tobit model. Additionally, the
Cragg model allows the write-off decision and the write-off magnitude to be analyzed
separately, which is an important advantage compared with the Tobit model. Second,
we analyze the European market, which until now has been a comparatively under-
researched market with regard to fixed asset write-offs. A number of studies have been
conducted on the US-American market and on the Australian market, but the imple-
mentation of accounting standards materially depends on institutional factors. Thus,
findings from US-American or Australian studies cannot be assumed to apply to the
European market without further investigation. This is complicated by the fact that
different accounting standards are employed in the mentioned markets. Finally, we
analyze the processes that drive fixed asset write-offs for three country clusters and
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compare the processes for two time periods. We can show that systematic differences
between write-offs in ‘outsider economies’ and ‘insider economies with strong enforce-
ment’ diminish and that the processes driving write-offs in these two clusters become
more similar, while ‘insider economies with weak enforcement’ develop independently.
This finding emphasizes the importance of enforcement for the implementation of ac-
counting standards.
The results of our study should be of interest to standard setters, national enforce-
ment agencies and users of financial statements. With the mandatory adoption of
IFRS, a good first step towards uniform financial reporting within the EU has been
taken. Nevertheless, as our results show, there still remains a lot of work to do since
different incentives exist across the member states due to different institutional set-
tings. Thus, uniform enforcement of IFRS across Europe is the necessary next step
to achieve uniform financial reporting. Until that point is reached, financial statement
users ought to avoid assuming that financial reporting is consistent across national
borders; instead they should consider national differences where applicable if financial
statements are compared.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. In section 3.2 we give a short in-
troduction to IAS 36 and discuss the existing literature. In section 3.3 the development
of hypotheses is presented. In section 3.4 we describe the research design. In section
3.5 descriptive statistics and regression results are displayed, while section 3.6 shows
some further analyses. We discuss the robustness of our results and some limitations
in section 3.7 and outline our conclusions in 3.8.
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3.2 Background
3.2.1 Impairment of Assets According to IAS 36
IAS 36 requires annual impairment testing of all assets that are not explicitly excluded
from the scope of the regulation. IAS 36 applies mainly to property, plant and equip-
ment and intangible assets including goodwill. The principal requirement is that all
assets must be tested for impairment separately, but if an asset does not generate cash
flows that are largely independent of those from other assets, the asset’s cash-generating
unit is subjected to a quantitative impairment test.
Impairment testing according to IAS 36 involves two steps. The first – qualitative –
step is the determination of whether an indication exists that the asset under consid-
eration is impaired. This step requires qualitative and quantitative reviews of changes
in the market environment, the company’s business activities and the nature of the
asset itself. In the second – quantitative – step the recoverable amount of the asset
under consideration has to be compared to the book value. If the book value exceeds
the recoverable amount the asset is said to be impaired and has to be written off to
the recoverable amount. The recoverable amount is defined as the higher of the fair
value less costs to sell and the value in use. The fair value less costs to sell is optimally
derived from an existing sales agreement or from prices on an active market. If such
values do not exist the fair value less costs to sell can be calculated based on valuation
methods such as the discounted cash flow approach, considering only those cash flows
that could be generated from the use of the asset by an external third party. The value
in use is the present value of future cash flows expected to be derived from the further
use and disposal of the asset. Here, those cash flows that the company expects have
to be used; hence, synergies may play an important role in the determination of the
value in use.
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For some assets that are not (yet) depreciated – namely goodwill, intangible assets
with an indefinite useful life and intangible assets that are not yet available for use
– the recoverable amount additionally has to be compared to the book value at one
arbitrary but fixed point in the year, irrespective of whether an indication for im-
pairment exists. By definition, goodwill does not generate cash flows that are largely
independent of those from other assets, and accordingly it always has to be allocated
to a cash-generating unit to be tested for impairment. If the recoverable amount of
the cash-generating unit falls below its book value the resulting impairment loss has
to be assigned to goodwill first. Only after goodwill is completely written off is the
remaining impairment loss assigned to the other assets in the cash-generating unit.
Even though the regulations for the impairment of assets appear quite detailed they
are still based on management estimations, creating space for managerial discretion.
Moreover, it is not only the estimation of fair value but also the calculation of value
in use – from the construction of cash-generating units up to the prediction of future
cash flows and the choice of an appropriate discount rate – that require managerial de-
cisions. What incentives influence these decisions is largely influenced by institutional
factors. For this reason we aim to analyze which accounting practices prevail in Europe
regarding the impairment of assets.
3.2.2 Prior Research
3.2.2.1 Asset Write-Offs
The first area of the existing literature that is of importance for our paper relates to
the determinants of fixed asset write-offs. As mentioned above, until now research has
mainly concentrated on the US-American and Australian markets. Pioneering work
has been done by a number of authors who provided early evidence of the factors
influencing the timing and amount of write-offs in the USA before the adoption of a
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specific accounting regulation concerning the impairment of long-lived assets. Strong
and Meyer (1987) emphasize the influence of tax considerations on the write-off decision
and assert that write-offs are recorded in periods with higher marginal tax rates and
when new investment opportunities exist – hence in periods with improving operating
environments. They show that write-off companies are neither the strongest nor the
weakest firms in their industry with regard to performance measures, and that write-
offs are associated with low financial performance but also with a recent improvement
in operating performance. Additionally, they find that write-offs are more frequent if
a change in senior management has occurred.
Elliott and Shaw (1988) analyze only material, separately disclosed write-offs (big
bath). They find that companies that disclose these discretionary write-offs are larger
than the average company in their industry and have underperformed in the preceding
three years. They also find that these companies frequently experience management
changes. By comparing expected earnings to the pre-write-off earnings, Zucca and
Campbell (1992) analyze the extent to which earnings management drives the amount
and timing of write-offs and find that both big bath accounting and income smoothing
are significant drivers of this decision. In contrast, Rees, Gill and Gore (1996) test for
earnings management by focusing on abnormal accruals made concurrently with asset
write-offs. They find that managers use discretion in the write-off decision to provide
value-relevant signals to investors.
Francis, Hanna and Vincent (1996) use a Tobit model to analyze the influence of
firm performance and management incentives on the write-off decision. They find that
the return of the preceding years has a significant negative influence and the occurrence
of a management change has a significant positive influence on write-offs. Contrary
to their expectations, they find a significant positive correlation between write-offs
and unusually poor earnings and a significant negative correlation between write-offs
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and unusually good earnings, meaning that neither income smoothing nor big bath
accounting is applied. To further analyze the influence of management incentives they
separately analyze write-offs of goodwill, inventory, and property, plant and equipment
and restructurings. Consistent with their expectations, they find that incentives are
more significant in explaining goodwill write-offs and restructurings than in explaining
write-offs of inventory and property, plant and equipment.
Riedl (2004) uses a Tobit model to compare the determinants of the write-off de-
cision before and after the adoption of Statement of Financial Accounting Standard
(SFAS) 121 Accounting for the Impairment of Long-Lived Assets and for Long-Lived
Assets to be Disposed of. He shows that write-offs are less associated with economic
factors and more associated with earnings management in the post-SFAS 121 setting.
Beatty and Weber (2006) examine the SFAS 142 Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets
adoption decision. In the adoption period companies were allowed to record a one-time
loss below the line as opposed to the uncertain recognition of future above-the-line
write-offs of goodwill. The authors analyze which factors influence the recognition of
a one-time loss below the line in two steps. First, they apply a probit model to ana-
lyze the factors influencing the decision to recognize a below-the-line loss and second,
they carry out a censored regression to analyze the factors influencing the amount of
goodwill that is written off. They find that contracting incentives, market incentives,
CEO tenure and exchange listings affect the decision regarding whether a one-time loss
below the line is recorded.
On the Australian market, Cotter, Stokes and Wyatt (1998) analyze the determi-
nants of write-offs based on an ordinary least squares regression. Disregarding firm
performance, they find that riskier companies, companies with a higher capacity to ab-
sorb write-offs and companies with more management changes report higher write-offs.
The authors use higher cash reserves and lower leverage as proxies for the capacity to
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absorb write-offs. Minnick (2011) uses a probit model to focus on the influence of cor-
porate governance on the write-off decision and finds that better governed companies
record impairments more often and that poorly governed companies use write-offs op-
portunistically. Using an ordinary least squares regression to analyze the determinants
of the write-off magnitude, she additionally finds that well governed companies realize
significantly lower write-offs.
As already mentioned, not much work has been done yet concerning the European
market. Garrod, Kosi and Valentincic (2008) analyze the factors influencing fixed and
current asset write-offs in small private companies in Slovenia. Outside the setting
of large publicly listed companies, their examination takes place in the absence of all
agency issues except for the information asymmetry between the company and the
tax authority. Employing a logit model to examine the determinants of the write-off
decision they find that current asset write-offs are driven by discretion while fixed
asset write-offs follow regulatory and accounting process issues linked to asset im-
pairment. Using a linear regression to analyze the drivers of the write-off magnitude
they find that more profitable firms write off higher amounts – contrary to the ac-
counting standard requirements. AbuGhazaleh, Al-Hares and Roberts (2011) examine
the drivers of goodwill write-offs in the United Kingdom after the implementation of
IFRS 3, which abandoned goodwill amortization and introduced the impairment-only
approach. The authors elaborate extensively on the influence of different corporate
governance variables on goodwill write-offs, and finally conclude that managers use
discretion concerning the goodwill write-off to convey private information.
In summary, these studies find that managerial incentives are important in under-
standing write-offs. The authors analyze the influence of different factors in different
institutional settings, but they all show that write-offs are not solely driven by asset
impairment; rather, write-offs are also used to manage earnings.
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3.2.2.2 Further Important Literature
Researchers have tried to classify countries according to certain similarities for a long
time. The American Accounting Association (1977) criticized the lag of comparative
accounting behind other research and proposed a morphology for the classification of
accounting systems based on a wide range of factors, such as the political and economic
system, the objective of financial reporting and the source of authority for the account-
ing standards. Frank (1979) examines the extent of use of 233 accounting principles in
38 countries, and categorizes them as ‘British Commonwealth countries’, ‘Latin Amer-
ican countries’, ‘Continental European countries’ and ‘US-influenced countries’. In a
similar attempt, Nair and Frank (1980) test whether these categories are robust over
time and with a disaggregation of the accounting practices in measurement and disclo-
sure. The authors find that they are not, and conclude that previous results may be
invalid.
Nobes (1983) proposes four country clusters for the countries of the ‘developed West-
ern world’ as determined in 1980. This classification system includes factors like the
type of users of the published accounts and the importance of tax rules. In a later
study, Nobes (1998) proposes to differentiate companies according to their country’s
type of culture and the strength of the equity outsider system. Similarly, Leuz, Nanda
and Wysocki (2003) use a descriptive cluster analysis based on nine institutional factors
drawn from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1997) and La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes and Shleifer (1998) to identify three country clusters that are similar with
respect to these institutional factors – namely ‘outsider economies’, ‘insider economies
with strong enforcement’ and ‘insider economies with weak enforcement’. Investor
protection decreases from the first to the last cluster, and the authors show that the
influence of earnings management correspondingly increases from the first to the last.
For our country cluster analyses we will use the country clusters proposed by Leuz,
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Nanda and Wysocki (2003) as they were constructed for an analysis of earnings man-
agement, which is the closest match with our analysis.
The aim of the mandatory adoption of IFRS has been to harmonize financial report-
ing. However, it is now popularly accepted that the introduction of common accounting
regulations does not suffice to reach uniformity in accounting practices. Ball (2006)
states that uniform accounting practices do not necessarily follow from uniform ac-
counting standards because accounting practices depend on economic and political
forces. Schipper (2005) argues that uniform reporting practices across the EU can only
be achieved if the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) provides detailed
implementation guidance and if a single European enforcement body is created. She
additionally underlines the fact that the institutional settings that materially influ-
ence the financial reporting incentives differ significantly across the EU member states.
Kvaal and Nobes (2010) analyze the accounting policies of large listed companies from
Australia, France, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom in 2005/2006 and find
that choices among IFRS policy options can largely be explained by the continuation
of pre-IFRS policies. Kvaal and Nobes (2012) compare the policies of 2005/2006 with
those of 2008/2009 to see whether the influence of the pre-IFRS policies decreases.
They find that while changes in the continental European countries mainly lead to
divergence from pre-IFRS policies, the national patterns still persist. These studies
show that harmony has not been achieved yet. They conclude that “the lack of com-
parability reduces the decision-usefulness of the accounting numbers and hampers the
realization of the rewards of accounting harmonization” (Kvaal and Nobes (2012), p.
368).
Vast quantities of research have been conducted regarding earnings management.
Good literature reviews are provided by Schipper (1989) and Healy and Wahlen (1999).
For our further analyses we define earnings management in accordance with Healy
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and Wahlen (1999) as the attempt to manage financial reports in order to influence




Similar to Riedl (2004), we assume that write-offs are influenced by both asset im-
pairment and management incentives. Following Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003)
we assume that management incentives will be more important in countries with low
investor protection while asset impairment prevails in countries with high investor pro-
tection.
3.3.2 Impairment
Following the requirements of IAS 36 a write-off has to be recorded when the asset under
consideration is impaired. An asset is said to be impaired when its recoverable amount
exceeds its book value; the magnitude of the write-off equals the difference between
these two amounts. Cotter, Stokes and Wyatt (1998) outline a number of incentives
for the management – namely signaling, contracting and compliance incentives – to
comply with the regulations and record a write-off when there are impaired assets.
Thus, measuring the correlation of the existence and amount of impaired assets, as
well as the occurrence and amount of write-offs, would be fairly simple if the required
data were available. However, neither the management’s expectations on which the
calculation of the recoverable amount is based nor other information at the asset level
is available. Hence we have to find another proxy for the existence of impaired assets.
Following prior studies (Riedl (2004); Beatty and Weber (2006); Francis, Hanna and
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Vincent (1996)) we assume that the probability that a firm has impaired assets and
the amount by which these assets are impaired depend on the overall firm performance.
The assumption that companies have an incentive to record a write-off when there are
impaired assets leads to our first two hypotheses:
H1a: The probability of write-offs rises with decreasing firm performance.
H1b: The magnitude of recorded write-offs rises with decreasing firm performance.
Prior research has proven that not only the performance of the company itself but
also the performance of the industry of the company influences the write-off of fixed
assets (Riedl (2004); Francis, Hanna and Vincent (1996)). Assuming that companies
that operate in an industry with worse performance are more susceptible to asset
impairment, we obtain our next two hypotheses:
H2a: The probability of write-offs rises with decreasing performance within the firm’s
industry.
H2b: The magnitude of recorded write-offs rises with decreasing performance within
the firm’s industry.
3.3.3 Reporting Incentives
3.3.3.1 Capital Market Incentives
Financial statements are an important source of information for (potential) sharehold-
ers, which may lead to an incentive for management to manipulate earnings to influence
the short-term stock price performance (Healy and Wahlen (1999)). Prior research on
the determinants of write-offs has found evidence of income smoothing (Zucca and
Campbell (1992); AbuGhazaleh, Al-Hares and Roberts (2011)) and big bath account-
ing (Zucca and Campbell (1992); Riedl (2004); AbuGhazaleh, Al-Hares and Roberts
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(2011)). Income smoothing occurs whenever the management tries to reduce earnings
fluctuation. According to Trueman and Titman (1988), income smoothing reduces the
stakeholders’ volatility estimates, which reduces their assessment of bankruptcy risk;
this in turn increases the stock price. On the other hand, big bath accounting describes
the management’s decision to delay loss recognition to a period in which earnings are
unexpectedly low, and then to realize a large one-time loss. Strong and Meyer (1987)
describe several advantages of big bath accounting. First, the recognition of a large
write-off signals that past problems have been addressed, which is intended to result
in a positive capital market reaction to the write-off. Second, by making good on
previously delayed losses and anticipating future losses, a reserve for future periods
is created. Finally, realizing a one-time loss ensures high returns for future periods.
Walsh, Craig and Clarke (1991) additionally argue that worsening an already bad
situation may have only limited additional impact.
While the coexistence of big bath accounting and income smoothing may be counter-
intuitive, Kirschenheiter and Melumad (2002) present a model in which both strategies
are part of one equilibrium reporting strategy. They prove that the firm value is maxi-
mized if managers reduce reported earnings when a positive earnings surprise occurs to
increase the inferred precision. If there is a negative earnings surprise the manager will
also reduce earnings to decrease the inferred precision, which in turn reduces the effect
of the negative earnings. Applied to asset write-offs, this means that the probability
and magnitude of reported write-offs rises for unexpectedly low and unexpectedly high
earnings. This gives rise to our next hypotheses:
H3a: The probability of write-offs rises for unexpectedly high and unexpectedly low
earnings.
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H3b: The magnitude of recorded write-offs rises for unexpectedly high and unexpect-
edly low earnings.
3.3.3.2 Contracting Incentives
There are different types of contracts that may influence write-offs. In this study we
concentrate on debt contracts. Watts and Zimmerman (1990) expound the debt/equity
hypotheses that higher leverage proxies for the closeness to debt covenant restrictions.
This in turn results in management’s choice of income-increasing accounting methods.
This assumption is based on the condition that the leverage can be used to proxy
for the closeness to debt covenant restrictions. Empirical evidence confirming this
assumption has been provided by Duke and Hunt (1990), who prove that various proxies
for leverage can be used to proxy for the existence of and closeness to debt covenant
restrictions. Sweeney (1994) analyzes a set of companies over the years prior to a debt
covenant violation and shows that managers of firms that are close to a violation of debt
covenant restrictions are more likely to adopt income-increasing accounting methods.
The arguments above entail the assumption of a negative relationship between leverage
and asset write-offs. Results consistent with these arguments have been obtained in
other studies (Riedl (2004); Beatty and Weber (2006)).
In contrast, high leverage could also result in increased monitoring by creditors
(especially banks), who enforce the recognition of a write-off when assets are impaired
(Cotter, Stokes and Wyatt (1998)). This argument entails the assumption of a positive
correlation between write-offs and leverage. As it is not clear which of these influences
prevails we do not assume a direction for the influence of leverage on write-offs:
H4a: The probability of write-offs is influenced by leverage.




We base our analysis on companies domiciled in one of the EU151 member states. To
identify the companies we used the Thomson Reuters Global Equity Indices2 for the
countries under consideration. We drew our data from the Worldscope database. Table
B.1 presents the process of sample selection.
(Table B.1 about here)
We start our analysis with a total sample of 1,893 companies and 15,144 firm-year
observations. 23 companies and 184 firm-year observations belong to companies from
countries outside the EU15 and are therefore excluded from the sample. Following prior
studies we additionally exclude finance, insurance and real estate companies (Standard
Industrial Classification (SIC) codes 6000-6999), which reduces our sample by a further
490 companies and 3,920 firm-years. Furthermore, we had to exclude 78 companies and
3,765 firm-year observations due to incomplete datasets. Finally, there were only two
companies with seven firm-years remaining in the industry Public Administration; we
excluded these observations to be able to analyze industry effects later on. Our sample
selection results in a final sample of 1,300 companies with a total of 7,268 firm-year
observations. Panels B to D of Table B.1 describe the sample. France, Germany and
the United Kingdom make up the largest part of the sample, which is in line with the
1EU15 refers to the member states of the EU until April 2004: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and
the United Kingdom.
2The Thomson Reuters Global Equity Indices aim to contain representative samples of
each stock market covering 75-80 % of total market capitalization. For more informa-
tion see http://thomsonreuters.com/content/financial/pdf/i_and_a/indices/datastream_
global_equity_manual.pdf (website last accessed at October 16th, 2012).
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size of the respective capital markets. We defined the industries according to the SIC
code divisions.3 Looking at the industry classification as depicted in Panel C we see
that almost half of our sample firms belong to the sector ‘Manufacturing’. The sectors
‘Services’ and ‘Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas, And Sanitary Services’
are represented with 222 and 179 companies respectively, while for all other sectors we
have fewer than 100 firms within our sample.
A write-off has been recognized in 957 companies and in 3,269 firm-years within our
sample, resulting in 343 companies which did not record a write-off within the whole
sample period from 2005 to 2011. Interestingly, in more than two-thirds of the write-
off firm-years a write-off of property, plant and equipment has been realized, while a
write-off of goodwill and other intangible assets has been recorded in only slightly more
than one-third of the write-off firm-years. In some firm-year observations more than
one type of write-off has been recorded; thus, the numbers of companies and firm-years
do not add up to all write-off numbers.
3.4.2 Country Clusters
To analyze systematic differences in the accounting of write-offs across the EU15 mem-
ber states due to different institutional settings, we partition our sample into three
country clusters. Following Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003) our three clusters are
‘outsider economies’ (due to the restriction to the EU15 member states this cluster
contains only the United Kingdom), ‘insider economies with strong enforcement’, and
‘insider economies with weak enforcement’. Table B.2 displays the allocation of coun-
3Prior studies use two-digit or four-digit SIC codes (Riedl (2004); Francis, Hanna and Vincent (1996)).
We used the SIC code divisions to prevent the inclusion of industries with too few observations.
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tries to the country clusters.4
(Table B.2 about here)
‘Outsider economies’ are characterized by large stock markets, dispersed ownership,
strong investor rights, and strong legal enforcement. ‘Insider economies’ have less well-
developed stock markets and concentrated ownership, and are further distinguished by
the strength of their legal enforcement. Following the argumentation of Leuz, Nanda
and Wysocki (2003), insiders try to use earnings management to conceal the firm’s
performance from outsiders. This is only possible when outsiders are not effectively
protected. Investor protection increases from cluster 1 to cluster 3; hence, we assume
that the impact of asset impairment on write-offs decreases from cluster 1 to cluster 3
while the impact of earnings management increases.
3.4.3 Model Choice
One important feature of data on write-offs that should not be neglected is that they
are limited dependent. Asset write-offs are continuously distributed over positive values
but there is a positive probability of zero write-offs. This kind of data could result from
either censoring or a corner solution response. Data censoring means that we cannot
observe the actual outcome of the dependent variable but we observe a censored version
instead. Hence the positive probability of the dependent variable taking one specific
value is artificial, following from the process of data collection. Here, we do not have a
data censoring problem. For asset write-offs we do observe the real write-off values, but
4As Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003) did not include Luxembourg in their analysis we could not
allocate it to one of the three clusters and hence excluded the respective observations from this anal-
ysis. The whole sample comprises only 52 firm-years from Luxembourgian companies. Nevertheless,
including Luxembourg in the cluster ‘insider economies with strong enforcement’ (untabulated) does
not change our results materially.
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there is still a non-trivial fraction of outcomes that takes the value zero – because the
company did not recognize a write-off, not because we observe censored data. Hence,
a corner solution model has to be applied.
In prior research on write-offs, the Tobit model has often been applied (Riedl (2004),
AbuGhazaleh, Al-Hares and Roberts (2011)). To our knowledge Beatty and Weber
(2006) are the only authors that use a two-step model, estimating a joint probit and
censored regression. Interestingly, none of the authors explain why the respective
model has been chosen or test their choice against an alternative model. We contrast
two models that can be applied to corner solution data: the Tobit model and the more
general Cragg model. Good overviews of the models that can be applied to limited
dependent variables are given by Amemiya (1984) and Wooldridge (2010). The Tobit
model was introduced by Tobin (1958) for the analysis of limited dependent variables.
In an example he analyzed the relationship of durable goods expenditure with age and
liquid asset holdings. The model has only one stage and estimates the effects on the
write-off decision and on the write-off magnitude simultaneously. The most appealing
feature of the Tobit model – its ease of implementation due to the one-step approach
– is at the same time its most important limitation. From the one-step approach it
follows that the partial effects of one explanatory variable on the probability to write
off and on the expected write-off magnitude must have the same sign. Additionally,
the relative effects of two continuous independent variables on the write-off probability
and on the expected write-off magnitude are identical (Wooldridge (2010)).
A model that is more flexible is the Cragg model, which allows different processes to
determine the participation decision (if a write-off is recorded) and the amount decision
(what magnitude is written off, if there is a write-off). These two decisions should not
be confused with the two steps of the impairment test according to IAS 36, i.e. the
qualitative and quantitative impairment tests. Here we assume that managers first
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decide whether they want to or have to recognize a write-off and afterwards decide on
the magnitude of the write-off. The Cragg model was introduced by Cragg (1971), who
wanted to extend the Tobit model to apply it to situations where the determination of
the size of the variable when it is positive depends on different parameters or variables
than the determination of the probability that it is non-zero. As a result, he shows that
the Tobit model is nested in his more general model. Like Tobin (1958) he applies his
model to the purchase of consumer durable goods. Applied to our analysis the models
take the following form (in the latent variable formulation):5
Tobit model
|WOT∗it | = βT0 + βT1 roa it + βT2 ocf it + βT3 mtbit
+ βT4 ind roa it + β
T
5 ind ocf it + β
T
6 ind mtbit
+ βT7 BigBath it + β
T
8 IncSmooth it + β
T
9 dta it
+ βT10∆gdpit + β
T
11size it + β
T
12big4 it
+ βT13wo prev it + β
T
14WO prev it + β
T
15−20Year t + εit
WOTit = max(0; |WOT∗it |)
(3.4.1)
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(3.4.2)
Variable definitions are given in Table B.3.
(Table B.3 about here)
The variable of interest in both models is the natural logarithm of the amount of
fixed asset write-offs of company i in t relative to the total assets of company i in the
period previous to t, WO it. For the Tobit model this equals the maximum of zero and
the value of the latent variable. For the Cragg model it is the result of multiplying the
indicator variable woit by the value of the latent variable. Prior models mostly use the
absolute value of company i’s write-off in t deflated by total assets (Riedl (2004); Cotter,
Stokes and Wyatt (1998); Beatty and Weber (2006)). As neither the absolute value
of write-offs nor the deflated value is close to a normal distribution but is extremely
skewed to the right, we decided to use the natural logarithm. We still do not obtain
a perfect normal distribution, but we are much closer to it than with the absolute or
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deflated values.6 Hence, we use the natural logarithm for all write-off amount variables
(in later analyses we include the write-off of goodwill, other intangibles and property,
plant and equipment). To have our observations left censored we use the absolute value
of the relative write-offs as the dependent variable. Defining our dependent variable
like this makes the interpretation of our regression results a little difficult, as we will
have to expect a negative sign for all variables with a positive influence on the write-off
magnitude. Table B.4 gives the rationale for our expected signs.
(Table B.4 about here)
The indicator variable woit equals 1 when company i recognized a write-off in t
and zero otherwise. As the Tobit model follows a one-step approach, we include all
test variables in this one stage. We define the Cragg model in such a way that the
vector of variables determining the amount decision is a strict subset of the vector of
variables determining the participation decision.7 To test hypothesis 1b we include
two proxies for firm performance in our estimation of the write-off magnitude, and to
test hypothesis 1a we include one additional proxy in the estimation of the write-off
probability. Similar to Riedl (2004) we use one accrual-related performance measure
(return on assets, roa it) and one cash-related performance measure (operating cash
flow, ocf it). This approach is additionally supported by the requirements of IAS 36.
IAS 36.14 (b) designates unexpectedly low cash flows as well as unexpectedly low profits
as indicators that an asset may be impaired. Furthermore, the cash flow is the basis
for the calculation of the value in use. We expect negative signs for both proxies in
6The skewness of absolute non-zero write-offs amounts to 18.74, that of non-zero write-offs deflated
with previous year total assets amounts to 13.63, and that of the natural logarithm of non-zero
write-offs deflated with previous year total assets amounts to only -0.31.
7This restriction is not necessary for the Cragg model; different sets of variables can be used to model
the participation decision and the amount decision (Wooldridge (2010)).
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the participation model and positive signs in the magnitude model. For the estimation
of the write-off probability, we additionally include a dummy variable indicating a
market-to-book ratio below one, mtbit. IAS 36.12 (d) identifies a market-to-book ratio
below one as an indicator that the asset under consideration is impaired; hence, we
expect that the write-off probability rises if the market-to-book ratio falls below one
and thus a positive sign.
Similarly, to test hypothesis 2b we include the industry’s mean return on assets,
ind roa it, as an accrual-based performance measure and the industry’s mean operating
cash flow, ind ocf it, as a cash-based performance measure in the estimations of the
write-off magnitude. To test hypothesis 2a, we additionally include a dummy variable
that indicates that the mean market-to-book ratio of i’s industry is below the mean
market-to-book ratio of all sample companies in the estimation of the write-off proba-
bility, ind mtbit. Similar to our expectations concerning the performance measures at
the company level, we expect negative signs for ind roa it and ind ocf it and a positive
sign for ind mtbit in the participation decision, and positive signs for ind roa it and
ind ocf it in the amount decision.
To test hypotheses 3a and 3b, we first calculate an earnings management indicator
emi it, similarly to Francis, Hanna and Vincent (1996). We define emi it as the difference
between company i’s Earnings Before Interest and Taxes (EBIT) before impairment
losses in t and company i’s previous year EBIT, scaled by previous year total assets
of company i. This ratio gives company i’s EBIT growth deflated by previous period
total assets. We then define BigBath it to equal emi it whenever emi it is lower than
the mean of emi it in company i’s industry, and zero otherwise. Similarly we define
IncSmooth it to equal emi it whenever emi it exceeds the mean of emi it in company i’s
industry, and zero otherwise. This definition is based on the assumption that the EBIT
of each company follows a geometric Brownian motion with the industry’s mean EBIT
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growth as a drift factor, a common assumption in finance research. Hence, the expected
growth of company i’s EBIT equals the industry’s mean EBIT growth; smaller growth
stands for unexpectedly low earnings and proxies for big bath accounting and larger
growth stands for unexpectedly high earnings and proxies for income smoothing. We
expect a positive sign for IncSmooth it and a negative sign for BigBath it on the write-off
probability and the opposite signs for the write-off magnitude. To test hypotheses 4a
and 4b we include the debt-to-asset ratio of company i in t, dta it, for which we do not
predict a sign.
Additionally, to our test variables we include several control variables. ∆gdpit
8 rep-
resents the change in the gross domestic product of the country company i is domiciled
in from the previous period to the present one, and is supposed to capture macroeco-
nomic effects (Riedl (2004)). We expect a negative influence for ∆gdpit as companies
in countries with worse overall performance are supposed to be more susceptible to
asset impairments. Following the political cost hypothesis (Watts and Zimmerman
(1990)), we include size it as the natural logarithm of company i’s total assets in t and
expect a positive sign regarding the write-off probability. Minnick (2011) finds that
better governed companies recognize write-offs more often and of lower magnitude.
We assume that this also holds for firm size, and hence assume a negative influence
(and by extension a positive sign) of size it for the write-off magnitude. To account for
the effect on write-offs a high quality audit might have we include big4 it, which is an
indicator variable equal to 1 when company i has been audited by a Big Four audit
company (PwC, KPMG, Ernst & Young or Deloitte) in t and zero otherwise. Following
the same argumentation as for firm size, we expect that an audit by a Big Four audit
8Our data on the gross domestic product were obtained from Eurostat http://epp.eurostat.ec.
europa.eu/portal/page/portal/national_accounts/data/main_tables (website last accessed at
October 26th, 2012). We use the gross domestic product at market prices at current prices in millions
of Euro and calculated the changes ourselves.
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company increases the probability of recognizing a write-off and decreases the write-off
magnitude.
Previous research has proven that prior period write-offs increase the probability
of future write-offs (Elliott and Hanna (1996); Francis, Hanna and Vincent (1996)).
To control for this effect we include WO prev it in the participation decision and the
amount decision and wo prev it only in the participation decision. WO prev it is the
natural logarithm of the amount of write-offs company i reported in the period previous
to t relative to the total assets at the end of the period previous to t. We do not take the
absolute value here; thus, changes in WO prev it are of the same sign as changes in the
absolute value of previous year write-offs. wo prev it is an indicator variable equal to 1 if
company i reported a write-off in the period previous to t and zero otherwise. We expect
that the occurrence of a write-off in the previous period increases the probability of a
write-off in t. For the magnitude of the previous year write-off we assume that a higher
write-off in the previous period decreases the write-off probability and magnitude in
the current period. Following Wooldridge (2010), we adapt the models to panel data
by including a complete set of year dummies (β15−20Year t, γ12−17Year t). To control for
serial correlation we use robust standard errors clustered at the company level.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table B.5 provides descriptive statistics for our sample firm-years. The upper section
of Table B.5 depicts the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values and
the 25%, 50% and 75% quartiles for the continuous variables, while the lower section
shows the mean, standard deviation and the amount of zeros and ones for the indicator
variables.
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(Table B.5 about here)
We find that in 45% of our sample firm-years a write-off has been realized. A write-
off of goodwill and other intangible assets has only been recorded in 16% and 17%
respectively of our sample firm-years, while a write-off of property, plant and equipment
has been realized in 33% of the sample. Hence, while write-offs, particularly of goodwill,
are highly discussed by theoreticians and practitioners equally, write-offs of property,
plant and equipment occur more than twice as often as write-offs of goodwill. However,
untabulated results for absolute write-offs show that mean absolute total write-offs
amount to e39 million. The mean absolute write-offs of goodwill, other intangible
assets and property, plant and equipment amount to e18 million, e6 million and e14
million respectively, showing that write-offs of goodwill are (as a mean) the largest
subgroup. Looking at the relative size of write-offs in relation to the total assets at
the beginning of the period (untabulated) we see that the mean of the relative total
write-offs amounts to 0.66% of total assets at the beginning of the period. Relative
goodwill, other intangibles and property, plant and equipment write-offs amount to
0.29%, 0.15% and 0.22% respectively. In summary, write-offs of property, plant and
equipment seem to occur more often, while write-offs of goodwill are higher in absolute
and relative magnitude.
Concerning the performance variables, we see that the average return on assets
amounts to 6.03 with a high standard deviation of 10.38. The mean operating cash
flow is 10% of total assets at the beginning of the period. The mean values for the
respective industry variables are the same as for the individuals. Additionally, we see
that 21% of our sample firms had a market-to-book ratio below one and 74% had
an industry average market-to-book ratio below the overall average of all sample firm-
years. For our management incentive variables we see that the mean big bath indicator
amounts to -0.02. As BigBath it equals the earnings management indicator, whenever
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this is below the industry mean earnings management indicator we expect a negative
value for BigBath it; the maximum value of 0.04 results from an industry mean earnings
management indicator higher than that. The mean income smoothing indicator is 0.03,
which as expected is a positive value. As there is no negative industry mean earnings
management indicator the minimum value is zero. The mean debt-to-asset ratio is
24.84%.
For our control variables we see that the average change in gross domestic product
amounts to 2%, with a minimum of -13% resulting from the United Kingdom in 2009
and a maximum of 20% resulting from Sweden in 2010. The mean natural logarithm
of total assets amounts to 13.97, and the (untabulated) mean total assets amount to
e6.6 billion. In 87% of our sample firm-years the audit has been conducted by a Big
Four audit company. Similar to the results regarding the current period, in 43% of
our sample firm-years a write-off in the previous firm-year has been recorded. 16%
recorded a write-off of goodwill in the prior period, 15% a write-off of other intangibles
and 31% a write-off of property, plant and equipment. The mean absolute amount of
previous year total write-offs (untabulated) is e36 million, comprising mean absolute
amounts of previous year write-offs of goodwill, other intangibles and property, plant
and equipment of e18 million, e6 million and e13 million respectively. The relative
amounts of write-offs are 0.59%, 0.24%, 0.13% and 0.23% of previous period total assets
for total write-offs, write-offs of goodwill, write-offs of other intangibles and write-offs
of property, plant and equipment respectively.
Table B.6 displays the descriptive statistics separated for companies that recorded a
write-off and companies that did not record a write-off in the current period. In Panel
A the segmentation is performed based on all companies, while panels B to D analyze
the differences between write-off and non-write-off firm-years for the country clusters.
(Table B.6 about here)
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Regarding Panel A we see that the return on assets and the relative operating cash
flow are significantly higher for non-write-off firm-years than they are for write-off firm-
years. Interestingly, the industry’s mean of return on assets and relative operating
cashflow are significantly higher for write-off firm-years than they are for non-write-
off firm-years, indicating that write-off companies operate in industries with higher
performance. 25% of the write-off firm-years have a market-to-book ratio below one,
while this is true only for 17% of the non-write-off firm-years. Similarly, in 77% of
the write-off firm-years and only 71% of the non-write-off firm-years the industry’s
mean market-to-book ratio is below the overall average market-to-book ratio of the
whole sample. Both differences are statistically significant. Considering management
incentives, we see that there is no significant difference in the big bath indicator while
the income smoothing indicator is significantly higher for the non-write-off firm-years.
This is in contrast to our expectations and may indicate that the companies that
write off are not those with the highest performance. Similar results are presented
by Strong and Meyer (1987). The debt-to-asset ratio of the write-off firm-years is
significantly higher than that of the non-write-off firm-years, indicating that leverage
is not an incentive for earnings management to reduce the cost of capital and the risk
of a covenant breach but proxies for the monitoring by creditors. Our control variables
are distributed as expected: write-off companies are significantly larger, have been
audited significantly more often by a Big Four company and recorded a write-off in the
previous year more often and of a lower magnitude than the non-write-off companies.
Regarding panels B to D of Table B.6, we see that most results are robust for the three
country clusters but some are not. For ‘outsider economies’ and ‘insider economies with
weak enforcement’ we see that neither the big bath indicator nor the income smoothing
indicator is significantly different between the two groups, while for ‘insider economies
with strong enforcement’ the means of both variables differ significantly. However, as
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with the income smoothing indicator in Panel A, the differences are the opposite of
what we expected, indicating that in this cluster it is neither the best nor the worst
performing company in a particular industry that records write-offs. Influences of the
company’s industry seem to be less important for ‘insider economies’. We find that the
industry’s mean operating cash flow does not differ significantly between write-off and
non-write-off companies in ‘insider economies with strong enforcement’; this is also true
for the indicator variable for an industry market-to-book ratio below the overall average
for ‘insider economies with weak enforcement’. For the latter, the company’s individual
operating cash flow, which should be the basis for the calculation of a write-off, is not
significantly different either. In summary, we see that earnings management has no
significant influence in outsider economies, but is significant for ‘insider economies
with strong enforcement’. For ‘insider economies with weak enforcement’ we do not
find evidence of earnings management but see that it does not seem to be the operating
cash flow that drives write-offs.
Table B.7 shows the correlation matrix of the variables used in the further analyses.
(Table B.7 about here)
The correlations are (after the preceding results) of the expected sign and relatively
low. Hence multicollinearity should not be a problem for the further analyses.
3.5.2 Multivariate Results
3.5.2.1 Model Comparison and Overall Results
We start our analysis by comparing the Tobit model and the Cragg model. Table B.8
displays the results of the two regressions.
(Table B.8 about here)
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A comparison of the results of the Tobit model to the results of the Cragg model
is difficult, as in the former the participation decision and the amount decision are
modeled at once, and we predicted different signs at the two stages for most variables.
We see that the sign and significance of the performance variables are similar to those
of the participation decision in the Cragg model, except for the industry’s operating
cash flow, which is significant at the 5% level with a negative sign in the Tobit model,
similar to the amount decision in the Cragg model. The income smoothing indicator
is significant (at 1%) with a negative sign, again comparable to the amount decision.
The influence of the control variables is comparable to the participation decision except
for the previous year write-off magnitude, which has a negative sign as in the amount
decision of the Cragg model. The Tobit model has an adjusted R2 (untabulated) of
9.51%, comparable to prior studies (Francis, Hanna and Vincent (1996); Riedl (2004);
AbuGhazaleh, Al-Hares and Roberts (2011)). As it is nested in the Cragg model, we
can easily test the models against each other using the likelihood ratio test. We obtain
a likelihood-ratio statistic of 3,856, resulting in a p-value of essentially zero, and hence
can strongly reject the Tobit model in favor of the Cragg model and conduct our further
analysis applying the Cragg model alone.
Regarding hypothesis 1a we see that the influence of roa it and mtbit is significant
at the 1% level and in line with our expectations. The probability of a write-off
increases with a decreasing return on assets and when the market-to-book ratio falls
below one. Contrary to our expectations, regarding the influence of ocf it we find a
significant (5%) positive influence on the write-off decision, meaning that companies
with higher operating cash flows are more likely to recognize a write-off. Cotter, Stokes
and Wyatt (1998) argue that companies with higher capacity to write down recognize
higher write-offs because they are able to absorb financial effects such as increasing
book value leverage without suffering a negative effect on their business. They use
94
lower leverage and higher cash reserves as proxies for the capacity to write off. The
increasing capacity to absorb write-offs due to higher operating cash flows could be an
explanation for the positive relationship we find.
We find no support for our hypothesis 2a. ind ocf it and ind mtbit are not significant
and ind roa it has a significant positive (5%) influence on the write-off probability. An
increase in the write-off probability due to an increase in the average return on assets
of the industry in which the company operates could – especially in combination with
the significant negative influence of roa it – result from higher pressure on individual
firm performance in better performing industries. Looking at the results for roa it and
ind roa it in Table B.6 we see that for non-write-off firm-years the mean of roa it is above
that of ind roa it, while for write-off firm-years it is below the mean of ind roa it.
We do not find support for our hypotheses 3a and 4a either. All three variables,
BigBath it, IncSmooth it and dta it, are insignificant for the write-off decision.
Looking at the control variables we find that ∆gdpit has no significant influence;
size it, big4 it and wo prev it are significant at the 1% level and have the expected pos-
itive signs. WO prev it is significant as well (5%) but has a positive sign, contrary to
our expectations, indicating that the probability of a write-off increases with higher
previous year write-offs.
In the interpretation of the factors influencing the write-off magnitude several points
require special attention. First, the results indicate the effect of the independent vari-
ables on the write-off magnitude, given that a write-off has been recognized. Second,
we used the absolute value of the natural logarithm of write-off magnitude relative to
the total assets at the beginning of the period as the dependent variable; therefore,
in the interpretation of the signs we have to consider that a positive sign indicates a
negative relationship between the dependent and independent variables.
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Regarding hypothesis 1b we find roa it to be significant at the 1% level with the
expected positive sign, indicating that the write-off-magnitude – given that there is
a write-off – increases with decreasing return on assets. ocf it has a negative sign,
indicating a positive influence as in the participation decision, but is significant only
at the 10% level. Regarding hypothesis 2b, ind roa it has the expected positive sign
(contrary to the influence on the write-off decision) and is significant at the 1% level,
indicating that if a write-off is recognized, its magnitude increases with decreasing
industry mean return on assets. This could follow from the reduced expectations for
future development that follow from a reduced industry performance. Contrary to our
expectations, ind ocf it is significant at the 1% level with a negative sign, indicating
that a higher industry mean operating cash flow increases the write-off magnitude,
conditional on a write-off being recognized. Similar to the argumentation for ocf it, the
positive influence could result from companies expecting lower future cash flows if they
operate in industries with lower average operating cash flows and hence write off less,
as they expect a decrease in their capacity to absorb write-offs.
We find strong support for our hypothesis 3b, as the big bath indicator is significant
at the 5% level with the expected positive sign, indicating that if a write-off is recog-
nized, its magnitude increases if the earnings of the company are unexpectedly low. The
income smoothing indicator is significant at the 1% level with the expected negative
sign, indicating that if a write-off is recorded its magnitude increases if the company’s
earnings are unexpectedly high. Again, we find no support for our hypothesis 4b as
the influence of dta it is not significant.
Regarding the control variables, we obtain the expected results except for WO prev it.
If the company writes off, the write-off amount increases for smaller growth in gross
domestic product and for smaller firm size. Whether the company has been audited
by a Big Four audit company has no influence on the write-off magnitude. Contrary
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to our expectations, WO prev it has a negative sign and is significant at the 1% level.
This indicates that if a write-off is recognized, the write-off magnitude increases with
increasing magnitude of previous year write-offs.
Taken together, our results show that the write-off decisions of European publicly
listed companies are mainly influenced by asset impairment while earnings management
has no significant influence. On the other hand, earnings management is an important
determinant of the write-off magnitude, conditional on the recognition of a write-off.
While asset impairment has a significant influence as well, we find highly significant
evidence of income smoothing and big bath accounting.
3.5.2.2 Results by Country Cluster
The results of our analysis by country cluster are given in Table B.9. The results of
the Cragg model for all countries from Table B.8 are given as a reference.
(Table B.9 about here)
For ‘outsider economies’ we see that the write-off decision seems to be driven only by
asset impairment. roa it and mtbit have a significant influence on the expected direction
while industry influences are not significant. Hence we can confirm hypothesis 1a but
cannot confirm hypothesis 2a. There is no significant evidence of earnings management
either; BigBath it, IncSmooth it and dta it are not significant.
For the write-off magnitude this looks quite different. While there is still a significant
negative influence of roa it, industry influences are significant here as well. ind roa it has
a significant negative influence, in line with hypothesis 2b, but ind ocf it is significant
with a positive influence. We additionally find evidence for hypothesis 3b, as BigBath it
and IncSmooth it are significant with the expected signs.
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For ‘insider economies with strong enforcement’ we find a significant influence of
asset impairment on the write-off decision too, as roa it and mtbit are significant with
the expected signs. However, we also find that ocf it and ind roa it have a significant
positive influence, contrary to what we expected. Additionally, IncSmooth it has a
significant negative influence, indicating that companies with an unexpectedly high
income do not take write-offs. dta it is significantly negative, supporting the hypothesis
that highly levered firms try to delay write-offs.
For the write-off magnitude we find support for our hypotheses 1b and 2b as roa it,
and ind roa it have a significant negative influence. ind ocf it is significant with a positive
influence, contrary to our expectations. We do not find evidence for hypotheses 3b or
4b here.
In ‘insider economies with weak enforcement’ the write-off decision seems to be driven
by firm performance. However, while roa it and mtbit are significant with the expected
signs, we again find a significant positive influence of ocf it.
The write-off magnitude seems to be determined materially by firm performance, and
roa it has a highly significant negative influence. However, here we find weak evidence
of income smoothing, as IncSmooth it has a significant negative influence.
Table B.10 gives an overview of the confirmation and rejection of our hypotheses for
the regressions by country cluster.
(Table B.10 about here)
Taken together, we could not confirm our assumption that the influence of asset
impairment decreases from cluster 1 to cluster 3 while that of earnings management
increases. Rather, we find evidence of earnings management in all three clusters, but
it is clear that different strategies are applied. In ‘outsider economies’ we find strong
evidence of big bath accounting and income smoothing in the write-off magnitude. The
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motivation for both strategies is to influence the perception of capital market partici-
pants, which is most important for countries in ‘outsider economies’. So, contrary to
what we expected, the high investor protection in ‘outsider economies’ does not suffice
to prevent earnings management from influencing the write-off magnitude. For the
‘insider economies’ we did not find such clear patterns of earnings management, but
one characteristic of such economies is that the capital market is not that important.
Hence, it is not too surprising that we do not find strong evidence of big bath ac-
counting and income smoothing. Nevertheless, the significant positive influence of the
operating cash flow still indicates that write-offs are managed. Finally, this analysis
proves that the factors that drive fixed asset write-offs vary between the EU15 member
states and that further steps are necessary to reach uniform accounting across Europe.
3.5.2.3 Changes in Differences between Country Clusters
It could be assumed that differences in the process to determine write-offs reduce over
time. On the contrary, Kvaal and Nobes (2012) argue that a company has an incentive
to maintain its accounting policy over time to reduce costs. To analyze whether the
differences in the processes driving write-offs decrease we partition our sample into two
periods, the first ranging from 2005 to 2008 and the second from 2009 to 2011. For
each country cluster we then compute the regression for both periods to see whether
there are material changes in the determinants of fixed asset write-offs and whether –
due to these changes – the practices are more similar in the latter period or if national
differences persist. Table B.11 shows the results of the regressions for the two periods.
(Table B.11 about here)
Regarding the write-off decision, we see that firm performance is less important in
the second period. For ‘outsider economies’ roa it is completely insignificant, and for
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the ‘insider economies’ the positive influence of ocf it becomes insignificant. While the
influence of mtbit becomes insignificant for clusters 1 and 2, it is significant only in the
second period for cluster 3. Similarly, ind roa it is significant in the second period for
clusters 1 and 2 but only in the first period for cluster 3.
Regarding the write-off magnitude we see again that the association with firm per-
formance decreases; roa it is completely insignificant for ‘outsider economies’ and ocf it
becomes insignificant in cluster 3. In contrast, the association with ind roa it increases
for clusters 1 and 2 and ind ocf it becomes significant for cluster 1. Interestingly, we see
that IncSmooth it has a significant negative influence in the first period for all three clus-
ters but becomes insignificant in the second period. However, for cluster 2 BigBath it
becomes significant in the second period.
In summary, we see that there are certain changes in the processes that drive write-
offs. Two important points have to be noted for these changes. First, changes seem
to reduce the influence of asset impairment on write-offs. Second, while the processes
that drive write-offs in clusters 1 and 2 seem to become more similar, the determinants
of write-offs in cluster 3 change somewhat individually.
3.6 Further Analyses
3.6.1 Results by Industry
To see whether systematic differences in the write-off behavior between different in-
dustries exist, we ran our regression separately for all industries. The results of these
analyses are given in Table B.12. Mirroring our approach in the country cluster anal-
ysis, we included the results of the Cragg model for all industries as a reference.
(Table B.12 about here)
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From Table B.12 we see that the determinants of fixed asset write-offs vary sig-
nificantly over the industries analyzed. We sorted the industries according to the
write-off behavior; industries in which write-offs largely depend on asset impairment
are displayed on the left side, while industries in which earnings management is an
important factor are displayed on the right. We did not obtain plausible results for
the determinants of write-offs in the mining industry. Hence, either write-offs in the
‘Mining’-industry are determined by factors we did not include in our analysis, or the
insignificant results follow from the relatively small sample size. Similarly, the re-
sults for the industries ‘Wholesale Trade’ and ‘Construction’ have to be interpreted
cautiously as we do not find significant results, at least for the write-off decision.
For the first stage regarding hypothesis 1a we see that roait has a significant nega-
tive influence and ocf it has a significant positive influence for the industries ‘Service’,
‘Manufacturing’, ‘Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Ser-
vices’ (henceforth ‘Transportation’ for simplicity), and ‘Retail Trade’, as in the analysis
of all industries. mtbit has no significant influence in the ‘Transportation’ industry but
is significantly positive for the other three industries and ‘Wholesale Trade’. Hence,
we obtain results that support hypothesis 1a as well as results that negate it for all
industries except for ‘Construction’ and ‘Mining’, for which we obtain no significant
results. IncSmooth it and BigBath it are insignificant for all industries except ‘Wholesale
Trade’, where IncSmooth it has a significant (10%) negative influence, suggesting that
the best companies in this industry do not write off. dta it has a significant negative
influence in the ‘Transportation’ industry, confirming hypothesis 4a, and is insignif-
icant for all other industries. size it is significantly positive for all industries except
‘Construction’ and ‘Mining’, and wo prev it is significantly positive for all industries.
Surprisingly, big4 it is significant only in the ‘Manufacturing’ industry, which is by
far the largest industry and hence probably drives the results of our main regression.
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Similarly, WO prev it has a significant negative influence only for ‘Manufacturing’ and
‘Transportation’ companies.
The results for the amount decision are a little more surprising. roa it has a significant
negative influence in support of hypothesis 1a, as in the main regression, for all indus-
tries except ‘Mining’. Contrary to hypothesis 1a, ocf it is significant with a negative
sign for the industries ‘Services’, ‘Retail Trade’, and ‘Wholesale Trade’, which , with
the addition of ‘Construction’, are the industries in which BigBath it is significant. This
is another indicator that the positive relationship between ocf it and WO it results from
earnings management. IncSmooth it is significant with a negative sign in line with our
expectations in all industries except ‘Services’ and ‘Mining’. As in the main regression,
WO prev ithas a significant influence for all industries except ‘Mining’. The results are
presented in a condensed form in Table B.13.
(Table B.13 about here)
Summarizing the above discussion we see that the determinants of fixed asset write-
offs and the use of earnings management vary across the industries. While the partic-
ipation decision follows similar processes across the industries, except for ‘Wholesale
Trade,’ ‘Construction’ and ‘Mining’, which have small sample sizes, the amount deci-
sion follows different patterns. Big bath accounting is significant only for ‘Services’,
‘Retail Trade’, ‘Wholesale Trade’ and ‘Construction’; income smoothing, on the other
hand, prevails in all industries except ‘Services’ and ‘Mining’.
3.6.2 Results by Type of Write-off
Francis, Hanna and Vincent (1996) state that they expect earnings management to
be more important in determining write-offs of goodwill than of property, plant and
equipment. They explain their assumption as the result of the existence of market
102
prices for the latter group and the necessity of subjective valuation for the former. To
analyze whether different determinants drive fixed asset write-offs we analyze the write-
offs of goodwill, other intangible assets and property, plant and equipment separately.
Similar to Francis, Hanna and Vincent (1996) we assume that write-offs of goodwill
are driven by earnings management, while write-offs of property, plant and equipment
are driven by asset impairment. Other intangible assets are assumed to be somewhere
in the middle as this category comprises assets for which market prices exist as well as
assets without market prices. Table B.14 shows the results of the regressions with the
basic regression from Table B.8 as a reference, as before.
(Table B.14 about here)
Looking at the participation decision we see for hypothesis 1a that the influence
of roa it is in line with our expectations; it is robust for all types of write-offs and
equal to that in the regression for all write-offs. The negative influence of ocf it, which
is contrary to our hypothesis 1a, is significant only for goodwill write-offs (1%) and
other intangible asset write-offs (10%), another indication that this is due to earnings
management, as assumed. In contrast, the positive influence of mtbit is significant
for goodwill and property, plant and equipment write-offs but insignificant for write-
offs of other intangible assets. Regarding hypothesis 2a we find that the positive
influence of ind roa it on the write-off decision seems to be driven solely by write-offs of
property, plant and equipment. Interestingly, we find a significant negative influence of
ind ocf it for property, plant and equipment, supporting hypothesis 2a, while there is a
highly significant positive relationship with other intangible asset write-offs, contrary to
hypothesis 2a. This is again suggestive of earnings management. For ind mtbit we find a
positive influence for other intangible assets and property, plant and equipment, which
is in line with our expectations; surprisingly, we find a significant negative relation for
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write-offs of goodwill, indicating that the write-off probability decreases if the market-
to-book ratio of the industry is relatively low. This result could stem from the fact
that managers try to delay goodwill write-offs when their expectations are bad.
Consistent with our expectations we find a significant relationship of BigBath it and
IncSmooth it with the probability of goodwill write-offs, but the signs are the opposite
of what we expected; hence, we have to reject hypothesis 3a for goodwill. This result is
again comparable to the finding of Strong and Meyer (1987). Neither the strongest nor
the weakest companies in a particular industry recognize goodwill write-offs. On the
contrary, we find support for big bath accounting for other intangible assets. There is
no significant relationship of BigBath it and IncSmooth it with the probability of write-
offs of property, plant and equipment. dta it has a significant negative influence on the
goodwill write-off probability, which shows that the write-off probability decreases with
rising leverage. Additionally, we find that big4 it is insignificant for goodwill write-offs,
while it is highly significant for write-offs of other intangible assets and property, plant
and equipment. The influence of size it and wo prev it is in line with our expectations
and robust for all types of write-offs.
Regarding the second stage we see again that the influence of roa it is robust over
all types of write-offs, confirming hypothesis 1b. ocf it is highly significant with a
negative sign for write-offs of property, plant and equipment, which is contrary to
what we expected, and insignificant for the other types of write-off, while ind ocf it is
significant with a negative sign only for these types. The other results are in sharp
contrast to what we expected: ind roa it is highly significant with a positive sign as
expected only for write-offs of goodwill and other intangible assets. BigBath it and
IncSmooth it are highly significant with the expected signs for write-offs of property,
plant and equipment. IncSmooth it is significant for other intangible assets as well,
but both earnings management variables are insignificant for write-offs of goodwill.
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Thus, contrary to what we expected we can confirm hypothesis 3b for other intangible
assets and property, plant and equipment but not for goodwill. dta it is insignificant
for all types of write-offs. As in the first stage, size it and WO prev it have a significant
influence that is in line with the overall regression. Table B.15 provides an overview of
the rejection and confirmation of our hypotheses.
(Table B.15 about here)
Altogether we find mixed results. We could not confirm our assumption that write-
offs of property, plant and equipment follow asset impairment while goodwill write-offs
are driven by earnings management. Rather, all analyzed types of write-offs seem to
be driven by asset impairment and earnings management. For the write-off decision
we find more support for earnings management for write-offs of goodwill, but there is
strong support for income smoothing and big bath accounting regarding the write-off
magnitude for property, plant and equipment. The participation decision as well as
the amount decision for write-offs of other intangible assets is significantly driven by
earnings management.
3.7 Robustness and Limitations
To be sure about our model choice we performed the analyses for country clusters,
industries and types of write-offs for both the Cragg model and the Tobit model. For
all regressions we had to reject the Tobit model in favor of the Cragg model, implying
that our model choice seems to be correct. That said, the Tobit model still reached
pseudo R2 between 9% and 14%, which is comparable to prior studies.
Regarding our management incentives for income smoothing and big bath accounting
we assumed a geometric Brownian motion to drive the EBIT with the industry’s mean
EBIT growth as drift. Francis, Hanna and Vincent (1996) assume a random walk and
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hence no drift to drive the pre-write-off earnings. We repeated our basic regression with
our income smoothing and big bath indicator defined based on a random walk – the
big bath indicator equals the earnings management indicator when this is below zero
and the income smoothing indicator equals the earnings management indicator when it
is above zero – and obtained qualitatively similar results, although the significance of
the management incentives decreased. Similarly, we repeated our analysis to define the
management incentives in accordance with Riedl (2004) and AbuGhazaleh, Al-Hares
and Roberts (2011). The income smoothing indicator equals the earnings management
indicator when this is above the median of non-zero positive values within the industry,
and the big bath indicator equals the earnings management indicator when this is below
the median of non-zero negative values within the industry. Neither Riedl (2004) nor
AbuGhazaleh, Al-Hares and Roberts (2011) include the industry in this analysis, but
we think that this is straightforward as we include industries in this analysis. Using
this definition we obtain similar results as for the definition following Francis, Hanna
and Vincent (1996).
Across all our analyses we find a positive influence of the operating cash flow and
the industry’s mean operating cash flow on the write-off decision and magnitude. This
result could proxy for earnings management, but could also result from the fact that
we had to use data at the company level to proxy for impairment at the asset level.
This is a limitation due to data availability that could not be avoided.
Furthermore, we did not include measures for management changes, earnings-based
bonus payments or corporate governance in our analyses, which have previously been
shown to have a significant influence on fixed asset write-offs. The goal of our analysis
was to gain an overview of the processes that drive fixed asset write-offs across Europe.
Therefore, we focused on national differences. Further analyses, including differences




This study analyzes the determinants of fixed asset write-offs in Europe. We compare
the Cragg model and the Tobit model and find that the Cragg model fits better. This
model has the advantage that the drivers of the participation decision (whether the
company recognizes a write-off) can by analyzed separately from the drivers of the
amount decision (given that the company recognizes a write-off, what amount will be
written off). We find that the participation decision is mainly driven by asset impair-
ment while there is strong support for big bath accounting and income smoothing in the
amount decision. Analyzing the three country clusters ‘outsider economies’, ‘insider
economies with strong enforcement’ and ‘insider economies with weak enforcement’,
we find that in ‘outsider economies’ the write-off magnitude seems to be driven by
earnings management. For the two clusters for ‘insider economies’ we do not obtain
such clear results, but we can show that it is not only asset impairment that drives
write-offs. Altogether, we find that there are large differences in the drivers of write-off
decisions and magnitudes across the country clusters that did not dissolve over time.
This analysis shows that the harmonization of financial reporting, which was the aim
of the mandatory adoption of IFRS, has not yet happened. As the processes that drive
asset write-offs in ‘outsider economies’ and ‘insider economies with strong enforcement’
seem to align, we have to conclude that enforcement is important in reaching this har-
monization. In conclusion we have to agree with the existing literature which assumes




Table B.1: Sample selection
Panel A: Selection of the final sample for further analysis
companies firm-years
Companies listed in the Datastream Global Equity Indices of EU15 member
states between 2004 and 2011
1,893 15,144
Not EU15 (23) (184)
Financial companies (490) (3,920)
No complete dataset (78) (3,765)
Industry with fewer than five companies (2) (7)
Final sample of firm-years 1,300 7,268
















United Kingdom 305 1,585
Total 1,300 7,268
Panel C: Sample by industry
companies firm-years




Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services 179 1,009
Wholesale Trade 51 283
Retail Trade 78 406
Services 222 1,211
Total 1,300 7,268
Panel D: Sample by type of write-off
companies firm-years
Companies reporting write-offs 957 3,269
Companies reporting goodwill write-offs 558 1,183
Companies reporting write-offs of intangible assets (other than goodwill) 510 1,246
Companies reporting write-offs of property, plant and equipment 751 2,383
Table B.1 describes the sample used for the further analysis. Panel A exhibits the process of sample selection
and panels B to D partition the sample by country, industry and type of write-off.
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Table B.2: Allocation of countries to country clusters
Cluster 1: Cluster 2: Cluster 3:
Outsider economies Insider economies with Insider economies with
high enforcement low enforcement









Table B.2 displays the allocation of the sample countries to the three country
clusters according to Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003).
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Table B.3: Variable definitions
woit An indicator variable equal to 1 if company i recognized a write-off in t and zero
otherwise.
(.) woit An indicator variable equal to 1 if company i recognized a write-off of (.) – GW for
Goodwill, Int for other intangible assets or PPE for property plant and equipment –
in t and zero otherwise.
WOit The natural logarithm of the fixed asset write-offs of company i in t relative to the
total assets of company i in the period previous to t when company i recognized a
write-off in t and zero otherwise.
(.) WOit The natural logarithm of the fixed asset write-offs of company i on (.) – GW for
Goodwill, Int for other intangible assets or PPE for property plant and equipment –
in t relative to the total assets of company i in the period previous to t when company
i recognized a write-off in t and zero otherwise.
roait The return on assets of company i in t.
ocf it The operating cash flow from company i in t divided by total assets of company i at
the end of the period previous to t.
mtbit An indicator variable equal to 1 if the market-to-book ratio of company i is lower
than 1 in t and zero otherwise.
ind roait The mean return on assets of company i’s industry in t; industries are defined based
on the SIC code divisions.
ind ocf it The mean operating cash flow scaled by previous period total assets from company
i’s industry in t; industries are defined based on the SIC code divisions.
ind mtbit An indicator variable equal to 1 if the mean market-to-book ratio of company i’s
industry is lower than the mean market-to-book ratio of all sample companies in t
and zero otherwise.
emiit The difference between EBIT before impairment losses of company i in t and previous
year EBIT of company i scaled by previous year total assets.
BigBathit Proxy for unexpected low earnings equal to emiit if emiit is lower than the mean of
emiit over i’s industry and zero otherwise.
IncSmoothit Proxy for unexpected high earnings equal to emiit if emiit exceeds the mean of emiit
over i’s industry and zero otherwise.
dtait The debt-to-asset ratio of company i in t.
∆gdpit The change in gross domestic product of the country company i is domiciled in from
t− 1 to t.
sizeit The natural logarithm of total assets of company i in t.
big4 it An indicator variable equal to 1 if company has been audited by a Big Four audit
company – KPMG, PwC, Deloitte, Ernst & Young – in t and zero otherwise.
wo prev it An indicator variable equal to 1 if company i recognized a write-off in the period
previous to t and zero otherwise.
(.) wo prev it An indicator variable equal to 1 if company i recognized a write-off of (.) – GW for
Goodwill, Int for other intangible assets or PPE for property plant and equipment –
in the period previous to t and zero otherwise.
WO prev it The natural logarithm of the fixed asset write-offs of company i in the period previous
to t relative to the total assets of company i in the period previous to t when company
i recognized a write-off in this period and zero otherwise.
(.) WO prev it The natural logarithm of the fixed asset write-offs of company i on (.) – GW for
Goodwill, Int for other intangible assets or PPE for property plant and equipment
– in the period previous to t relative to the total assets of company i in the period
previous to t when company i recognized a write-off in this period and zero otherwise.
Table B.3 exhibits the variable definitions for the variables used in the further analyses.
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Table B.4: Rationale for expected signs
Write-off decision Write-off magnitude
Change in Expected change Resulting Expected change Resulting change in the Resulting change in Resulting
independent variable in write-off probability expected sign in relative write-off magnitude natural logarithm of the the absolute value expected sign
relative write-off magnitude
roait ↑ Pr(woit = 1) ↓ - EXP(WO it) ↓ WO it ↓ |WO it| ↑ +
ocf it ↑ Pr(woit = 1) ↓ - EXP(WO it) ↓ WO it ↓ |WO it| ↑ +
mtbit ↑ Pr(woit = 1) ↑ + n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
ind roait ↑ Pr(woit = 1) ↓ - EXP(WO it) ↓ WO it ↓ |WO it| ↑ +
ind ocf it ↑ Pr(woit = 1) ↓ - EXP(WO it) ↓ WO it ↓ |WO it| ↑ +
ind mtbit ↑ Pr(woit = 1) ↑ + n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
BigBathit ↑ Pr(woit = 1) ↓ - EXP(WO it) ↓ WO it ↓ |WO it| ↑ +
IncSmoothit ↑ Pr(woit = 1) ↑ + EXP(WO it) ↑ WO it ↑ |WO it| ↓ -
dtait ↑ Pr(woit = 1) n.a. +/- EXP(WO it) n.a. WO it n.a. |WO it| n.a. +/-
∆gdpit ↑ Pr(woit = 1) ↓ - EXP(WO it) ↓ WO it ↓ |WO it| ↑ +
sizeit ↑ Pr(woit = 1) ↑ + EXP(WO it) ↓ WO it ↓ |WO it| ↑ +
big4 it ↑ Pr(woit = 1) ↑ + EXP(WO it) ↓ WO it ↓ |WO it| ↑ +
wo prev it ↑ Pr(woit = 1) ↑ + n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
WO prev it ↑ Pr(woit = 1) ↓ - EXP(WO it) ↓ WO it ↓ |WO it| ↑ +
Table B.4 gives a rationale for the expected signs in the regression analysis. The expression EXP(WO it) indicates that we raise the natural logarithm of the relative
write-offs to the power of the Euler constant to receive the relative write-off.
Table B.5: Descriptive statistics
continuous Mean Standard Min 25%- Median 75%- Max N
variables Deviation Quartile Quartile
WO it -2.61 3.15 -14.47 -5.46 0.00 0.00 0.37 7,268
GW WO it -0.95 2.32 -13.89 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.37 7,268
Int WO it -1.14 2.64 -15.49 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7,268
PPE WO it -2.09 3.17 -14.47 -5.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 7,268
roait 6.03 10.38 -174.60 2.95 5.79 9.32 134.10 7,268
ocf it 0.10 0.13 -3.18 0.05 0.09 0.14 2.62 7,268
ind roait 6.03 0.89 4.14 5.42 6.18 6.18 8.09 7,268
ind ocf it 0.10 0.02 0.06 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.15 7,268
BigBathit -0.02 0.06 -3.88 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.04 7,268
IncSmoothit 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 1.84 7,268
dtait 24.84 21.24 0.00 10.88 23.30 35.32 885.58 7,268
∆gdpit 0.02 0.06 -0.13 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.20 7,268
sizeit 13.97 1.81 3.91 12.71 13.86 15.09 19.39 7,268
WO prev it -2.52 3.17 -14.53 -5.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 7,268
GW WO prev it -0.94 2.33 -13.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7,268
Int WO prev it -1.02 2.55 -15.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7,268
PPE WO prev it -2.00 3.14 -14.53 -4.94 0.00 0.00 0.00 7,268
Indicator Mean Standard 0 1 N
variables Deviation
woit 0.45 0.50 3,999 3,269 7,268
GW woit 0.16 0.37 6,085 1,183 7,268
Int woit 0.17 0.38 6,022 1,246 7,268
PPE woit 0.33 0.47 4,885 2,383 7,268
mtbit 0.21 0.41 5,765 1,503 7,268
ind mtbit 0.74 0.44 1,900 5,368 7,268
big4 it 0.87 0.34 948 6,320 7,268
wo prev it 0.43 0.49 4,160 3,108 7,268
GW wo prev it 0.16 0.36 6,135 1,133 7,268
Int wo prev it 0.15 0.36 6,165 1,103 7,268
PPE wo prev it 0.31 0.46 4,996 2,272 7,268
Table B.5 provides descriptive statistics for the sample observations.
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Table B.6: Descriptive statistics separated by write-off and non-write-off firm-years
Panel A: All companies Panel B: Outsider Economies
Non-write-off firm-years (N=3,999) Write-off firm-years (N=3,269) Non-write-off firm-years (N=980) Write-off firm-years (N=605)
Mean Median Standard Mean Median Standard Mean Median Standard Mean Median Standard
(p-value) Deviation Deviation (p-value) Deviation Deviation
roait 7.32 6.58 10.41 4.45 4.76 10.13 9.59 7.98 8.94 6.50 5.86 11.94
(0.000) (0.000)
ocf it 0.11 0.10 0.15 0.09 0.08 0.11 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.10 0.10
(0.000) (0.003)
mtbit 0.17 0.00 0.38 0.25 0.00 0.43 0.13 0.00 0.34 0.23 0.00 0.42
(0.000) (0.000)
ind roait 5.98 6.18 0.88 6.09 6.18 0.91 6.11 6.18 1.05 6.45 6.18 1.17
(0.000) (0.000)
ind ocf it 0.102 0.10 0.02 0.103 0.10 0.02 0.105 0.10 0.02 0.110 0.10 0.02
(0.006) (0.000)
ind mtbit 0.71 1.00 0.45 0.77 1.00 0.42 0.60 1.00 0.49 0.66 1.00 0.47
(0.000) (0.032)
BigBathit -0.02 0.00 0.08 -0.01 0.00 0.04 -0.01 0.00 0.04 -0.02 0.00 0.04
(0.380) (0.201)
IncSmoothit 0.033 0.00 0.08 0.028 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.07 0.03 0.00 0.07
(0.007) (0.442)
dtait 23.55 21.27 24.38 26.41 25.53 16.46 19.95 18.06 17.50 24.12 22.84 15.47
(0.000) (0.000)
∆gdpit 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.06 -0.01 0.02 0.09 -0.02 0.02 0.09
(0.002) (0.003)
sizeit 13.43 13.38 1.64 14.63 14.52 1.80 13.59 13.40 1.40 14.63 14.49 1.72
(0.000) (0.000)
big4 it 0.83 1.00 0.37 0.91 1.00 0.28 0.94 1.00 0.25 0.98 1.00 0.13
(0.000) (0.000)
wo prev it 0.19 0.00 0.40 0.71 1.00 0.45 0.19 0.00 0.39 0.66 1.00 0.48
(0.000) (0.000)
WO prev it -1.16 0.00 2.54 -4.19 -4.95 3.06 -0.95 0.00 2.16 -3.46 -4.14 2.84
(0.000) (0.000)
Panel C: Insider economies with strong enforcement Panel D: Insider economies with weak enforcement
Non-write-off firm-years (N=2,073) Write-off firm-years (N=1,969) Non-write-off firm-years (N=910) Write-off firm-years (N=679)
Mean Median Standard Mean Median Standard Mean Median Standard Mean Median Standard
(p-value) Deviation Deviation (p-value) Deviation Deviation
roait 7.17 6.75 11.46 4.39 4.94 10.06 5.13 4.69 8.89 2.74 3.61 8.14
(0.000) (0.000)
ocf it 0.11 0.10 0.17 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.08 0.07 0.13 0.07 0.07 0.08
(0.000) (0.215)
mtbit 0.15 0.00 0.36 0.21 0.00 0.41 0.26 0.00 0.44 0.37 0.00 0.48
(0.000) (0.000)
ind roait 6.01 6.18 0.78 6.06 6.18 0.82 5.78 6.18 0.86 5.87 6.18 0.81
(0.054) (0.025)
ind ocf it 0.103 0.10 0.01 0.102 0.10 0.01 0.098 0.10 0.02 0.099 0.10 0.01
(0.351) (0.070)
ind mtbit 0.72 1.00 0.45 0.79 1.00 0.41 0.80 1.00 0.40 0.81 1.00 0.39
(0.000) (0.510)
BigBathit -0.02 0.00 0.06 -0.01 0.00 0.04 -0.02 0.00 0.13 -0.02 0.00 0.04
(0.097) (0.695)
IncSmoothit 0.037 0.00 0.10 0.028 0.00 0.06 0.022 0.00 0.07 0.022 0.00 0.06
(0.000) (0.930)
dtait 21.98 19.05 28.14 24.56 23.83 15.83 31.44 30.81 19.54 34.11 33.92 16.92
(0.000) (0.004)
∆gdpit 0.029 0.04 0.04 0.025 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.03
(0.020) (0.000)
sizeit 13.30 13.34 1.72 14.71 14.63 1.83 13.54 13.39 1.66 14.33 14.23 1.73
(0.000) (0.000)
big4 it 0.81 1.00 0.40 0.90 1.00 0.30 0.80 1.00 0.40 0.90 1.00 0.30
(0.000) (0.000)
wo prev it 0.21 0.00 0.41 0.74 1.00 0.44 0.16 0.00 0.37 0.70 1.00 0.46
(0.000) (0.000)
WO prev it -1.30 0.00 2.67 -4.33 -5.11 2.98 -1.08 0.00 2.60 -4.46 -5.15 3.37
(0.000) (0.000)
Table B.6 depicts descriptive statistics separated by write-off firm-years and non-write-off firm-years. Significance levels of t-tests for differences in
means are reported in parentheses. Panel A presents the results for all companies and panels B to D present the results for the country clusters.
Table B.7: Correlation analysis
woit WOit roait ocf it mtbit ind roait ind ocf it ind mtbit BigBathit IncSmoothit dtait ∆gdpit sizeit big4 it wo prev it WO prev it
woit 1.000 -0.943 -0.194 -0.104 0.088 0.055 -0.011 0.063 -0.025 -0.023 0.118 -0.077 0.329 0.118 0.522 -0.492
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.346) (0.000) (0.035) (0.048) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
WOit -0.916 1.000 -0.219 -0.110 0.096 0.052 -0.018 0.082 -0.037 -0.034 0.134 -0.080 0.436 0.135 0.523 0.500
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.117) (0.000) (0.002) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
roait -0.138 -0.153 1.000 0.610 -0.342 0.109 0.081 -0.028 0.233 0.293 -0.245 0.217 -0.057 0.006 -0.119 0.096
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.016) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.637) (0.000) (0.000)
ocf it -0.067 -0.067 0.732 1.000 -0.329 0.110 0.136 -0.037 0.186 0.270 -0.227 0.172 -0.061 0.002 -0.080 0.071
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.836) (0.000) (0.000)
mtbit 0.088 0.095 -0.195 -0.180 1.000 -0.020 -0.066 0.031 -0.145 -0.129 0.137 -0.210 0.023 -0.047 0.042 -0.033
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.094) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.047) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005)
ind roait 0.062 0.067 0.086 0.099 -0.033 1.000 0.479 -0.019 0.011 0.022 -0.099 0.006 -0.050 -0.017 0.059 -0.044
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.111) (0.370) (0.056) (0.000) (0.616) (0.000) (0.138) (0.000) (0.000)
ind ocf it 0.032 0.044 0.073 0.118 -0.058 0.844 1.000 -0.171 0.042 0.012 -0.144 -0.004 -0.184 -0.051 -0.006 0.030
(0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.328) (0.000) (0.709) (0.000) (0.000) (0.612) (0.011)
ind mtbit 0.063 0.084 -0.007 -0.020 0.031 -0.081 -0.553 1.000 -0.014 0.006 0.058 0.020 0.185 0.064 0.064 -0.066
(0.000) (0.000) (0.550) (0.087) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.226) (0.600) (0.000) (0.093) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
BigBathit 0.010 0.005 0.242 0.332 -0.080 0.005 -0.005 -0.008 1.000 0.302 -0.026 0.193 0.082 0.015 0.054 -0.044
(0.380) (0.647) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.677) (0.694) (0.516) (0.000) (0.030) (0.000) (0.000) (0.200) (0.000) (0.000)
IncSmoothit -0.032 -0.040 0.180 0.202 -0.046 0.046 0.071 0.018 0.097 1.000 -0.105 0.209 -0.095 -0.014 0.072 -0.010
(0.007) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.116) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.243) (0.000) (0.398)
dtait 0.067 0.080 -0.135 -0.141 0.148 -0.066 -0.063 0.045 -0.011 -0.060 1.000 -0.069 0.297 0.078 0.096 -0.102
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.367) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆gdpit -0.037 -0.048 0.092 0.069 -0.142 -0.037 -0.040 0.048 0.099 0.072 -0.030 1.000 0.027 0.022 0.052 -0.009
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.020) (0.061) (0.000) (0.441)
sizeit 0.328 0.450 0.066 0.004 0.013 0.001 -0.055 0.188 0.104 -0.128 0.185 0.016 1.000 0.224 0.326 -0.343
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.751) (0.252) (0.909) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.165) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
big4 it 0.118 0.136 0.021 0.013 -0.047 -0.015 -0.015 0.064 0.036 -0.018 0.062 0.043 0.224 1.000 0.117 0.112
(0.000) (0.000) (0.075) (0.267) (0.000) (0.204) (0.214) (0.000) (0.002) (0.118) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
wo prev it 0.522 0.522 -0.058 -0.055 0.042 0.066 0.039 0.064 0.052 0.051 0.061 0.051 0.326 0.117 1.000 -0.951
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
WO prev it -0.477 0.489 0.031 0.042 -0.029 -0.046 -0.007 -0.066 -0.046 0.034 -0.054 -0.030 -0.340 -0.107 -0.921 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.014) (0.000) (0.544) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.012) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Table B.7 exhibits the pairwise Pearson correlation coefficients in the lower left triangle. Pairwise Spearman correlation coefficients are provided in the upper right triangle. Significance levels
are reported below in parentheses.
Table B.8: Basic regression results
Cragg model Tobit model
N=7,268 N=7,268
Predicted Coefficient Predicted Coefficient Coefficient
Sign (Z-Statistic) Sign (Z-Statistic) (Z-Statistic)
Write-off Write-off Overall-
decision magnitude Model
constant +/- -3.625∗∗∗ +/- 5.800∗∗∗ -14.969∗∗∗
(-16.190) (12.630) (-17.330)
roait - -0.023
∗∗∗ + 0.055∗∗∗ -0.063∗∗∗
(-7.530) (5.820) (-7.340)
ocf it - 0.612





ind roait - 0.091
∗∗ + 0.257∗∗∗ 0.492∗∗∗
(2.260) (3.030) (3.430)
ind ocf it - -1.192 + -25.267
∗∗∗ -18.409∗∗
(-0.530) (-2.230)
ind mtbit + -0.005 0.019
(-0.120) (0.120)
BigBathit - -0.065 + 3.264
∗∗ 0.772
(-0.210) (2.150) (0.510)
IncSmoothit + -0.453 - -2.951
∗∗∗ -2.030∗
(-1.630) (-3.260) (-1.900)
dtait +/- -0.001 +/- 0.002 -0.003
(-1.370) (0.590) (-0.830)




∗∗∗ + 0.050∗∗ 0.811∗∗∗
(14.910) (2.050) (16.630)
big4 it + 0.165
∗∗∗ + -0.190 0.653∗∗∗
(2.890) (-1.260) (2.940)
wo prev it + 1.496
∗∗∗ 7.130∗∗∗
(15.020) (18.050)
WO prev it - 0.036
∗∗ + -0.087∗∗∗ -0.202∗∗∗
(2.470) (-7.180) (-4.520)
Sigma 1.748 4.960
Log Likelihood -10,128.64 -12,057.07
Wald-statistic 0.000 0.000
Table B.8 displays the results of the basic regressions of the Cragg model and the Tobit
model according to equations 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 with robust clustered standard errors. Results
for the year dummies were not reported for the sake of readability. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote
significance at the <0.01, <0.05 and <0.1 levels respectively.
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Table B.9: Results for the regression analysis by country clusters
All Cluster 1: Cluster 2: Cluster 3:
Countries Outsider Insider economies Insider economies
economies with strong with weak
enforcement enforcement
Predicted Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Sign (Z-Statistic) (Z-Statistic) (Z-Statistic) (Z-Statistic)
N=7,268 N=1,585 N=4,042 N=1,589
Write-off decision
constant +/- -3.625∗∗∗ -4.448∗∗∗ -3.645∗∗∗ -2.918∗∗∗
(-16.190) (-9.970) (-10.880) (-6.160)
roait - -0.023
∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗
(-7.530) (-2.580) (-6.940) (-4.470)
ocf it - 0.612
∗∗ 0.594 0.569∗ 1.325∗∗
(2.470) (1.100) (1.930) (2.340)
mtbit + 0.170
∗∗∗ 0.276∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗ 0.154∗
(3.720) (2.730) (2.190) (1.750)
ind roait - 0.091
∗∗ 0.102 0.098∗ 0.087
(2.260) (1.310) (1.830) (0.850)
ind ocf it - -1.192 2.018 -3.344 -1.709
(-0.530) (0.470) (-1.040) (-0.320)
ind mtbit + -0.005 0.058 -0.030 -0.101
(-0.120) (0.670) (-0.470) (-0.870)
BigBathit - -0.065 -1.432 0.520 -0.366
(-0.210) (-1.570) (0.930) (-0.610)
IncSmoothit + -0.453 -0.132 -0.764
∗∗ 0.360
(-1.630) (-0.200) (-2.230) (0.520)
dtait +/- -0.001 0.003 -0.002
∗ -0.001
(-1.370) (1.150) (-1.880) (-0.530)
∆gdpit - -0.178 n.a. 0.663 -0.525
(-0.420) n.a. (0.770) (-0.270)
sizeit + 0.179
∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗
(14910) (6.550) (12.220) (5.110)
big4 it + 0.165
∗∗∗ 0.278 0.164∗∗ 0.235∗∗
(2.890) (1.450) (2.160) (2.280)
wo prev it + 1.496
∗∗∗ 1.031∗∗∗ 1.644∗∗∗ 1.819∗∗∗
(15.020) (4.840) (11.980) (7.980)
WO prev it - 0.036
∗∗ -0.025 0.066∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗
(2.470) (-0.680) (3.310) (2.040)
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All Cluster 1: Cluster 2: Cluster 3:
Countries Outsider Insider economies Insider economies
economies with strong with weak
enforcement enforcement
Write-off magnitude
constant +/- 5.800∗∗∗ 4.214∗∗∗ 5.556∗∗∗ 4.726∗∗∗
(12.630) (3.960) (8.550) (3.550)
roait + 0.055
∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗
(5.820) (2.320) (6.170) (3.780)
ocf it + -1.436
∗ -2.048 -1.045 -1.645
(-1.680) (-1.270) (-1.130) (-1.070)
ind roait + 0.257
∗∗∗ 0.238∗ 0.379∗∗∗ 0.007
(3.030) (1.820) (3.420) (0.030)
ind ocf it + -25.267
∗∗∗ -20.617∗∗∗ -28.452∗∗∗ -8.131
(-4.940) (-2.580) (-4.080) (-0.680)
BigBathit + 3.264
∗∗ 3.701∗∗ 2.070 3.244
(2.150) (2.160) (0.970) (1.080)
IncSmoothit - -2.951
∗∗∗ -2.093∗ -2.096 -4.117∗
(-3.260) (-1.720) (-1.620) (-1.670)
dtait +/- 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.001
(0.590) (-0.290) (-0.330) (0.150)
∆gdpit + 1.328
∗ n.a. -1.194 -7.189∗
(1.700) n.a. (-0.880) (-1.690)
sizeit + 0.050
∗∗ 0.073 0.043 0.121∗∗
(2.050) (1.390) (1.380) (2.040)
big4 it + -0.190 0.716 -0.073 -0.096
(-1.260) (0.880) (-0.410) (-0.300)
WO prev it + -0.087
∗∗∗ -0.068∗∗∗ -0.073∗∗∗ -0.078∗∗
(-7.180) (-2.570) (-4.690) (-3.250)
Sigma 1.748 1.605 1.673 1.898
Log Likelihood -10,128.64 -1,937.10 -5,824.04 -2,183.08
Wald-statistic 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Table B.9 displays the results of our regression analyses by country cluster using the Cragg model
with robust clustered standard errors. The results of the Cragg model for all countries are equal
to those given in Table B.8 and serve as a reference only. Results for the year dummies were not
reported for the sake of readability. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at the <0.01, <0.05 and <0.1
levels respectively.
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Table B.10: Confirmation of hypotheses for regressions by country clusters
Cluster 2: Cluster 3:
All Cluster 1: Insider economies Insider economies
countries Outsider economies with strong with weak
enforcement enforcement
H1a +/- + +/- +/-
H2a - ◦ - ◦
H3a ◦ ◦ - (I) ◦
H4a ◦ ◦ + ◦
H1b +/- + + +
H2b +/- +/- +/- ◦
H3b + (B,I) + (B,I) ◦ + (I)
H4b ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Table B.10 presents the confirmation of our hypotheses for the regressions by country cluster
in condensed form. A hypothesis is confirmed (+) when we found support through at
least one variable for this hypothesis. When we have no statistically significant results the
hypothesis is neither confirmed nor rejected (◦). The hypothesis is rejected (-) when we
found significant support against it. +/- indicates that we found support in favor of the
hypothesis as well as against. For H3a and H3b we additionally indicated whether the
hypothesis was confirmed/rejected based on big bath accounting (B), income smoothing (I)
or both (B,I).
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Table B.11: Results for the regression analysis by country clusters for two periods
Cluster 1: Cluster 2: Cluster 3:
Write-off decision Outsider economies Insider economies with strong enforcement Insider economies with weak enforcement
2005-2008 2009-2011 2005-2008 2009-2011 2005-2008 2009-2011
Predicted Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Sign (Z-Statistic) (Z-Statistic) (Z-Statistic) (Z-Statistic) (Z-Statistic) (Z-Statistic)
N=703 N=882 N=2,014 N=2,028 N=762 N=827
constant +/- -4.707∗∗∗ -4.276∗∗∗ -3.721∗∗∗ -3.355∗∗∗ -3.772∗∗∗ -2.347∗∗∗
(-7.130) (-7.870) (-8.420) (-8.080) (-5.080) (-4.000)
roait - -0.022
∗∗∗ -0.014 -0.025∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗
(-2.670) (-1.550) (-5.580) (-5.620) (-2.460) (-2.660)
ocf it - 0.367 1.061 0.884
∗∗∗ 0.478 1.378∗ 1.043
(0.520) (1.290) (2.900) (1.220) (1.730) (1.180)
mtbit + 0.472
∗∗∗ 0.184 0.184∗ 0.110 0.077 0.186∗
(2.940) (1.350) (1.800) (1.330) (0.510) (1.750)
ind roait - -0.015 0.174
∗ 0.078 0.123∗ 0.239∗ -0.054
(-0.140) (1.920) (1.160) (1.890) (1.800) (-0.420)
ind ocf it - 6.820 -1.813 -1.954 -5.170 -2.848 -0.197
(1.170) (-0.350) (-0.480) (-1.340) (-0.400) (-0.030)
ind mtbit + 0.105 0.003 -0.063 -0.003 -0.094 -0.109
(0.850) (0.030) (-0.840) (-0.030) (-0.600) (-0.790)
BigBathit - -0.926 -2.213 1.391
∗ -0.152 -0.274 -1.318
(-0.800) (-1.480) (1.780) (-0.250) (-0.260) (-0.770)
IncSmoothit + 0.603 -0.617 -0.739 -0.781
∗ 0.188 1.209
(0.450) (-0.990) (-1.580) (-1.650) (0.280) (0.840)
dtait +/- -0.003 0.008
∗∗ -0.002 -0.003 0.001 -0.003
(-0.780) (2.350) (-0.880) (-1.590) (0.240) (-1.130)
∆gdpit - n.a. n.a. -0.001 0.948 -5.883 1.628
n.a. n.a. (0.000) (1.020) (-1.560) (0.610)
sizeit + 0.203
∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗
(5.290) (4.770) (10.210) (8.220) (3.890) (4.140)
big4 it + 0.402 0.136 0.191
∗∗ 0.131 0.093 0.283∗
(1.190) (0.600) (2.050) (1.360) (0.610) (1.850)
wo prev it + 1.079
∗∗∗ 1.070∗∗∗ 1.808∗∗∗ 1.500∗∗∗ 1.765∗∗∗ 1.817∗∗∗
(2.830) (4.300) (9.730) (8.130) (5.080) (6.300)
WO prev it - -0.011 -0.025 0.095
∗∗∗ 0.037 0.073 0.048
(-0.170) (-0.570) (3.590) (1.300) (1.520) (1.180)
Cluster 1: Cluster 2: Cluster 3:
Write-off magnitude Outsider economies Insider economies with strong enforcement Insider economies with weak enforcement
2005-2008 2009-2011 2005-2008 2009-2011 2005-2008 2009-2011
constant +/- 4.487∗∗∗ 3.844∗∗∗ 6.840∗∗∗ 4.684∗∗∗ 2.663 6.460∗∗∗
(2.020) (3.140) (7.180) (6.540) (1.300) (4.570)
roait + 0.064
∗∗∗ 0.036 0.071∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗
(4.100) (1.400) (5.710) (4.690) (3.670) (2.840)
ocf it + -2.596 -2.152 -1.123 -1.230 -5.016
∗∗ 1.571
(-1.260) (-1.010) (-1.210) (-1.100) (-2.520) (0.780)
ind roait + 0.174 0.320
∗ 0.417∗∗ 0.326∗∗∗ 0.093 -0.091
(0.860) (1.950) (2.540) (2.590) (0.340) (-0.410)
ind ocf it + -13.666 -24.713
∗∗ -35.145∗∗∗ -21.609∗∗∗ -5.302 -9.201
(-1.230) (-2.370) (-3.410) (-2.900) (-0.330) (-0.710)
BigBathit + 3.439 2.552 -1.505 4.650
∗∗ 4.261 1.180
(1.440) (0.750) (-0.480) (2.520) (1.100) (0.320)
IncSmoothit - -6.987
∗∗∗ 0.550 -6.654∗∗∗ -0.651 -5.845∗ -3.794
(-4.450) (0.500) (-3.390) (-0.540) (-1.930) (-1.280)
dtait +/- 0.006 -0.008 -0.004 0.001 0.001 0.004
(0.690) (-1.350) (-0.680) (0.150) (0.120) (0.450)
∆gdpit + n.a. n.a. -5.894 -0.473 -5.679 -4.066
n.a. n.a. (-1.310) (-0.360) (-0.650) (-0.700)
sizeit + 0.012 0.091 0.017 0.057
∗ 0.248∗∗∗ 0.036
(0.210) (1.400) (0.390) (1.680) (3.080) (0.510)
big4 it + 0.512 1.018 -0.385 0.183 0.695
∗ -0.514
(0.240) (1.170) (-1.360) (1.030) (1.670) (-1.100)
WO prev it + -0.125
∗∗∗ -0.029 -0.070∗∗∗ -0.076∗∗∗ -0.005 -0.122∗∗∗
(-3.450) (-0.790) (-3.060) (-3.620) (-0.140) (-3.070)
Sigma 1.543 1.594 1.752 1.570 1.771 1.930
Log Likelihood -768.01 -1,149.73 -2,822.77 -2,969.60 -919.86 -1,242.87
Wald-statistic 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Table B.11 displays the results of our regression analyses by country cluster and for two periods using the Cragg model with robust clustered standard errors. Results for the
year dummies were not reported for the sake of readability. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at the <0.01, <0.05 and <0.1 levels respectively.
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Table B.12: Regression results by industry
Transportation,
Write-off decision All Services Manufacturing Communications, Retail Wholesale Construction Mining
Industries Electric, Gas and Trade Trade
Sanitary Services
Predicted Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Sign (Z-Statistic) (Z-Statistic) (Z-Statistic) (Z-Statistic) (Z-Statistic) (Z-Statistic) (Z-Statistic) (Z-Statistic)
N=7,268 N=1,211 N=3,499 N=1,009 N=406 N=283 N=452 N=333
constant +/- -3.625∗∗∗ -2.825∗∗∗ -3.872∗∗∗ -3.270∗∗∗ -3.428∗∗ -3.793∗∗∗ -1.545∗∗ -2.358∗∗∗
(-1.190) (-5.910) (-14.730) (-6.660) (-3.660) (-2.880) (-2.240) (-3.780)
roait - -0.023
∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗ -0.070∗∗∗ -0.019 -0.034 -0.007
(-7.530) (-4.820) (-8.210) (-2.810) (-2.690) (-1.600) (-1.640) (-1.110)
ocf it - 0.612
∗∗ 1.795∗∗∗ 0.425∗ 1.819∗∗ 5.385∗∗∗ 0.398 0.746 0.007
(2.470) (3.580) (1.700) (2.270) (2.740) (0.320) (0.380) (0.010)
mtbit + 0.170
∗∗∗ 0.267∗∗ 0.136∗∗ 0.081 0.500∗∗ 0.375∗ 0.041 0.145
(3.720) 2.350) (2.060) (0.650) (1.970) (1.880) (0.250) (0.650)
BigBathit - -0.065 -0.380 0.093 0.239 -0.437 1.708 0.521 -0.986
(-0.210) (-0.420) (0.150) (0.190) (-0.110) (0.600) (0.190) (-0.610)
IncSmoothit + -0.453 -0.797 -0.097 -0.011 -0.230 -6.230
∗ -2.185 -0.724
(-1.630) (-1.280) (-0.260) (-0.010) (-0.070) (-1.840) (-1.350) (-0.950)
dtait +/- -0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.007
∗∗ 0.008 -0.007 -0.004 0.000
(-1.370) (0.570) (-0.090) (-2.410) (1.190) (-1.000) (-0.920) (0.000)
∆gdpit - -0.178 0.166 -0.024 0.062 1.468 -0.714 -1.511 -5.299
∗∗∗
(-0.420) (0.190) (-0.030) (0.050) (0.820) (-0.350) (-0.970) (-3.110)
sizeit + 0.179
∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗ 0.216∗∗ 0.088∗ 0.130
(14.910) (3.830) (12.470) (5.630) (2.060) (2.230) (1.770) (3.070)
big4 it + 0.165
∗∗∗ 0.177 0.165∗ 0.296 0.198 0.266 0.004 0.100
(2.890) (1.270) (1.910) (1.550) (0.910) (0.720) (0.020) (0.410)
wo prev it + 1.496
∗∗∗ 1.098∗∗∗ 1.452∗∗∗ 1.834∗∗∗ 2.186∗∗ 1.711∗∗∗ 1.514∗∗∗ 1.417∗∗∗
(15.020) (4.420) (10.040) (6.650) (4.490) (2.740) (3.150) (3.140)
WO prev it - 0.036
∗∗ -0.037 0.047∗∗ 0.077∗∗ 0.098 0.001 0.019 -0.005
(2.470) (-0.900) (2.240) (1.960) (1.350) (0.010) (0.270) (-0.060)
Transportation,
Write-off magnitude All Services Manufacturing Communications, Retail Wholesale Construction Mining
Industries Electric, Gas and Trade Trade
Sanitary Services
constant +/- 5.800∗∗∗ 3.308∗∗∗ 5.097∗∗∗ 5.218∗∗∗ 6.967∗∗∗ 5.824∗∗∗ 3.136∗∗ 4.209∗∗∗
(12.630) (2.660) (9.810) (5.500) (4.430) (3.860) (1.960) (3.640)
roait +
∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗ 0.022
(5.820) (3.170) (7.320) (3.390) (5.250) (5.830) (2.090) (1.120)
ocf it + -1.436
∗ -4.276∗∗∗ -0.706 -2.672 -11.395∗∗∗ -7.373∗ 1.120 0.273
(-1.680) (-3.380) (-0.790) (-1.300) (-4.590) (-1.720) (0.370) (0.120)
BigBathit + 3.264
∗∗ 6.297∗∗ 0.997 2.606 20.146∗∗∗ 8.529∗ 9.010∗ -2.800
(2.150) (1.990) (0.450) (0.900) (3.100) (1.860) (1.950) (-1.030)
IncSmoothit - -2.951
∗∗∗ 0.583 -3.399∗∗∗ -4.038∗∗ -9.060∗∗∗ -15.086∗∗∗ -6.885∗ -0.516
(-3.260) (0.370) (-3.130) (-2.110) (-3.020) (-2.930) (-1.910) (-0.250)
dtait +/- 0.002 -0.009 -0.002 0.011 0.001 0.021 0.025
∗∗ 0.012
(0.590) (-1.440) (-0.360) (1.640) (0.160) (1.270) (2.520) (0.890)
∆gdpit + 1.328
∗ -0.526 0.802 -0.601 4.860∗∗ 1.582 -3.058 1.016
(1.700) (-0.220) (0.700) (-0.250) (2.380) (0.450) (-1.200) (0.270)
sizeit + 0.050
∗∗ 0.179∗ 0.017 -0.001 -0.022 -0.078 0.174∗ 0.047
(2.050) (1.930) (0.500) (-0.010) (-0.210) (-0.780) (1.660) (0.480)
big4 it + -0.190 -0.343 0.023 -0.129 -0.934
∗ 0.427 -0.409 -0.087
(-1.260) (-0.920) (0.110) (-0.470) (-1.720) (0.530) (-0.580) (-0.210)
WO prev it + -0.087
∗∗∗ -0.088∗∗∗ -0.073∗∗∗ -0.065∗∗ -0.125∗∗∗ -0.080∗ -0.094∗∗ -0.054
(-7.180) (-2.710) (-4.160) (-2.170) (-3.280) (-1.770) (-2.250) (-0.820)
Sigma 1.748 1.775 1.725 1.706 1.421 1.425 1.637 1.837
Log Likelihood -10,128.64 -1,428.41 -5,011.17 -1,408.12 -578.69 -317.19 -599.53 -491.83
Wald-statistic 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Table B.12 exhibits the results of the regression analyses by industry applying the Cragg model with robust clustered standard errors. Industry is defined in
accordance with the SIC code divisions. We did not include the industry Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing in the analysis as we have only 75 firm-years in
our sample that belong to this industry. We do not have any observations in our sample that belong to the sectors Finance, Insurance and Real Estate or
Public Administration; see Table B.1. The results of the Cragg model for all countries are equal to those given in Table B.8 and serve as a reference only.
Results for the year dummies were not reported for the sake of readability. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at the <0.01, <0.05 and <0.1 levels respectively.
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Table B.13: Confirmation of hypotheses for regressions by industry
Transportation,
All Services Manufacturing Communications, Retail Wholesale Construction Mining
Industries Electric, Gas and Trade Trade
Sanitary Services
H1a +/- +/- +/- +/- +/- + ◦ ◦
H2a - n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
H3a ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ - (I) ◦ ◦
H4a ◦ ◦ ◦ + ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
H1b +/- +/- + + +/- +/- + ◦
H2b +/- n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
H3b + (B,I) + (B) + (I) + (I) + (B,I) + (B,I) + (B,I) ◦
H4b ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ + ◦
Table B.13 presents the confirmation of our hypotheses for the regressions by industry in condensed form. A hypothesis
is confirmed (+) when we found support through at least one variable for this hypothesis. When we have no statistically
significant results the hypothesis is neither confirmed nor rejected (◦). The hypothesis is rejected (-) when we found significant
support against it. +/- indicates that we found support in favor of the hypothesis as well as against. For H3a and H3b we
additionally indicated whether the hypothesis was confirmed/rejected based on big bath accounting (B), income smoothing
(I) or both (B,I).
Table B.14: Regression results by type of write-off
All Write-offs Write-offs Write-offs
write-offs of goodwill of other of property, plant
intangible assets and equipment
Predicted Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Sign (Z-Statistic) (Z-Statistic) (Z-Statistic) (Z-Statistic)
N=7,268 N=7,268 N=7,268 N=7,268
Write-off decision
constant +/- -3.625∗∗∗ -2.526∗∗∗ -3.865∗∗∗ -4.356∗∗∗
(-16.190) (-10.810) (-15.590) (-18.840)
roait - -0.023
∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗
(-7.530) (-7.370) (-4.550) (-6.850)
ocf it - 0.612
∗∗ 1.085∗∗∗ 0.473∗ 0.338
(2.470) (3.020) (1.820) (1.530)
mtbit + 0.170
∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ -0.039 0.190∗∗∗
(3.720) (2.910) (-0.760) (4.170)
ind roait - 0.091
∗∗ -0.042 -0.050 0.191∗∗∗
(2.260) (-0.940) (-1.100) (4.530)
ind ocf it - -1.192 -1.544 7.349
∗∗∗ -4.538∗
(-0.530) (-0.590) (2.770) (-1.940)
ind mtbit + -0.005 -0.242
∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗ 0.091∗
(-0.120) (-4.910) (1.980) (1.840)
BigBathit - -0.065 1.034
∗ -0.446∗ -0.292
(-0.210) (2.040) (-1.810) (-1.130)
IncSmoothit + -0.453 -1.176
∗∗∗ -0.099 -0.161
(-1.630) (-3.230) (-0.300) (-0.540)
dtait +/- -0.001 -0.003
∗∗∗ -0.002 0.001
(-1.370) (-2.670) (-1.630) (0.860)
∆gdpit - -0.178 -0.330 -0.825
∗ 0.578
(-0.420) (-0.680) (-1.650) (1.280)
sizeit + 0.179
∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗
(14.910) (11.680) (10.730) (13.340)
big4 it + 0.165
∗∗∗ -0.066 0.222∗∗∗ 0.248∗∗∗
(2.890) (-0.980) (3.050) (3.870)
wo prev it + 1.496
∗∗∗ 1.229∗∗∗ 1.790∗∗∗ 1.599∗∗∗
(15.020) (8.830) (11.660) (13.240)
WO prev it - 0.036
∗∗ 0.004 0.048∗∗ 0.022
(2.470) (0.180) (2.260) (1.270)
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All Write-offs Write-offs Write-offs
Write-off magnitude write-offs of goodwill of other of property, plant
intangible assets and equipment
constant +/- 5.800∗∗∗ 2.608∗∗∗ 4.549∗∗∗ 6.748∗∗∗
(12.630) (3.440) (4.660) (12.560)
roait + 0.055
∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗
(5.820) (6.200) (2.800) (4.500)
ocf it + -1.436
∗ -1.604 -0.067 -1.588∗∗
(-1.680) (-1.450) (-0.080) (-2.370)
ind roait + 0.257
∗∗∗ 0.518∗∗∗ 0.470∗∗∗ -0.058
(3.030) (3.830) (2.920) (-0.630)
ind ocf it + -25.267
∗∗∗ -32.530∗∗∗ -41.333∗∗∗ -9.206
(-4.940) (-4.140) (-3.840) (-1.540)
BigBathit + 3.264
∗∗ 0.985 2.602 4.014∗∗∗
(2.150) (0.270) (1.410) (3.280)
IncSmoothit - -2.951
∗∗∗ -2.710 -2.845∗∗∗ -1.791∗∗
(-3.260) (-1.510) (-3.260) (-2.200)
dtait +/- 0.002 0.004 0.000 0.000
(0.590) (0.950) (0.050) (-0.080)
∆gdpit + 1.328
∗ 2.183∗ 1.837 1.709∗
(1.700) (1.680) (1.290) (1.880)
sizeit + 0.050
∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗ 0.222∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗
(2.050) (4.240) (5.750) (2.410)
big4 it + -0.190 -0.014 -0.131 -0.350
∗
(-1.260) (-0.070) (-0.400) (-1.800)
WO prev it + -0.087
∗∗∗ -0.100∗∗∗ -0.060∗∗∗ -0.076∗∗∗
(-7.180) (-5.500) (-3.230) (-5.750)
Sigma 1.748 1.794 1.885 1.706
Log Likelihood -10,128.64 -4,960.16 -5,065.87 -7,853.32
Wald-statistic 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Table B.14 exhibits the result of the regression analyses by type of write-off applying the Cragg
model with robust clustered standard errors. The results of the Cragg model for all countries are
equal to those given in Table B.8 and serve as a reference only. Results for the year dummies were
not reported for the sake of readability. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at the <0.01, <0.05 and
<0.1 levels respectively.
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Table B.15: Confirmation of hypotheses for regressions by type of write-off
All Write-offs Write-offs Write-offs
write-offs of goodwill of other of property, plant
intangible assets and equipment
H1a +/- +/- +/- +
H2a - - +/- +/-
H3a ◦ - + (B) ◦
H4a ◦ + ◦ ◦
H1b +/- + + +/-
H2b +/- +/- +/- ◦
H3b + (B,I) ◦ + (I) + (B,I)
H4b ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Table B.15 presents the confirmation of our hypotheses for the regressions by
type of write-off in condensed form. A hypothesis is confirmed (+) when we
found support through at least one variable for this hypothesis. When we
have no statistically significant results the hypothesis is neither confirmed nor
rejected (◦). The hypothesis is rejected (-) when we found significant support
against it. +/- indicates that we found support in favor of the hypothesis
as well as against. For H3a and H3b we additionally indicated whether the
hypothesis was confirmed/rejected based on big bath accounting (B), income
smoothing (I) or both (B,I).
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Abstract IAS 36 Impairment of Assets requires the discounting of future cash
flows when calculating the value in use. These cash flows are expected to result from
the further use and the disposal of the asset under consideration. IAS 36 prescribes
the use of a pre-tax discount rate which is independent of the capital structure. How
this discount rate is to be determined has been widely discussed but no theoretically
convincing answer has yet been found. In this paper we show that the pre-tax cost of
equity of the unlevered firm fulfills the requirements of IAS 36. While the calculation
of the unlevered cost of capital is a commonly known technique, until now there has
not been a theory for the calculation of the pre-tax cost of equity. Therefore, we derive
the return equation of a variation of the CAPM in which corporate taxes are explicitly
considered. However, this return equation entails some parameters that will be hard
to determine in practice. We recommend a revision of the regulations concerning the
calculation of the value in use to reduce managerial discretion as well as application
problems.
4.1 Introduction
Write-offs are usually very important in the calculation of net profit according to the
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).1 This is why the regulations con-
cerning the recognition of write-offs attract attention from theoreticians and practition-
ers, alike. A number of empirical analyses found that managerial discretion inherent in
the recognition and measurement of fixed asset write-offs is used for earnings manage-
ment.2 IAS 36 Impairment of Assets contains extensive guidance on when write-offs
have to be recognized and what amount has to be written off. Managerial discretion
mainly arises because the recoverable amount – which is the central measure of IAS 36
– requires the forecasting and discounting of future cash flows. More specifically, the
recoverable amount is defined as the higher value of the fair value less costs to sell and
the value in use. While the calculation of the fair value less costs to sell is straight-
forward – although not simple – following a fair value hierarchy, the calculation of the
value in use involves some difficulties. One of these is that the definition of the discount
rate that has to be used entails some puzzling and conflicting requirements. Interest-
ingly, this matter has been discussed very little until now. The aim of this paper is to
illustrate the complex and maybe unrealizable requirements of IAS 36 concerning the
discount rate that has to be deployed to calculate the value in use. For this purpose
we derive a model that is theoretically suited to IAS 36 but has a number of practi-
cal problems. Our recommendation to the International Accounting Standards Board
1For example, in 2008, the E.On Group recognized a write-off in the amount of 3,626 m EUR in
the consolidated financial statements corresponding to a net profit in the amount of 1,604 m EUR.
Similarly, the Deutsche Telekom Group recognized a write-off in the amount of 2,555 m EUR in the
2009 consolidated financial statements, corresponding to a net profit of 873 m EUR. See E.ON AG
(2008), pp. 96-99 and Deutsche Telekom AG (2009), pp. 156-160.
2Empirical analyses have mainly been conducted for the US market. As both US-GAAP and IFRS
entail similar managerial discretion, the mere finding that this discretion is used opportunistically
should be transferable. See, for example, Riedl (2004) or Beatty and Weber (2006).
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(IASB) is to revise the regulations concerning the calculation of the value in use so as
to reduce practical problems as well as managerial discretion.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In section 4.2 we describe the rules relevant for
the determination of the value in use. In section 4.3 we give a short literature review. As
prior research is scarce we additionally review the guidance given in the commentaries
of the big four audit companies, which should give insights from a practical perspective.
In section 4.4 we derive the model implied by the requirements of IAS 36; section 4.5
summarizes and concludes.
4.2 The Requirements of IAS 36
4.2.1 Calculation of the Value in Use
Following the rules of IAS 36, a qualitative impairment test has to be conducted an-
nually in which the firm has to analyze whether there are any indications that the
asset under consideration may be impaired.3 If there are such indications a quanti-
tative impairment test has to be conducted in which the recoverable amount has to
be calculated and then compared to the carrying amount. The recoverable amount
is defined by IAS 36.6 as the higher value of the fair value less costs to sell and the
value in use. As the focus of this paper is the derivation of the discount rate for the
calculation of the value in use, we only briefly present the basic regulations concerning
the determination of the cash flows for the value in use, instead delving a little deeper
into those rules concerning the discount rate.
3According to IAS 36.66, the impairment test shall basically be conducted for the single asset. Only
if the recoverable amount cannot be determined is the impairment test conducted on the level of the
asset’s cash-generating unit as defined in IAS 36.6. For the rest of this paper we will talk about assets
for reasons of simplicity, but it should be noted that our results can be applied to cash-generating
units as well.
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IAS 36.6 defines the value in use as “the present value of the future cash flows
expected to be derived from an asset (...)”. Detailed guidelines for the determination
of the cash flows and the discount rate and two alternative techniques for calculating
the present value are given. In summary, the cash flows from the further use of the
asset assuming unaltered use and the cash flows from the disposal have to be used; the
cash flows have to be before taxes and independent of the capital structure.
According to IAS 36.32 and 36.A2, the present value may be calculated using either
the traditional approach – in which the most probable cash flows have to be discounted
with a discount rate that reflects all risk – or the expected cash flow approach – in
which the expected cash flows are discounted with a discount rate that reflects only
those risks for which the cash flows have not been adjusted. As it is the more common
– and, according to IAS 36.A7, the more effective – measurement tool, we focus on the
expected cash flow approach.
Following IAS 36.55 a pre-tax rate is to be used to discount the cash flows.4 While
the cash flows have to be derived from corporate planning, the discount rate is supposed
to reflect market assessments of the time value of money and the risks specific to the
asset. According to IAS 36.A19, the discount rate has to be independent of the capital
structure and the way the firm financed the purchase of the asset.
This discount rate shall be derived from an asset that is similar with respect to
potential of use and risk structure.5 Only if this is not possible does the firm have to
estimate the discount rate. IAS 36.A17 gives three alternatives that may be used as
4IAS 36 does not explicitly specify which taxes shall not be reflected in the discount rate. In contrast,
regarding the estimation of cash flows, IAS 36.50 requires that income taxes may not be included. As
the cash flows and the discount rate should be determined consistently, we assume that the discount
rate has to be a rate before income taxes – at the level of the company as well as at the private level
– for our analysis.
5See IAS 36.56.
140
starting points for this estimation:
• the entity’s weighted average cost of capital (WACC) determined using techniques
such as the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM);
• the entity’s incremental borrowing rate; and
• other market borrowing rates.
These three rates have to be adjusted to “reflect the way the market would assess the
specific risk associated with the asset’s estimated cash flows and to exclude risks that
are not relevant to the asset’s estimated cash flows or for which the estimated cash
flows have been adjusted”.6
The Basis for Conclusion to IAS 36 outlines two approaches for the calculation of
a pre-tax rate from a post-tax rate. IAS 36.BCZ85 states that “in theory, discounting
post-tax cash flows at a post-tax discount rate and discounting pre-tax cash flows at a
pre-tax discount rate should give the same result (...)”. Under this assumption the pre-
tax rate can be determined from the post-tax rate by applying an iterative procedure.
The second approach is called grossing up and entails the simple division of the pre-tax
rate by (1-tax rate). However, in the example presented in IAS 36.BCZ85 the IASB
declares that the pre-tax rate calculated by grossing up does not always equal the
correct pre-tax rate – which is the one calculated using the iterative procedure – but
only if constant cash flows are realized.
4.2.2 A short Note on the Requirements of IAS 36
The definition of the recoverable amount as the higher amount of the fair value less
costs to sell and the value in use is supposed to reflect the rational calculus of the
6See IAS 36.A18.
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manager, who should only retain the asset if further use produces higher value than
the sale of the asset. Having said this, it seems inconsistent that IAS 36 requires a pre-
tax calculation of the value in use as the rational investor – or in this case the rational
manager – will include only post-tax measures in his decisional calculus. However, the
aim of this paper is not to discuss whether the rules of IAS 36 are in line with rational
behavior, but rather to analyze what a discount rate that fulfills the requirements
might look like.
For the calculation of the value in use, a pre-tax discount rate shall be determined
that is independent of the capital structure. The three rates that are presented as
possible starting points surely depend on the capital structure, and at least the WACC
is after taxes. The approaches presented in the appendix of IAS 36 to derive the
pre-tax rate from the post-tax rate crucially depend on the basic assumption that the
value in use calculated by discounting post-tax cash flows with a post-tax discount
rate should equal the value in use calculated by discounting pre-tax cash flows with
a pre-tax discount rate. However, this relationship holds only if a specific tax system
applies that is neutral with regard to different investment alternatives.7 Such a tax
system does not apply in any of the countries of the European Union. Hence, the
assumption of the equality of the pre-tax and post-tax calculations is not reflected in
actual tax systems. Additionally, the rationale of requiring a pre-tax calculation based
on a post-tax calculation is not clear, especially because the post-tax calculation would
be in line with actual finance theory.
7See Husmann, Schmidt and Seidel (2002). A tax system is neutral with regard to different investment
alternatives if the investment decision made on the basis of the net present value criterion is not
altered if taxes are introduced, i.e. if the order of the net present values of the projects under
consideration is the same before and after taxes. An equal present value before and after taxes only
results from very specific tax systems that are neutral with regard to different investment alternatives;
see Kruschwitz, Husmann and Schneider (2002).
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Maybe even more interesting is the fact that the second requirement – the inde-
pendence of the capital structure – is not discussed either in the main text or in the
appendices of IAS 36. Hence, the user has to develop his own technique to adjust the
discount rate with regard to the influences of the capital structure.
4.3 Literature Review
In this section we outline the recommendations of the existing literature regarding
the derivation of the discount rate for the calculation of the value in use. Because
theoretical literature is scarce we additionally discuss the positions of the big four audit
companies, Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG and PwC, as presented in their respective
commentaries. Due to their practical experience and policy work on accounting issues
we hope to gather insights into the solutions applied in practice. We discuss the
independence of the capital structure and the use of a pre-tax rate separately in the next
two subsections as we believe that these are the theoretically most crucial requirements.
The essential task following from this discussion will be to incorporate taxes in the
classical CAPM. Therefore, in the third subsection we briefly explain why the Tax-
CAPMs are not suitable for this task.
4.3.1 Independence of the Capital Structure
According to Pellens et al. (2005), 76 % of German firms listed in the Prime Standard
use the WACC to calculate the value in use. 20 % use rates derived from the sector
and 11 % use the cost of equity.8 A European survey conducted by KPMG regarding
the impairment test elaborates only on the determination of those factors required to
8See Pellens et al. (2005), p. 16.
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calculate the WACC,9 indicating that most of the firms analyzed use the WACC to
calculate the value in use.
As already noted, analytical discussion regarding the rules of IAS 36 is scarce. The
only one we are aware of is that between Husmann and Schmidt and Kvaal. This dis-
cussion is based on the assumption that the Modigliani-Miller theorem holds, resulting
in WACC that is independent of the capital structure.10 Husmann and Schmidt (2008)
compare the three discount rates given as starting points in IAS 36.A17. They first
discard the other market borrowing rates from their analysis due to the vague formu-
lation, and then use option pricing theory to derive a relation between the WACC and
the incremental borrowing rate. They find that these two rates vary significantly and
argue that – since from the perspective of finance theory the WACC is the only appro-
priate rate for the calculation of the value in use – the options to use the incremental
borrowing rate or other market borrowing rates should be deleted. Kvaal (2010), on
the other hand, argues against this because he deems their definition of the incremental
borrowing rate to be inadequate and shows that, when using an appropriate definition,
the incremental borrowing rate can be seen as a good second-best solution, especially
if one considers that the CAPM could not hold. Husmann and Schmidt (2011) argue
in response that the mere fact that Kvaal supposes a different definition for the incre-
mental borrowing rate than they do emphasizes the managerial discretion that follows
from the option to choose this rate as a starting point. Additionally, they explain that
the validity of WACC does not depend on the calculation of the cost of equity using
the CAPM, but that other approaches can be used as well.
There are two points worth emphasizing in this discussion. First, it is based on the
9See KPMG (2010), pp. 32-44.
10Modigliani and Miller (1958) proove that without taxes the market value of a firm as well as its
WACC are independent of its capital structure.
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assumption that the Modigliani-Miller theorem holds, necessitating a world without
taxes. However, it does not follow from the requirement to calculate a pre-tax value in
use that we operate in a world without taxes, because managers as well as investors will
include taxes in their decisional calculus independent of the requirements of IAS 36.
Second, the argumentation is driven by what is appropriate according to finance theory,
in contrast to what the rules of IAS 36 require. In the model we derive in section 4.4,
we will neither require a world without taxes nor consider what finance theory deems
to be appropriate. Instead we will be guided solely by the requirements of IAS 36.
Regarding the opinions of the big four audit companies, the assumption that WACC
is the discount rate usually applied is confirmed.11 Regarding whether this is in line
with the requirement of a discount rate that is independent of the capital structure, we
find guidance only from KPMG and Ernst & Young. KPMG (2011) section 3.10.300.70
states that, as the discount rate shall be independent of the entity’s capital structure,
the gearing and the cost of debt of a market participant assumed to invest in the asset
must be used. Similarly, in the example depicted in Ernst & Young (2013) section
22.4.5, the average gearing of companies operating predominantly in the same industry
as the cash-generating unit is deployed, while the cost of debt and the cost of equity
of a hypothetical listed company with a similar risk profile as the cash-generating unit
are used. This approach, while practically appealing, is theoretically questionable as it
still results in a discount rate that depends on the capital structure, although not on
that of the company. In section 4.4.2 we will discuss why such a method is superfluous.
The Modigliani-Miller theorem does not hold in a world with taxes. From this
fact we state that it therefore cannot be used here. Nevertheless, if the Modigliani-
Miller theorem is not applied then the WACC depends on the capital structure and
11See KPMG (2011) section 3.10.300.30, Ernst & Young (2013) section 22.4.5 and PwC (2013) section
18.214.
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thus cannot be used to calculate the value in use. The fact that the WACC is one
of the suggested starting points of IAS 36.A17 cannot be held against this because,
while IAS 36.A17 gives only possible starting points12, IAS 36.A19 strictly requires
the independence of the capital structure.13 In reality, i.e. in a world with taxes, true
independence of the discount rate of the capital structure may even be impossible to
constitute, because an assumption regarding the capital structure is required for the
calculation of WACC as well as for the isolated consideration of the cost of debt or
cost of equity. Therefore, we interpret IAS 36.A19 as the requirement that the actual
capital structure and changes therein shall have no influence on the discount rate. This
can either be achieved by using the cost of equity of a (fictitiously) unlevered firm, or
by using the cost of debt of a firm (fictitiously) financed completely with debt.14 As
there is a theory only for the first approach, we recommend the former.
4.3.2 Calculating a Pre-Tax Rate
In the survey conducted by KPMG it was found that 85 % of the companies that
calculate the value in use apply a post-tax calculation. Only 68 % of these companies
derive the pre-tax rate from this post-tax rate.
Theoretical discussion regarding the derivation of a pre-tax discount rate is even
more scarce than works discussing the independence of the capital structure. Hus-
mann, Schmidt and Seidel (2002) analyze the value in use based on a finance perspec-
tive. They explain that the present value before taxes equals that after taxes only in
12See IAS 36.A17: “As a starting point in making such an estimate, the entity might take into account
(...)”.
13See IAS 36.A19: “The discount rate is independent of the entity’s capital structure (...)”.
14If there is only one financier, the required return should be independent of the form of financing
and both (fictitious) forms of the cost of capital were equal. If there is more than one financier this
relation does not necessarily hold due to the increasing risk of insolvency.
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specific tax systems that are neutral with regard to different investment alternatives.
Additionally, they point out that the IASB’s intention to reflect the decisional calcu-
lus in the definition of the recoverable amount is negated by introducing this pre-tax
calculus. As a rational investor will decide based on post-tax numbers, the pre-tax
calculation may lead to irrational decisions. While their critique is certainly apt, they
do not suggest a discount rate that is in line with IAS 36. Similarly, Kvaal (2007) com-
pares the two approaches presented in IAS 36.BCZ85 to derive the pre-tax discount
rate from the post-tax discount rate. In line with IAS 36 he assumes that the pre-tax
discount rate derived by iteration from the post-tax rate is the correct value, and finds
that grossing up is applicable only in those rare situations where future cash flows are
constant. Like Husmann, Schmidt and Seidel (2002), therefore, Kvaal (2007) does not
present a discount rate that fulfills all of IAS 36’s requirements.
As with the theoretical debate, the opinions of the big four audit companies do
not provide a satisfying result. All of the commentaries basically restate the two
approaches given by IAS 36. While Deloitte (2013) section 8.3.1 states that, in practice,
grossing up could be a reasonable approximation if a cash-generating unit is considered,
Ernst & Young (2013) section 22.4.5.4 declares that grossing up will work only in very
specific situations. Ernst & Young (2013) section 22.4.5.3 and PwC (2013) section
18.222.5 both elaborate extensively on how the pre-tax and post-tax cash flows must
be determined to appropriately consider the influence of deferred taxes, but finally
their arguments are based on the assumption that, without deferred taxes, the value
in use before taxes equals that after taxes.
As we do not have a tax system that is neutral with regard to different investment
alternatives the value in use before taxes does not equal that after taxes, independent
of the existence of deferred taxes. Thus, neither the iterative approach nor grossing
up will deliver suitable results, meaning the pre-tax rate should in fact be calculated
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directly.
4.3.3 Standard-CAPM and Tax-CAPMs
In section 4.3.1 we suggested that the cost of capital of the fictitiously unlevered firm
is suitable to calculate a discount rate independent of the capital structure, and hence
it should be used to calculate the value in use. The cost of equity of a firm is usually
calculated using the CAPM. Therefore, in this section, we want to briefly describe why
the CAPM is not suitable – at least not without further assumptions – to derive the
discount rate for the calculation of the value in use. As this might seem intuitive, we
additionally describe why the Tax-CAPMs cannot be applied.
The CAPM was developed in the 1960s by Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Mossin
(1966). It is an equilibrium model that can be used to calculate the prices and returns
of all risky assets traded on the capital market. Moreover, if the capital market is
sufficiently complete, one can reasonably assume that the cash flows of non-traded
assets can be replicated by traded assets.15 The price of the non-traded asset equals
the price of the portfolio used to replicate its cash flows to prevent arbitrage. One
assumption underlying the CAPM is that there are neither taxes nor transaction costs.
However, applied in a world with taxes, the prices and returns calculated are post-tax
prices or returns. As a rational investor decides on the basis of observable data, and
because observable data is after taxes on the firm level and before taxes on the private
level, prices and returns calculated with the CAPM will therefore be after taxes on the
firm level and before taxes on the private level.
The classical Tax-CAPM was originally developed by Brennan (1970) but has been
15This assumption, called “spanning”, is quite usual in finance theory. For the necessary conditions,
see, for example, Duffie and Huang (1985).
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repeatedly developed further to meet the special conditions of national tax systems.16
These Tax-CAPMs incorporate the fact that a rational investor will not only include
observable data in his decisional calculus, but will also consider future tax payments
on the private level. Applied in the real world, these models give the return after taxes
on the firm level as well as on the private level, with only the latter being explicitly
modeled.
As outlined above in section 4.2, we assume that for the calculation of the value
in use a discount rate before taxes on both the firm and the private level is required.
This requirement is neither met by the classical CAPM nor by the Tax-CAPMs – or
indeed by any other model we know of. The existence of this research gap is not too
surprising if one considers that the exclusion of taxes gives no further insights from
the perspective of a finance theoretician. Still, as IAS 36 requires the calculation of a
discount rate before taxes on both the firm and the private level, we will now present
an approach to modify the CAPM according to the requirements of IAS 36.
4.4 A Pre-Tax CAPM
We have outlined in section 4.3 that we understand the rules of IAS 36 to be the
requirement to calculate a discount rate that is independent of the capital structure,
and that this is a pre-tax rate with respect to taxes on the firm as well as on the private
level. In this section we derive a model that is theoretically suited to calculating a pre-
tax discount rate. In section 4.4.2 we briefly discuss why a further adjustment to
eliminate influences of the capital structure is not necessary. Our model is basically a
variation of the CAPM with the additional assumption that there are taxes on the firm
level. The cash flows that are related to these taxes, as well as the pre-tax cash flows,
16For Germany, see, for example, Wiese (2006), Wiese (2007) and Jonas, Löffler and Wiese (2004).
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are not traded on the market but are spanned. For the sake of readability, however, we
will still talk about the prices and cash flows of these assets and not about the prices
and cash flows of the portfolios used to span them. Because the market is arbitrage-free
the sum of the prices for the pre-tax cash flows and for the tax cash flows has to equal
the price of the cash flows after taxes on the firm level. We do not have to adjust for
taxes on the private level, as these are excluded from the CAPM anyway.
4.4.1 The Model
The traditional assumptions for the CAPM are valid. The only variation is the intro-
duction of taxes on the firm level. For the derivation of the pre-tax discount rate we
apply the derivation technique of Kruschwitz and Husmann (2012), originally devel-
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The first constraint depicts investor i’s budget constraint. The investor tries to max-
imize his utility U i, which is determined by today’s consumption Ci0 and the expected
consumption tomorrow Ei[C̃i1] as well as its variance V ar
i[C̃i1]. n
i
j reflects the amount
of security j held by investor i in t = 0. From security j the investor receives an
uncertain cash flow in the amount of X̃j − T (X̃j) in t = 1. In contrast to the CAPM,
this cash flow is split into two components: the uncertain cash flow before taxes on
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the firm level X̃j and the uncertain tax cash flow T (X̃j). The difference between these
two components equals the post-tax cash flow considered in the CAPM. P (X̃j) reflects
the price of the uncertain cash flow before taxes in t = 0, the price of the uncertain




. Hence, like the cash flow, the price is split into
two components. ni0 is the amount of the risk-free asset contained in the portfolio of
investor i. For calculational simplicity, we set the price of this risk-free asset in t = 0
to 1
1+rf
, resulting in a certain cash flow in t = 1 in the amount of 1 due to a return in
the amount of rf . A bar on top of a variable indicates the initial endowment in t = 0.
The second constraint describes the state-dependent consumption of investor i in
t = 1, Ci1s. In addition to the certain cash flow from the risk-free asset n
i
0, investor i
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the following relations apply:17
17In contrast to the CAPM, where, with the given notation, the variance of the future state-dependent









i[X̃j , X̃k], we
receive additional covariances due to the consideration of the uncertain tax cash flows. This re-



























Covi[X̃j, X̃k]− Covi[X̃j, T (X̃k)]
−Covi[T (X̃j), X̃k] + Covi[T (X̃j), T (X̃k)]
)
.
By substituting the expected value and the variance in the utility function we can
reduce the maximization problem 4.4.1 and state the Lagrangian function with only
one constraint:

































We can then derive the individual demand function by calculating the first-order












Covi[X̃j, X̃k]− Covi[X̃j, T (X̃k)]
1 + rf
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nikT (X̃k) = T (X̃m)
and aggregating for all market participants gives the aggregated indirect demand
function, where X̃m represents the uncertain cash flows from the market portfolio before
































By solving 4.4.2 for H, multiplying by nij and taking the sum over all market par-











































































T (X̃j), T (X̃m)
]
.
For our purposes, we need to consider the two different components of the cash flows



































Here, E[X̃ ′m] and P (X̃
′
m) reflect the expected cash flow and the price of the market
portfolio used in the CAPM, respectively.
For the return of the market portfolio after taxes r̃′m, the pre-tax return of security




− 1, r̃j =
X̃j
P (X̃j)






Considering the calculation rules of variances and covariances, inserting E[X̃ ′m] =
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(1 + E[r̃′m])P (X̃
′








in equation 4.4.4 gives:
P (X̃j) =




































We can cancel P (X̃ ′m) in the variance-covariance term, resulting in:
P (X̃j) =
































We solve this expression for (1 + rf ) and divide by P (X̃j). Therefore, we first have
to define the rate of exchange of the prices of the cash flow before taxes and the tax






. This results in the following:

















+ α(1 + rf ).
After some final transformations we receive the return equation of our model:
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and thus rewrite equation 4.4.6 as follows:18
E[r̃j] = rf (1− α) + αE[τ̃j] + (E[r̃′m]− rf )(β − αβτ ). (4.4.7)
It should be noted that, even though it looks quite similar, there are some important
differences between equation 4.4.7 and the return equation of the classical CAPM that
require consideration. For the risk-free interest rate rf and the expected return of
the market portfolio E[r̃′m], standardized methods of evaluation have evolved, which
we will not discuss further here. However, in α and E[τ̃j], this model introduces two
additional firm-specific factors that have to be calculated before the pre-tax discount
rate can be determined. Additionally, the beta factor is split into two components β
and βτ that have to be estimated separately.
Alpha α represents the rate of exchange of the prices of the cash flow before taxes
and the tax cash flow. There are some simple relations regarding α that we can
18Under the assumption of a linear relation between X̃j and T (X̃j), equation 4.4.7 is reduced to the
return equation of the classical CAPM. Such a linear relation represents one specific tax system that
is neutral with regard to different investment alternatives: the taxation of cash flows.
157
analyze. First, if the expected pre-tax cash flow and the expected tax cash flow
are positive, the prices will be positive as well, resulting in a positive value for
α. Similarly, if the expected pre-tax cash flow and the expected tax cash flow
are negative, the prices will be negative as well, resulting again in a positive
value for α. However, a negative value for α could result from the fact that the
net profit is used as the tax base, and hence there are situations in which the
pre-tax cash flow is positive and the tax cash flow is negative. Thus, we expect
α to be usually positive but there can be exceptions. Second, if the relation of
X̃j and T (X̃j) was linear, then α would represent the tax rate. Even if there
is no linear relation, i.e. if the cash flow is not used as the tax base, usually
|T (X̃j)| < |X̃j| will be valid. Again, due to the fact that the profit is used as the









| < |P (X̃j)| is necessary to prevent arbitrage, resulting in α < 1.
Therefore, taken together α should usually be positive and smaller than 1.
To calculate α, the prices of the pre-tax cash flow and the tax cash flow have to be
determined. Looking at equation 4.4.5, we see that we therefore need to determine
the expected pre-tax cash flow, the expected tax cash flow and the covariances
of the cash flow from the market portfolio with the two components of the firm-
specific cash flow. The calculation of the expected pre-tax cash flow and the
expected tax cash flow might entail some difficulties, but these calculations are
possible based on corporate planning. In contrast, neither the expected cash flow
of the market portfolio, nor its variance or the respective price are known. The
same is true for the covariance of the post-tax cash flow of the market portfolio
and the pre-tax cash flow or the tax cash flow of the individual security. While
it may be possible to estimate the expected cash flow of the market portfolio, its
variance and the price of the market portfolio from historical data, the calculation
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of the required covariances will confront practitioners with material problems as
none of the values are observable.









. In our return equation, E[τ̃j] is an addition to the pre-tax re-
turn due to the uncertainty regarding future tax payments. If taxes were certain,
E[τ̃j] = rf would be true. However, as the variance-covariance risk increases, the
price for the tax cash flows decreases, which in turn increases E[τ̃j].
For the calculation of E[τ̃j], the expected tax cash flow as well as its price is






Beta factors In the model presented in this section, the beta factor is split into two
components: the covariance risk of the market portfolio with the pre-tax return,
and the tax return. Here, one has to remember that β reflects the covariance of
the pre-tax return with the post-tax return of the market portfolio, and hence
it is not equal to the beta factor used in the classical CAPM, which reflects the
covariance risk of the post-tax return with the post-tax return of the market
portfolio.
For the calculation of the cost of capital using the classical CAPM, the beta factor
is calculated based on observed market data. Here, neither the factors necessary
to calculate β nor those necessary to calculate βτ are observable. Therefore, it is
not clear how the beta factors could be estimated.
One appealing feature of the CAPM, and probably the reason for its widespread use
in practice, is that only the expected return of the market portfolio and its variance
as well as the covariance of the return of the market portfolio with the return of the
individual security are required as input factors. All these factors can reasonably be
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estimated from historical data. This does not hold true for the parameters required to
calculate the pre-tax discount rate. In practice the application of the model presented
here would therefore require extensive research for the calculation of the parameters
required.
4.4.2 Leverage Risk
In section 4.4.1 we showed how a discount rate before income taxes on the private as
well as the firm level can theoretically be determined. In section 4.3 we identified the
independence of the capital structure as the second requirement of IAS 36 regarding
the discount rate used to calculate the value in use. We additionally argued that the
cost of equity of the fictitiously unlevered firm can be used to fulfill this requirement.
In this section, we want to discuss the question of whether and how the pre-tax cost of
equity from equation 4.4.7 have to be transformed to reflect the pre-tax cost of equity
of the fictitiously unlevered firm.
To calculate the cost of equity of a fictitiously unlevered firm in a post-tax setting,
the cost of equity of the levered firm – determined using the CAPM – is transformed
using the Miles-Ezzell formula or the Modigliani-Miller formula. The transformation
is necessary due to the existence of the tax shield. The cash flows of the levered firm
exceed those of the unlevered firm because the interest payments are tax deductible
and hence they reduce the tax payments. If the lower cash flows of the fictitiously
unlevered firm are discounted, the discount rate has to be transformed to incorporate
this fact. This transformation is usually called unlevering.
IAS 36 requires the calculation of the value in use on a pre-tax basis. Hence, the
present value of the future pre-tax cash flows X̃j has to be determined. However, if the
cash flows of a levered firm differ from those of an unlevered firm only by the tax cash
flows (which are lower for the levered firm), then the pre-tax cash flows of a levered
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firm and those of an unlevered firm have to be identical. The tax shield thus has to be
contained in T (X̃j). From this, it follows that a transformation of the cost of equity is
superfluous in the pre-tax setting. Rather, to fulfill all the requirements of IAS 36, it
would be suitable to calculate the pre-tax discount rate according to equation 4.4.7.
We want to emphasize that this does not mean that we operate in a world without
taxes, in which the capital structure has no influence on the value in use. Rather, we
work in a world with taxes and therefore we have derived a formula for the calculation
of a pre-tax discount rate in section 4.4.1. The fact that unlevering is not necessary is
due to the requirement of IAS 36.50 to consider only the pre-tax cash flows – which
are not influenced by the capital structure.
4.5 Summary and Conclusion
In this study we analyze the requirements of IAS 36 regarding the discount rate that
has to be used to calculate the value in use. Despite the fact that the rules of IAS 36
contain several requirements that are theoretically interesting and confront the practice
with unsolved problems, theoretical discussion is scarce. We identified two requirements
that are most appealing: the independence of the capital structure and the requirement
to use a pre-tax rate.
IAS 36 requires the use of a discount rate that is independent of the capital struc-
ture and, at the same time, presents the WACC as a suitable starting point for the
derivation. Modigliani and Miller (1958) proved that in a world without taxes, the
WACC as well as the market value of the firm are independent of the capital structure.
However, as we are not in a world without taxes, the use of WACC does not fulfill the
requirement of a discount rate that is independent of the capital structure. Rather, the
cost of equity of a fictitiously unlevered firm should be used, as this is not influenced
by the capital structure. We do not see a conflict with the specifications of IAS 36,
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as independence of the capital structure is an explicit requirement while the WACC is
only given as one potential starting point.
Regarding the calculation of a pre-tax discount rate, IAS 36 argues that the value
in use calculated by discounting the post-tax cash flows with a post-tax discount rate
should usually equal the value in use calculated by discounting the pre-tax cash flows
with a pre-tax discount rate. From this it follows that the pre-tax discount rate can be
iteratively determined from the post-tax rate. In fact, such a relation exists only if a
special tax system applies, i.e. one that is neutral with regard to different investment
alternatives. This is not the case in any European country. Hence, the pre-tax rate
cannot be derived from the post-tax rate. We interpret IAS 36 as entailing the require-
ment to use a discount rate that is not influenced by income taxes, either on the private
or the firm level. The result of the classical CAPM as well as of the Tax-CAPMs are
discount rates after taxes on the firm level. We derive a variation of the CAPM that is
theoretically suited to the calculation of a discount rate before income taxes on both
levels.
As only the cash flows before taxes have to be considered in the calculation of the
value in use, unlevering is not necessary. Nevertheless, the practical use of the model
derived in this study is questionable. While it is theoretically suited to fulfill all the
requirements of IAS 36, the derivation of all parameters necessary to calculate the pre-
tax rate will necessitate material further research. Additionally, as several previous
authors have argued, the pre-tax calculation contradicts the intention of the IASB
to construct an impairment test that reflects the decisional calculus of the rational
investor. Combined with the imponderables related to the practical implementation of
the model derived here, this fact leads to our recommendation to the IASB to revise
the rules concerning the calculation of the value in use. A post-tax calculation would
reduce managerial discretion as well as problems in the practical application.
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Abstract We analyze under which situations it is optimal to opportunistically
delay a fixed asset write-off and when transparent reporting of write-offs is optimal. We
apply a simplified real options approach to find an answer to this question. Therefore,
we analyze two settings, one of which does not allow for reporting discretion while the
other one does. If there is no reporting discretion the expected carrying amount can
be reflected by reducing the carrying amount after depreciation by the payoff of a put
option, with the carrying amount as the strike price and the recoverable amount as
the underlying. If reporting discretion exists regarding the reporting of write-offs, the
payoff the firm earns when the write-off is delayed can be interpreted as the value of
a barrier option with the carrying amount as the barrier and the recoverable amount
as the underlying. We find that the probability that write-offs are delayed increases
with the benefits of earnings management and decreases with the costs of earnings
management and the benefits of transparent reporting.
5.1 Introduction
In 2011 the Vodafone Group Plc recorded a write-off in the amount of EUR 6.2 bn,
which corresponded to about 4 % of their prior year total assets.1 At the same time,
there is a current and widespread discussion about the fact that write-offs are under-
stated and delayed.2 Due to their magnitude and the possibility of material influences
on the stock price, write-offs have been a focus for researchers ever since. Under In-
ternational Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), write-offs have to be recognized
whenever the recoverable amount of the asset under consideration falls below its carry-
ing amount. Hence, write-offs correct for declines in the recoverable amount exceeding
systematic depreciations. In the existing research asset write-offs are often linked to
earnings management. However, to the best of our knowledge the circumstances under
which managers decide to apply earnings management in the write-off decision have
not been analyzed until now. In this study we examine the write-off decision using a
simplified real options approach, which enables us to identify the circumstances under
which it is optimal to apply earnings management. Our findings should be of interest
to market participants, international standard setting boards and enforcement institu-
tions, since they can be used as the basis for a strategy to decrease the use of earnings
management in the write-off of fixed assets.
Earnings management is usually defined as the attempt to manage reported earnings
to receive a specific goal.3 Similarly, for the purposes of this paper, we define earnings
1See Vodafone Group Plc (2011), pp.80–81.
2In his speech at the IAAER conference in Amsterdam 2012, the chairman of the International Ac-
counting Standards Board (IASB) Hans Hoogervorst stated that the impairment test often comes
too late; see Hoogervorst (2012). Similarly, a recent survey by the European Securities and Markets
Authority (ESMA) found that goodwill write-offs do not seem to reflect the effects of the financial
and economic crises appropriately; see ESMA (2013)
3See, for example, Fields, Lys and Vincent (2001) and Healy and Wahlen (1999).
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management as follows:
“Earnings management occurs whenever a firm reports numbers that devi-
ate from the best estimate.”
It is important to recognize that this definition does not necessitate information asym-
metries. Even though a firm will not engage in earnings management without expecting
benefits, it will suffice if not all market participants are willing to undo the effects of
earnings management.4 Still, for the possibility of earnings management to arise a
necessary condition is that there must be room for judgment. Regarding asset write-
offs, it is usually argued that managerial discretion arises either because of missing
accounting rules or because existing accounting rules refer to unobservable measures.5
In this paper we analyze write-offs in the special setting of IFRS.6 IAS 36 Impairment
of Assets gives specific instructions regarding the timing and valuation of fixed asset
write-offs. Managerial discretion therefore arises from the lack of observability of the
employed accounting measures. We argue that even though there are no information
asymmetries, managerial discretion in the preparation of financial statements exists
regarding the reporting of write-offs.
In the existing research, there is an ongoing debate on the so-called depreciation
problem. Jackson (1911) described this problem as the necessity to accumulate reserves
during the useful life of a fixed asset so as to be able to replace it at the end of its
useful life. In more recent research, the accounting and the economic approach to
the depreciation problem have been distinguished. While the accounting approach
requires the distribution of the depreciation amount over the useful life in a systematic
4See Fields, Lys and Vincent (2001).
5See, for example, Zucca and Campbell (1992), Riedl (2004).
6Due to the general setting of the model applied our findings are equally valid for the write-off decision
under similar accounting rules such as US GAAP.
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and rational manner to match income and expenses for each asset, the aim of the
economic approach is to reflect the “true” depreciation.7 The rationale behind the
economic approach to the depreciation problem is that, from a financial management
perspective, the depreciations should provide useful information for optimal investment
decision making. The accounting depreciation usually does not fulfill this requirement.8
From the accounting approach, research concerning the optimal depreciation choice to
minimize taxes evolved.9 For the analysis at hand we assume the depreciation method
to be externally given. Hence, we do not provide further insights into the depreciation
problem analyzing the write-off decision under fixed depreciations.
Goex and Wagenhofer (2009) use a game theoretical approach to show that con-
servative accounting – which they identify by the recognition of write-offs in contrast
to revaluations – is the optimal accounting system if lenders have to construct debt
contracts based on the accounting information. We do not consider debt contracts,
instead analyzing the decision to immediately recognize write-offs or to delay them
opportunistically given specific payoffs for earnings management.
Empirical studies on asset write-offs focus on two main issues. First, they analyze
which determinants influence the decision to write off and the amount that is written
off and second, they look into the capital market’s reaction to the recorded write-offs.
The approach of those studies that analyze the determinants of fixed asset write-offs
is to define situations in which earnings management is expected to arise (e.g. years in
which the management changed or years in which the company is in danger of breaching
covenants from credit agreements) and thus to analyze whether write-offs are recognized
7See, for example, Wright (1964).
8See, for example, Kim and Moore (1988) and Eichin and Schneeweiss (2001).
9See, for example, Landskroner and Levy (1979), Berg, Waegenaere and Wielhouwer (2001) and Kulp
and Hartman (2011).
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more often or are of a higher magnitude in these periods. Early empirical studies
from Elliott and Shaw (1988), Zucca and Campbell (1992) and Cotter, Stokes and
Wyatt (1998) show that write-offs are regularly recognized in periods that coincide with
managerial incentives. However, more recent studies from Francis, Hanna and Vincent
(1996), Riedl (2004) and Beatty and Weber (2006) show that it is not only earnings
management but also declines in asset values that are related to write-offs, which
raises the question of when write-offs are driven by asset impairment and when it is
earnings management that motivates the write-off. Recent studies from Minnick (2011)
and AbuGhazaleh, Al-Hares and Roberts (2011) include corporate governance in their
estimations and find that better governed companies are less likely to apply earnings
management in the write-off decision, presumably because they have a lower expected
use of earnings management. Concerning the capital market reaction, differing results
have been found. Elliott and Hanna (1996) and Francis, Hanna and Vincent (1996)
find a significant negative capital market reaction to write-offs. However, Elliott and
Shaw (1988) and Alciatore, Easton and Spear (2000) show that the decrease in stock
prices precedes the write-off, indicating that the capital market participants anticipate
the loss. Finally, Minnick (2011) shows that the market reacts positively to write-offs
that reflect asset impairment (which we will term transparent write-offs from now on),
while negative abnormal returns follow opportunistic write-offs. Similar results have
been found by Keung, Lin and Shih (2010), who show that the capital market punishes
earnings management. The finding that capital market participants anticipate write-
offs and see through earnings management supports our assumption that there are no
information asymmetries.
While empirical studies have shown that earnings management is an important de-
terminant of fixed asset write-offs, they cannot give a definitive answer to the question
of when a firm chooses to apply earnings management. We argue that if managerial
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discretion exists regarding the recognition of write-offs the firm has the option to delay
the write-off. We interpret this option as a real option and thus apply a simplified
real options approach. The intention of this paper is to analyze under which circum-
stances transparent write-offs are a firm’s optimal choice and when it is optimal to
opportunistically delay write-offs.
Since the seminal works of Majd and Pindyck (1987) and McDonald and Siegel
(1986) real options have played an important part in decision analysis and have fre-
quently been applied in investment decision theory. A recent application is that by
Mölls and Schild (2012). For the analysis in this paper we apply the technique to
solve one important accounting problem and hence gather some valuable insights into
certain key questions in accounting research.
We analyze two different settings. In the first setting, there is no discretion; if
the asset is impaired a write-off is immediately recognized. We show that even in
this simple setting the consideration of the potential write-off in future periods has a
material effect on the expected carrying amount. More specifically, we show that the
reduction of the carrying amount due to the possible write-off can be interpreted as the
payoff of a short put option. We derive a valuation formula which is straightforward
under these preconditions.
In the second setting, we introduce discretion regarding the recognition of write-offs.
In particular, we assume that if the asset is impaired the firm has the option to delay
the write-off. We show that the value of delaying the write-off can be interpreted as
a down-and-in call with the carrying amount in the next period as the barrier. We
derive a valuation formula for this barrier option, which is different to a typical barrier
option in several ways. We find that the value of delaying the write-off increases
with the benefits and decreases with the costs related to this earnings management.
Additionally, we show that the payoff for transparent reporting also increases the value
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of the option, which is probably the most surprising result. Sensitivity analyses for the
determinants of the decision to delay the write-off are presented.
The paper is organized as follows. In the following section we present our basic as-
sumptions. Section 5.3 derives the expected value of an asset if there is no possibility
to manage earnings. In section 5.4, earnings management is introduced and the opti-
mal decision of the firm in an earnings management setting is analyzed. Section 5.5
summarizes our findings and concludes.
5.2 General Assumptions
In this section we turn our attention to some assumptions which are necessary for
developing a computational simple model for the problem outlined above. We consider
a firm that publishes annual statements in accordance with IFRS every year. The time
interval [0, T ] consists of N years, 0, 1, 2, ..., t, t + 1, t + 2, ..., t + N = T , where
each year can be partitioned in n periods of equal length. One period could thereby
describe a quarter of a year, for example. In order to provide closed-form solutions we
will focus on the discussion of two arbitrary points in time.
The firm makes an investment in an asset (factory, equipment etc.) with a volume
of Is in period s, with s < t. We assume an arbitrage-free capital market, and that
all cash flows regarding the firm can be replicated by buying or selling traded assets.10
These assumptions imply an important precondition for our analysis: the existence
of a risk-neutral probability measure Q, which is equivalent to the real or subjective
probability measure. This probability measure is one of the main findings in asset
pricing.11 In simplified terms, asset pricing under the risk-neutral probability measure
10This assumption, called “spanning” is quite usual in finance theory. For the conditions necessary,
see, for example, Duffie and Huang (1985).
11For an intensive treatment, see, for example, Harrison and Kreps (1979) or Shreve (2004).
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is performed by adjusting the probabilities of all possible future states such that they
incorporate investors’ preferences. This enables us to determine the present value of
any kind of asset by using the risk-free rate. In addition, we assume the risk-free rate
rf to stay constant.
The valuation of the asset for the purpose of financial reporting follows the IFRS.
According to IAS 16 Property, Plant and Equipment,12 the initial carrying amount
CAs of the asset equals the investment volume, CAs = Is. Assuming that the firm
applies the cost model for measurement after recognition, the carrying amount of the
asset has to be decreased each period by a depreciation D and, if applicable, a write-off
WO. Assuming that straight-line depreciation is used, the carrying amount has to
be decreased by a constant depreciation each year until the carrying amount equals
the expected residual value RV at the end of the useful life UL. The useful life of
the investment is assumed to be UL = T − s. For simplicity, but without loss of
generality, the residual value is assumed to be zero, RV = 0. This implies constant
annual depreciations of D = Is
UL
.
According to the rules of IAS 36 an asset has to be tested for impairment annually.
We assume that the test is performed at the end of the year. The asset is said to
be impaired whenever the recoverable amount is below the carrying amount. The
recoverable amount is defined to be the higher value of the fair value less costs to sell
and the value in use.13 This definition represents the decisional calculus of a rational
investor to sell the asset if this brings higher returns than the internal use of the asset.
12Conceptually comparable regulations are valid for most intangible assets according to IAS 38 In-
tangible Assets.
13IAS 36 presents detailed rules for how to derive the fair value less costs to sell and the value in use.
In short, the fair value less costs to sell shall reflect the market price of the asset, and the value in
use is the present value of the future cash flows expected to be derived from the further internal use
of the asset.
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If the asset is impaired, a write-off has to be recognized and the carrying amount has
to be decreased to the recoverable amount. Throughout our analysis we assume that
no write-off has to be recognized before t. Hence, without considering write-offs the
carrying amount evolves as follows:




According to equation 5.2.1, CAt depends on deterministic variables only, and thus is
deterministic itself.
In contrast to the value of CAt the value of RAt is an uncertain quantity in t− 1. A
well-known assumption for modeling the future price (or market value) of an asset is the
Geometric Brownian motion (GBM), originally used by Merton (1973b) and Black and
Scholes (1973) to model the random behavior of stock prices. In the case of a single
asset it is useful to directly model its market value.14 Even though the recoverable
amount does not reflect a single market value we assume for simplicity that the higher
amount of a market-oriented value and the value in use follows a discrete approximation
of a GBM.15 Figure 5.1 depicts an exemplary pathway of the carrying amount without
consideration of write-offs and the recoverable amount following a GBM with a drift
of −0.05, which is equal to the depreciation rate applied to the carrying amount, and
a variance of 0.2.
In order to provide a convenient and simple model we assume a recombining binomial
lattice for the discrete approximation of the GBM as developed by Cox, Ross and
14See, for example, Majd and Pindyck (1987) and recently Mölls and Schild (2012). Furthermore,
Merton (1973a) assumes that the market prices of all assets follow a GBM.
15A more detailed assumption could be that the fair value less costs to sell and the value in use
follow two separate GBMs. In this case, the recoverable amount would follow a bivariate normal
distribution. We believe that this approach, despite being more detailed, would give no further
material insights into the questions we want to analyze.
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Figure 5.1: Recoverable amount and carrying amount
Rubinstein (1979).16 Due to the fact that accounting figures are published at specific
time intervals (annually, semi-annually etc.) it is valid to perform a model analysis in
discrete time. This approach is often used in real options or decision-tree analysis.17
As depicted in Figure 5.2, the recoverable amount RAt at each node either increases
by an upward-movement u with probability pu,t or decreases by a downward-movement
d with probability pd,t = 1 − pu,t. This implies that the recoverable amounts of two
subsequent periods t and t+ 1 have the following relationship:
RAt+1 =
 RAt · u, in the case of an up-movement in t+ 1,RAt · d, in the case of a down-movement in t+ 1. (5.2.2)
According to these preliminary considerations the expected recoverable amount can
be calculated as follows:
16For a generalization see Nelson and Ramaswamy (1990).
17See, for example, Brandao, Dyer and Hahn (2005).
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Et [RAt+1] = pu,t · u · RAt + pd,t · d · RAt
= (pu,t(u− d) + d)RAt.
(5.2.3)
The extended version of equation 5.2.3 for the consideration of N periods is given
by:







pku,t · pN−kd,t · u
k · dN−k · RA0, (5.2.4)
where N is the number of periods and j is the number of up-movements.









5.3 Immediate Write-Off: The Case without Earnings Management
5.3.1 Calculation of the expected Carrying Amount
Following the rules of IAS 36, an asset is said to be impaired when its recoverable
amount RAt falls below its carrying amount CAt – hence if RAt < CAt. In this
case, a write-off has to be recognized to reduce the carrying amount of the asset to
the recoverable amount. The setting for this section is depicted by the timeline in
Figure 5.3.
Figure 5.3: Timeline for immediate write-off







These preconditions imply that in an arbitrary period t, with s < t, the carrying
amount of the asset after write-off, CA∗t , can be determined by:
CA∗t = min(CAt; RAt)
CA∗t = CAt −max(0; CAt − RAt),
(5.3.1)
where −max(0; CAt − RAt) states a payoff that is well known in option theory and
can be interpreted as a short put option.
A put option is a (financial) contract that gives the holder (long position) the right
to sell the underlying asset at the strike price at maturity to the writer (short position).
(The holder of the put exercises the option at maturity when the current price of the
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underlying exceeds the strike price). In the described case, the holder of the put is the
environment or the standard setter, the short position is held by the firm, the variable
CAt in the max-function can be interpreted as the strike price and the recoverable
amount RAt is the underlying asset. This implies that (under perfect conditions) the
environment exercises the above stated put option as soon as RAt < CAt and thereby
enforces a write-off at the firm level that is equivalent to:
WOt = CAt − RAt. (5.3.2)
As the recoverable amount is stochastic, the carrying amount after write-offs cannot be
predicted with certainty. Nevertheless, the relation described by equation 5.3.1 enables
us to calculate the expected future carrying amount as follows:
E[CA∗t ] = E[CAt −max(0; CAt − RAt)]
E[CA∗t ] = CAt − E[max(0; CAt − RAt)]
(5.3.3)
Under the assumption that RA evolves according to equation 5.2.2 as depicted in Figure
5.2, the present value of the max-function reflecting the payoff of the put option can
be calculated under the binomial probability distribution.
Following Cox, Ross and Rubinstein (1979), as a first step, the Q-probabilities have
to be determined based on u, d and rf according to:
qu =
1 + rf − d
u− d
qd =
u− (1 + rf )
u− d
with qu + qd = 1.
(5.3.4)
As a second step, these Q-probabilities have to be used to calculate the expected payoff
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d ·max(0; CAt − RAt−1 · u
k · dn−k). (5.3.5)
Here, n is the number of subperiods and k is the number of up-movements. As EQ[Pt]
is the expected value under the risk-neutral probability measure, in the third step, rf
has to be applied to calculate the present value:




This present value under the risk-neutral probability measure equals the present value
under the subjective probability measure. Now, to calculate the expected carrying
amount in t considering a possible write-off in t we have to combine the findings of
equations 5.2.1, 5.3.3, 5.3.5 and 5.3.6:
EP[CA
∗
t ] = CAt−1 −
Is
T − s
− EQ,t−1[Pt] · (1 + r), (5.3.7)
where r represents the risk-equivalent cost of capital.
5.3.2 Example without Earnings Management
In the example for the immediate write-off we consider a quarterly estimation of the
recoverable amount and therefore assume that RA follows a five-step binomial lattice
as depicted in Figure 5.4. The first step represents RAt, the recoverable amount today,
and the last step represents RAt+1, the recoverable amount next year. This setting
conforms to the assumption of the preparation of quarterly reports.
Using this binomial lattice and the equation given in 5.3.7 we are able to determine
the expected book value of the asset considering a possible write-off in t + 1. To
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apply the risk-neutral valuation method we first need to find the Q-probabilities and
the expected payoff in all possible states in t + 1. The assumed parameters and the
calculations are given in Table 5.1.
We see that the put option has a payoff that deviates from zero only for less than
three up-movements, as only in these cases is the recoverable amount below the carrying
amount in t + 1. Nevertheless, the expected book value considering a possible write-
off in t + 1 amounts to 103, as opposed to the expected carrying amount without
consideration of write-offs in equation 5.2.1, where it amounts to 120.
This finding could be of real interest to financial analysts, who try to predict earnings
figures on the basis of the carrying amount of fixed assets deployed in the production
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Table 5.1: Parameters and calculations: Example without earnings management
Assumed parameters :
u = 1.25 d = 1
u
= 0.8 rf = 0.04 RAt = 115
Is = 200 UL = 10 CAt = 140 ∆t =
1
4
n = 4 r = 0.15
Development of the carrying amount :




1.25−0.8 = 0.53 qd =
1.25−(1+0.04)
1.25−0.8 = 0.47
State-dependent values of the put option in t+ 1:
Puuuu = max[120− 285.61; 0] = 0 Puuud = max[120− 197.73; 0] = 0
Puudd = max[120− 136.89; 0] = 20 Puddd = max[120− 94.77; 0] = 56
Pdddd = max[120− 65.61; 0] = 79.04





























Expected value of the put option under the risk-neutral probability measure:
EQ[Pt+1] = 1 · 0.534 · 0 + 4 · 0.533 · 0.47 · 0 + 6 · 0.532 · 0.472 · 5
+4 · 0.53 · 0.473 · 46.40 + 1 · 0.474 · 72.90 = 15.38
Expected carrying amount in t+ 1:
EP[CA
∗
t+1] = 140− 20010 −
15.38
1.04
· 1.15 = 103
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process. From the simple example presented here we see that if the possibility of a
future write-off is not considered, material distortions in the forecast may arise.
5.4 The Firm’s optimal Decision: Earnings Management
5.4.1 The Option to delay Write-Offs
In this section we discuss the more realistic scenario wherein discretion does exist
regarding the reporting of the recoverable amount. We will show how the firm (or the
firm’s manager) will optimally choose in the best interest of the firm’s shareholders18
whether to immediately recognize or delay the write-off if the asset is impaired.
We start our model analysis by stating some assumptions regarding investors’ infor-
mation about the recoverable amount. Primarily, we assume all investors have access to
the same information about the current value of RA. This assumption is supported by
the fact that empirical studies find that stock prices decrease before write-offs are an-
nounced.19 Nevertheless, we assume that discretion exists with respect to its reporting.
In addition, we assume that no discretion exists if the asset is not impaired.
The implementation of earnings management in our setting is straightforward; as
depicted in Figure 5.5, the firm has the possibility to immediately recognize the write-
off in t as described in section 5.3, or to delay the write-off until the next annual
reporting in t + 1. As opposed to section 5.3, the analysis in this section includes the
period t+ 1. The timeline for this section is depicted in Figure 5.6.
Let us first discuss the immediate write-off in t. If the firm immediately recognizes
18The assumption of a manager who acts in shareholders’ best interests has a long tradition in the
real options setting: see, for example, Myers (1977). Even though alternative assumptions are used
in the well-developed body of research regarding investment decisions and capital structure (see,
for example, Andrikopoulos (2009) and Huang, Huang and Shih (2012)) we use this simplifying
assumption to examine the basic features of the real option to write off.
19See, for example, Elliott and Shaw (1988) and Alciatore, Easton and Spear (2000).
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Figure 5.6: Timeline for write-offs with earnings management
s t t+ 1 T ∞





of CAt and RAt
and on the relation
of GG and EM
End of
useful life
the write-off we assume that it realizes a certain payoff of GG as reward for transparent
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reporting.20 This reward may result from better relations with suppliers and customers
and might, for example, arise if these groups choose their business ties based on the
degree of transparency in the reporting of potential business partners. A company
with better relations with its suppliers and customers will probably realize lower costs
of production and higher margins in asset sales compared to a company with worse
relations, which increases the free cash flows and, hence, the firm value.
For the case that the firm delays the write-off until t + 1 we have to consider two
further scenarios, depending on the value of RA. The recoverable amount evolves
between t and t+ 1 according to the binomial process given in equation (5.2.2) and as
depicted in Figure 5.2. This implies that the value of RAt+1 is an uncertain quantity
in t. The two scenarios are:
The recoverable amount exceeds the carrying amount (RAt+1 > CAt+1):
A write-off is no longer necessary and the firm realizes a payoff of (1+rf )GG. This
case might occur if the difference in the value has been eroded by depreciation or
if the recoverable amount has increased since t. Assuming this payoff assures that
the firm is indifferent between the two reporting strategies of immediate write-off
and no write-off if it is only temporary. By not recognizing a temporary write-off,
the firm has proven itself to be far-sighted. With the information available in
t+ 1 the decision to delay the write-off in t is ex-post a correct one. In the long
run, a write-off has not been necessary; this anticipation is rewarded by a higher
payoff in t+ 1.
20We assume that the recognition of the write-off loss itself has no influence on the firm value. This
is consistent with the assumption that all market participants are able to estimate the recoverable
amount. Under this assumption, a decrease in the recoverable amount can have an influence on the
firm value, but the mere reporting of it will not.
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The recoverable amount is below the carrying amount (RAt+1 < CAt+1):
A write-off is still necessary. Again, two cases might occur: The firm either
decides to catch up on the write-off or to delay the write-off again. If the write-
off is recognized then the firm immediately realizes the payoff αGG. This implies
that a one-period delay of the write-off is still considered a transparent action
by market participants, but there is a certain discount α with 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 for the
delayed reporting. In the other case the firm realizes a payoff EM(RA), which is
defined as a function of the stochastic variable RA. This payoff requires a more
detailed analysis.
If the firm has chosen to delay the write-off in t, with the recoverable amount
subsequently still being below the carrying amount in t+1, and if the firm chooses
to further delay the write-off in t + 1, then we assume that the following payoff
is realized:
EM(RA) = EM+ − EM−(CAt+1 − RAt+1). (5.4.1)
This payoff is composed of two parts since we assume that there are benefits as
well as costs associated with earnings management.
The firm receives benefits amounting to EM+. EM+ is a positive and certain
quantity that reflects the firm- and industry-specific benefits that can be realized
from earnings management. Hence, the benefits from earnings management in
t + 1 are a certain quantity from the perspective of t. Benefits from earnings
management may, for example, result from reduced interest or from positively
influencing the outcome of other contracts that refer to the reported profit. Lower
interest could result from, for example, credit agreements that relate interest
rates to accounting figures. Another possibility is that credit agreements contain
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covenants that require immediate redemption if certain accounting figures fall
below or rise above a given threshold.
As all market participants are able to estimate the recoverable amount as well as
the manager can, they cannot be misled. Rather, they can identify the earnings
management and punish the firm for it.
We assume that due to this punishment the firm value is reduced by EM−(CAt+1−
RAt+1), where EM
− is positive and known with certainty. The total costs of earn-
ings management are proportional to the managed amount and hence uncertain
from the perspective t. Punishments may include higher interest, worse relations
with suppliers or customers or even costs resulting from punishment through
enforcement mechanisms.21
Taken together, the payoff of the firm if the write-off is delayed in t + 1 can be
described as follows:
BOt+1 =
 (1 + rf )GG, if RAt+1 > CAt+1,max(αGG; EM), if RAt+1 < CAt+1, (5.4.2)
where BOt+1 is the payoff in t+ 1. Inserting the definition of the payoff in the case
where the firm again delays the write-off in t+ 1 from equation 5.4.1 we can transform
this to:
21Enforcement mechanisms are usually deployed in principal-agent settings, which we explicitly do
not consider here. Additionally we do not install a clear distinction between earnings management
within the regulatory range and fraud. Punishment by enforcement mechanisms can by definition
occur only in the latter case. We do not want to delve deeper into this theme, but it should still be














, if RAt+1 < CAt+1.
(5.4.3)
This is a barrier option-like payoff which can be interpreted as a down-and-in call.
Remember that rf , CAt+1, GG, EM
+ and EM− are deterministic and only RAt+1 is





, the barrier is CAt+1.
5.4.2 The Value of the Write-Off Option
Pricing of barrier options in discrete time is complicated by the fact that, besides
the number of paths that terminate in the money, the number of those paths that
additionally cross the barrier has to be determined. Fortunately, closed-form solutions
for the valuation of barrier options in discrete time already exist.22 Nevertheless, there
are some special features that have to be taken into account in the considered setting.
As described in section 5.2, an impairment test has to be conducted annually. Each
year consists of n periods and the recoverable amount evolves in these periods according
to equation 5.2.2. A write-off has to be recognized only if the recoverable amount is
below the carrying amount at the time the impairment test is conducted, which is at
the end of the year. In contrast to the usual barrier options, the firm will not receive
the payoff if the recoverable amount falls below the carrying amount at some point
during the year but is above the carrying amount at year-end.
22See Levitan, Mitchell and Taylor (2003).
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In the context of the valuation of the barrier option this is a simplification. While
the order of the up- and down-movements usually has to be considered to identify
the number of paths that crossed the barrier during the year, we have to consider the
total number of up- and down-movements only. In fact, as we define d = 1
u
, we can
rewrite the value of the recoverable amount at the end of the year RA · uk · dn−k as
RA · dn−2k = RA · dx, where x is the net number of down-movements at the end of the
year, and this is the only number that we have to consider to ensure that the option is
in the money and that the barrier is breached at year-end.
From the Appendix C.1, the pricing formula is given by:




























































































































































































































The case differentiation is necessary so as to correctly distinguish the different outcomes
and prevent double counting.
The first summation in the pricing formula covers the paths for which the barrier is not
breached at the year-end, the second summation reflects those paths in which the barrier
is breached and the option to further delay the write-off is in the money, and the third
summation contains those paths for which the barrier is breached at the year-end and the
option to further delay the write-off is out of the money.
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5.4.3 Example with Earnings Management
The setting for this example is equal to the one considered in the example without earnings
management in section 5.3.2, but now we introduce reporting discretion. Hence, if the re-
coverable amount is below the carrying amount at the end of t + 1, the firm has the option
to either further delay the write-off and receive EM or to recognize the write-off and receive
αGG. If the recoverable amount is above the carrying amount in t+ 1 the company receives
(1 + rf )GG. The evolution of RA and the barrier given by CAt+1 are depicted in Figure 5.7.






















To determine the expected output for each possible state we first have to calculate the
borders of x, a and b. The assumed parameters and the calculations are given in Table 5.2.
We see that only if x = 0, in the case of two up- and two down-movements, is the recoverable
amount below the barrier CAt+1 and the option to delay the write-off is in the money. If
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Table 5.2: Parameters and calculations: Example with earnings management
Assumed parameters:
u = 1.25 d = 1u = 0.8 rf = 0.04 RAt = 115




Development of the carrying amount :




1.25−0.8 = 0.53 qd =
1.25−(1+0.04)
1.25−0.8 = 0.47
Assumed parameters for the payoffs:
GG = 5 α = 0.9 EM+ = 20 EM− = 2







ln 0.8 = −0.19 b =
ln( 112.25115 )
ln 0.8 = 0.11
State-dependent values of the put option in t+ 1:
Puuuu = (1 + 0.4) · 5 = 5.20 Puuud = (1 + 0.4) · 5 = 5.20
Puudd = 0.9 · 5 + 2 · (115− 112.25) = 10
Puddd = 0.9 · 5 = 4.50 Pdddd = 0.9 · 5 = 4.50


































Expected value of the barrier option under the risk-neutral probability measure:
EQ[BOt+1] = 1 · 0.534 · 5.20 + 4 · 0.533 · 0.47 · 5.20 + 6 · 0.532 · 0.472 · 10
+4 · 0.53 · 0.473 · 4.50 + 1 · 0.474 · 4.50 = 6.80
Value of the barrier option in t:
BOt =
1
1+0.04 · 6.80 = 6.54
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x > 0, RAt+1 > CAt+1 and the firm receives (1 + rf )GG. If x < 0, the option is out of the
money and the firm receives αGG. The final value of the barrier option amounts to 6.54.
5.4.4 The Decision to delay the Write-Off
We now want to turn our attention to the question of when the firm decides to delay the
write-off. We start with the decision in t+ 1 and subsequently analyze the setting in t.
In t + 1 the firm will decide to further delay the write-off whenever αGG < EM. Using
equation 5.4.1 this can be transformed into αGG < EM+ − EM−(CAt+1 − RAt+1). If this
relation holds, we say that the option is in the money. Remember that as we have a barrier
option, the firm will have the opportunity to exercise the option only if RAt+1 < CAt+1.
However, if this relation holds, the following is true for the probability that the option to
further delay the write-off is exercised:
α(−), GG(−), EM+(+), EM−(−), CAt+1(−), RAt+1(−). (5.4.4)
The intuition behind the fact that the probability of the option exercise decreases in α
and GG is that the payoff which the firm receives when the option is not exercised can be
interpreted as opportunity costs. These costs increase as α or GG increase. As the probability
that the option is exercised decreases in the opportunity costs, it decreases in α and GG.
Similarly, as EM+ increases, the benefit from earnings management increases, which in turn
increases the probability that the option is exercised. The costs of further delaying the write-
off increase in EM−, reducing the probability of the option exercise taking place. The same is
true for CAt+1−RAt+1. The costs of earnings management depend on the managed amount.
Hence, for the opportunity to exercise the option the difference must be positive, but the
probability that the option is exercised is larger the smaller this difference is, this is, the
smaller CAt+1 and the larger RAt+1.
In t, the firm will decide to delay the write-off whenever GG < BOt. For the value of the
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barrier option BOt, as given by equation C.1.6, the following is true:
rf (−), α(+), GG(+), EM+(+), EM−(−), d(+/−), CAt+1(+/−). (5.4.5)
It is important to consider that the value of the barrier option comprises the payoffs for all
three cases depicted in equation C.1.5, which helps us to make better sense of the signs given
in equation 5.4.5. The intuition behind them is as follows: rf gives the time preference. As
rf increases, payoffs in t are relatively more appreciated than those in t+ 1. As the payoff of
the barrier option is received in t+ 1, its value decreases in rf .
α increases the payoff the firm receives if the barrier is breached but the option is not
exercised, and thereby increases the value of the option. GG increases the payoff the firm
receives if the barrier is not breached as well as the payoff the firm receives if the barrier is
breached but the option is not exercised. Note that GG has no influence on the payoff the
firm receives if the option is exercised. Regarding GG, it is important to consider that, even
though the value of the barrier option increases with increasing GG, the probability that the
firm delays the write-off in t is decreased with increasing GG. This is due to the fact that the
opportunity costs (which are given here by GG) increase even more in GG. Because GG does
not influence all payoffs and because there is compensation for the time preference only if the
barrier is not breached in t + 1, a one-unit increase in GG will lead to a less than one-unit
increase in BOt, reducing the probability that GG < BOt, which is the necessary condition
for the firm to delay the write-off in t.
As described above, the probability that the option to further delay the write-off is exercised
in t + 1 increases in EM+. Because the payoff the firm receives if the option is exercised
exceeds the payoff the firm receives if the option is not exercised, the value of the barrier
option in t increases as the probability that the option to further delay the write-off in t+ 1
increases. Hence, BOt increases in EM
+. Similarly, because an increase in EM− decreases
the probability that the option to further delay the write-off in t + 1 is exercised, the value
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of the barrier option in t decreases in EM−.
The changes to BOt in d and CAt+1 are not straightforward to describe. The sensitivity
of BOt with respect to u =
1
d is depicted in Figure 5.8. Changes in d change the evolution of
RAt+1 as well as the Q-probabilities. Due to the change in the Q-probabilities, the value of
the barrier has its maximum at qu = qd at about u = 1.3. If u is decreased and d increased
from this point, qd increases and the probability that the firm receives αGG increases. As
αGG < (1 + rf )GG, this reduces the option value. The opposite happens if u is increased
and d is decreased. At the same time, when qu or qd approaches zero, the Q-probabilities
for the extreme cases increase but those for the other cases approximate zero, so only one
case has material weights. As qd approaches zero at qu = 1 + rf = 1.04, the curve steeply
decreases to this point (see Figure 5.8). Additionally, if d is increased, the probability that
the covenant is breached increases because RAt+1 is lower, which results in additional paths
in which the option is exercised, increasing the option value. This case is not depicted in
Figure 5.8, because with the given parameters u < 1 + rf would be necessary, which leads to
a negative qd.
The sensitivity of BOt with respect to CAt+1 is presented in Figure 5.9. As discussed above,
the option to further delay the write-off in t + 1 will be exercised only if RAt+1 < CAt+1.
However, the higher the carrying amount the lower the probability that the barrier is not
breached, resulting in a payoff of (1+rf )GG, which is higher than the payoff the firm receives
if the barrier is breached and the option is not exercised, i.e. αGG. This is why the flatter
part of the curve depicted in Figure 5.9 decreases with increasing CAt+1. The peaks result
from the fact that the strike increases in CAt+1, with the consequence that whenever the
carrying amount is just above the recoverable amount at one path, the value of the option is
high because the barrier is breached for this outcome and the strike is relatively low. With
increasing carrying amount the strike increases until the option is not exercised anymore.
Notice that the peaks coincide with the outcomes for RAt+1 as depicted in Figure 5.7.
There are some practical implications that can be deduced from our findings. The values
of rf , d and CAt+1 cannot be affected externally in most cases. However, the values of α, GG,
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Figure 5.8: Sensitivity with respect to u
Figure 5.9: Sensitivity with respect to CAt+1
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EM+, and EM− can. These values reflect how capital market participants react to earnings
management and transparent reporting. Considering the findings reported above, we see that
it is the costs and benefits of earnings management that are the most effective parameters
to prevent earnings management in the write-off decision. Because the benefits from trans-
parent reporting have a positive influence on the value of delaying the write-off, they have
less influence on the probability that write-offs are delayed at the first stage. The existence
of benefits from earnings management crucially depends on contractual outcomes that refer
to accounting numbers. The costs of earnings management can be increased by implement-
ing punishment mechanisms. Therefore, with the implementation of powerful enforcement
mechanisms, a good step in this direction has already been taken.
5.5 Summary
In this paper we provide a theoretical approach to the question of when earnings management
regarding the writing off of fixed assets is optimal. More specifically, we analyze the condi-
tions under which a write-off will be opportunistically delayed and when it is immediately
recognized and transparent reporting is guaranteed. While earnings management regarding
the write-off decision is frequently analyzed empirically, a theoretical framework does not yet
exist.
In our analysis, we apply a simplified real options setting to study the determinants of the
write-off decision. We first examine a setting in which no reporting discretion exists and each
write-off is immediately recognized. We find that the possibility of future write-offs reduces
the expected carrying amount by the value of a put option with the recoverable amount as the
underlying and the carrying amount as the strike price. Subsequently, we analyze a setting
in which reporting discretion exists in a way that allows the firm to delay the write-off in t
and again in t + 1. In this setting, the payoff in t + 1 can be interpreted as the payoff of a
barrier option, particularly a down-and-in call. The firm will only delay the write-off in t if
the value of the barrier option exceeds the payoff that results from immediate recognition of
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the write-off. We provide sensitivity analyses for the determinants of the decision to delay
the write-off in each period.
While those determinants that describe the evolution of the carrying amount and the re-
coverable amount cannot be influenced externally, those that describe the payoffs in all states
can. The payoff the firm receives for transparent reporting is influenced by the assessment of
transparency by market participants and the importance ascribed to it. Similarly, the payoff
the firm receives for earnings management is influenced by the amount of (contractual) out-
comes that can be influenced by earnings management and by the existence and efficiency
of punishment mechanisms. Hence, our results should be of interest to market participants,
standard setters and enforcement institutions alike, as it is a first step on the way to reducing
earnings management in the write-off decision.
The model developed here has the potential for several extensions. From the real options
point of view, the analysis could be transferred to a continuous time setting, the perpetuity
of the option to delay the write-off could be incorporated and a number of further options
to manage earnings using the write-off decision and the respective size could be included.
From an accounting point of view, revaluations could be considered and the payoffs could be
defined differently. A further interesting extension would be to introduce an agency conflict
between the manager and the shareholders of the company by introducing a performance-
based compensation system as Huang, Huang and Shih (2012) did for the analysis of the
optimal investment and financing decision. Furthermore, the setting developed here is not




C.1 Derivation of the pricing formula for the down-and-in call
We consider a down-and-in call with maturity t+ 1, where the period [t; t+ 1] is divided into







and CAt+1 the barrier. For the analysis of a down-and-in call at time t, RAt > CAt+1 is
valid. RA evolves according to equation 5.2.2. The value of RA at time t + 1 is RAt+1 =
RAtu
kdn−k, where k is the number of up-movements. As d = 1u we can write RAt+1 =
RAtd
n−2k = RAtd
x where x = n − 2k denotes the net number of down-movements. If









. If the barrier is not breached at the end of the
year, the firm receives the payoff (1 + rf )GG.
In the case considered here, the barrier is only breached if it is really crossed and not
simply touched. The minimum net number of down-movements a at the end of the year for








































Remember that all parameters of a and b are known in t.














where Ct is the price of the call in t, St−1 is the value of the underlying in t − 1 and K
is the strike price. If a barrier option is considered, the holder will not receive the payoff
of the maximum function in all cases, but only in those cases in which the barrier has been
crossed. In our special case the firm will receive the payoff specified in equation 5.4.3 as the
second case only if the recoverable amount is below the carrying amount at the end of the
year; otherwise, it will receive (1 + rf )GG. Considering the boundaries for x derived above,
this results in the following payoff of the barrier option in t+ 1:
BOt+1 =










, if a < x ≤ b,
αGG, if x > b.
(C.1.4)
Because x = n − 2k evolves in steps of two, we cannot use it as index for the summation.
Hence, we have to calculate the boundaries for the number of up-movements, k. From
x = n− 2k and a < x ≤ b it follows that 12(n− b) ≤ k <
1
2(n− a) has to hold for the barrier
to be breached and the option to terminate in the money. Expressing the boundaries as a
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function of k, we get:
BOt+1 =

(1 + rf )GG, if k ≥ 12(n− a),






)) , if 12(n− b) ≤ k < 12(n− a),
αGG, if k < 12(n− b).
(C.1.5)
For the pricing equation, a case differentiation is necessary to correctly distinguish the
different payoffs. For those cases in which (n−a) or (n−b) is an even integer, the boundaries
have to be chosen manually. In all other cases we can use the ceiling and the floor functions:





























































































































































































































, using only the floor and ceiling functions would lead to double
counting whenever (n − a) or (n − b) is an even integer. As n, a and b are known in t, the
relevant case can therefore easily be chosen.
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